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This thesis demonstrates how theory and praxis may be integrated within a 
postcolonial, or more specifically, anticolonial frame. It argues for the necessity of 
telling, listening and responding to personal narratives as a catalyst for understanding 
the construction of identities and their relationship to place. This is achieved through 
a theorisation of narrative and critique of postcolonialism. Three sites of contestation 
are visited to provide this critique: the “Patterns of Life: The Story of Aboriginal 
People of Western Australia” exhibition at the Perth Museum; a comparison of 
Western Australian legislation that governed the lives of Aboriginal people from 1848 
to the present and, the life story of Alice Nannup; and, an analysis of the Australian 
Institute Judicial Association’s “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar for 
magistrates. Most importantly, this work calls for strategies for negotiating a just basis 
for coexistence between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. 
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This thesis is about the importance of telling and listening to personal stories.  I have 
therefore adopted a methodology and writing style that reflects this, one that embodies 
and grounds these stories within the larger text.  And that consequently requires the 
reader to shift between story and theory until the boundaries between them blur.  As a 
result of this methodology I begin with a story that has been formative for this work 
and my broader academic praxis.  The experience upon which this story reflects 
encouraged me to think and rethink my academic work and to extend it beyond the 
study of texts.  As a result I was privileged to work with and to hear the stories of many 
extraordinary people. 
In October 1991 I was holidaying with friends and staying in Wickham, 1 a 
small town in the Pilbara region of Western Australia.  One Friday night, at about 9 
o'clock, there was a sharp rap on the door.  A woman holding a baby and a young girl 
were standing there.  The woman wanted a place to stay until the white miner she lived 
with, who was drunk, fell asleep.  She came in and as we drank tea and talked she 
explained that he had been beating her and then began to hit her 9-year-old daughter, 
so she had to get out for a while.  As we talked we learnt that she was from the Bunjima 
community at Onslow, some four hundred kilometres south.  She would like to go 
home but could not leave because he had threatened to take the baby, “which was his”, 
if she did so. 
At the time, listening to this woman made me feel exceedingly angry, sad, 
compromised and very ineffectual.  She told her story as one might repeat the events 
of a relatively ‘normal’ day.  The only overt emotion she showed related to her 
daughter being hit that night.  One of my immediate responses was a desire to say “but 
you have rights.  No-one can take your child.”  However, this was not her reality.  
Further, knowledge of one’s rights in itself does not ensure justice.2  Even taking her 
to the Aboriginal Legal Service so that someone could explain her rights would not 
                                                          
1 Wickham is a small town west of Roebourne, built by Hamersly Iron, for miners and their families.  
It allowed people working for the company to be separated from the Aboriginal community at 
Roebourne.  
2 This is discussed in some detail in Chapter Six, which illustrates how liberalism with its emphasis on 
equity, justice equality and rights perpetuates colonialist and inhumane praxis. 
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necessarily be useful.  She still had to go home and confront this man.  For her 
circumstances to change significantly, she needed assistance to leave her current 
situation.  We were visitors and could therefore provide no real help. 
For me this incident raised many issues about social justice and the nature of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships in Australia.  It poignantly demonstrated 
the difference between the potential for justice, as it is embodied within the law, and 
justice as a social reality.3  But it was also something much simpler than that.  I was 
struck by the power of the narratives we tell and listen to each day to influence our 
lives. Too often it is official narratives that are understood as providing the central 
threads of our lives, rather than the personal narratives or their interaction. Importantly, 
this incident also challenged my academic practice and in particular my engagement 
with postcolonial theory. 
Her life as a Bunjima woman meant that she knew many people who had been 
taken from their parents or whom had children taken from them. She was not merely 
being threatened by his power as a man but as a white man, with all its colonial 
implications.  Her knowledge of her rights to her own baby came from the personal 
stories of other Aboriginal people.  It was not just that there was a disjunction between 
personal and official narratives about the rights of mothers.  These were not 
disconnected threads.  The stories she heard were directly related to state legislation, 
particularly the 1905 Act, an official narrative, which had sanctioned the taking of 
children from their families and was still indirectly determining the life of herself and 
her children.  Abolishing that legislation and granting Aboriginal people citizenship in 
19674 did not effectively change this because changes to the official narratives did not 
become part of the weave of her everyday life. 
The significance of personal stories of Indigenous people in Australia and the 
imperative to listen to them has been reinforced in a number of ways this decade.  The 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody called for the personal stories 
of the families of those who had died to be heard and acknowledged by the Australian 
                                                          
3 A more detailed discussion of this event is provided in Kathryn Trees, “The Politics of Post-colonial 
Reading Praxis as they Relate to the Work of Aboriginal Writers”, in Teaching Post-Colonialism and 
Post-Colonial Literatures, Anne Collett, Lars Jensen and Anna Rutherford (eds) Denmark: Aarhus 
University Press, 1997, pp. 155-159.  
4 At the National Media Forum, “Telling Both Stories”, held in Perth on Friday 1996 Michael Mansell 
made the point that Aboriginal people were not allowed to vote at the 1967 referendum that 
determined their citizenship. 
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public and in particular the legal system.  Telling Our Story a report by the Aboriginal 
Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc) on the removal of Aboriginal children from 
their families in Western Australia also attests to the importance of telling and listening 
to personal narratives.  According to Ted Wilkes, President of the Aboriginal Legal 
Service, this report is an official “acknowledgement that in the process of colonisation 
white Australia had cruelly denied generations of Aboriginal children their most 
precious and fundamental right - that of a mother's love and a family's care.”5  Wilkes 
asserts that the stories told, listened to and read are beneficial for both Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people: 
[f]or Aboriginal participants it provides a catharsis for feelings of sorrow 
and rage, and it encourages us to anticipate that, after generations of 
neglect, white Australia is finally prepared to own the shame of its past, 
and to accept the responsibility of effecting real and substantial reparation 
in the future. 
For non-Indigenous West Australians, the report is a sombre reminder of a 
most inglorious aspect of their history, and an incentive to take firm hold 
of a long overdue opportunity to make amends.6 
A similar experience is found in South Africa where the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission provides a forum for the telling and hearing of what are 
often horrific experiences as a way of facilitating “the transformation of the state and 
the civil society in South Africa.”7  The challenge in Australia also remains to ensure 
that the telling of stories produces strategies for change.  This is a central concern for 
the work of this thesis and of my engagement with postcolonial theory. 
The incident in Wickham occurred six months after I had begun the research 
for my PhD.  At that time, I was going to do a comprehensive analysis of texts written 
by Indigenous people as a critique of 'white' Australian history, from a postcolonial 
perspective.  As I reflected on my project in the context of this incident and a series of 
events that occurred during that same holiday I came to understand it as being too 
detached from people’s actual lived reality.  Subsequently I began to question the 
                                                          
5 Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia, Telling Our Story A report by the Aboriginal Legal 
Service of Western Australia (Inc) on the removal of Aboriginal children from their families in 
Western Australia, Tony Buti (project coordinator), Perth: Aboriginal Legal Service of Western 
Australia (Inc), 1995, p. ii. 
6 Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia, 1995, p. iii. 
7 H.S. Bhola, “Between the Social and the Spiritual: Reconciliation in South Africa”, in Proceedings 
of the 42nd Annual Conference of the International Society for the Systems Sciences, Janet K. Allen 
and Jennifer Wilby (eds), July 19-24, Atlanta, Georgia, on CDROM, 1998. 
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appropriateness of postcolonialism as a way of describing Indigenous peoples 
experiences in Western Australia or of facilitating the relationships between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. 
My concern was clearly articulated by Jacquie Lo at the "Postcolonial 
Fictions" conference in December 19948 where she posed a profound and provoking 
question about postcolonial theory.  A question I ask of law and other grand narratives.  
She asked: “Where are the bodies?”  The answer, in part, is that we all have bodies 
and are addressing theoretical concerns about and to bodies, but these bodies are often 
regarded as problematic. The bodies of the colonised to which Lo was most directly 
referring are perhaps even more problematic. 
It is my concern with real events and real bodies, which leads to my own 
interest in the nexus of theory and praxis. That there is such a nexus is undeniable.  
However, how it functions is often less clear.  Theory functions as an articulation of 
individual(s) and group relationships and the spaces and places we live in.  It provides 
a meta-account of our daily lives.  I argue it is through the theoretical that we formulate 
‘rules for living’ and work through moral and ethical issues.   The theorisation of our 
everyday lives occurs both at the academic level and in the ways that we think about 
what we do and rationalise the choices we make.  There is a danger however when 
academics simply write for each other without contact with ‘the real’.  It is then that 
charges of elitism and inappropriateness can be directed at academics and theory. This 
is not to suggest that I would want to level the same charge because theory, like any 
text, functions in a variety of domains and ways.  Theory is an 'articulation with the 
real' it allows for the exploration of ideas – and of course not all academics are out of 
touch with the everyday – this is too simple an accusation to make. 
Aware of such criticism however, particularly as it is directed at 
postcolonialism, this thesis attempts an instantiation of the nexus between theory and 
praxis. A ‘substantive articulation’ of theory and praxis may be achieved in a number 
of ways, including: via a concentration on local, personal, individual stories/narratives 
and their interaction with official narratives; empowering people to speak or tell their 
stories (as in the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody); and, 
                                                          




understanding the past as a step towards transcending it, by acting upon what is said.  
In the examples used in this thesis, students, magistrates and Aboriginal people have 
been encouraged to draw on their own experiences and knowledges as a way of 
recognising and deconstructing colonialist and racist institutional practices in ways 
that empower themselves to act in postcolonial or anti-colonial ways.  (The distinction 
being drawn between these terms is discussed in Chapter Three.) 
Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore’s edited collection, Feminisms and Critical 
Pedagogy, has been significantly influential for the work of this thesis.  The ethical 
and philosophical concerns expressed by Luke and Gore and the specific questions 
they raise about the possibility of achieving an emancipatory classroom capable of 
accounting for differences in gender, class, sexuality and ability have guided my own 
praxis.  In the Introduction to the volume its editors explain that “texts, classrooms and 
identities are read as discursive inscriptions on material bodies/subjectivities.  
Pedagogical encounters and pedagogical texts are read both as a politics of 
signification and as historically contingent cultural praxis.”9  Their concerns for 
effective critical pedagogy within specific cultural contexts reflect my own concerns 
with postcolonialism, particularly how to achieve ethical and competent praxis as a 
way of achieving dialectical relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people in Western Australia. 
In discussing critical pedagogy Luke and Gore write that such an approach is: 
... to empower students to become politically active and critical citizens by 
valuing their experience and voice; in short, to develop in students a sense 
of "critical agency"[10] with which to work towards a critical democracy.  
The transformative task is for teachers to enable students to name and give 
voice to their experience (their subject positions) and then transform and 
give meaning to those experiences. [and to] ... provide students with a 
language of critique with which to demystify and politicise the discursive 
production of meaning students (and teachers) use to articulate their own 
experience and, as well, to analyse those institutional discourses applied to 
and against them.11 
                                                          
9 Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore, Feminisms and Critical Practice, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 4. 
10 Luke draws on the work of Peter McLaren for her understanding of critical agency.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of critical agency as theorised by him see Peter McLaren, Critical 
Pedagogy and Predatory Culture, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 87-116. 
11 Carmen Luke, "Feminist Politics in Radical Pedagogy" in Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore 
Feminisms and Critical Practice, London: Routledge, 1992, p 35. 
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Empowerment, political activity and critical agency, identified here as 
characteristics of critical pedagogy, are also fundamental to my own postcolonial or 
anticolonial praxis. For empowerment to be more than empty rhetoric it is vital to 
“clarify what it signifies to ‘empower’”12, just as it is vital to know what postcolonial 
praxis is.  As Maxine Greene indicates in the forward to Feminisms and Critical 
Pedagogy the purpose of the text’s contributors is to identify “an emancipatory 
feminist praxis.” This is achieved within the text by an engagement with several 
questions.  Greene identifies these questions as: 
… how are they [teachers] to launch a critique of dominant discourses 
(racist, perhaps sexist, classist) those students have never questioned?  
How … are they to move to self-definition students whose lived 
experiences are entirely different from their own?  How are they to deal 
with what they choose to identify as oppression, especially when the voices 
in the classroom become defiant, rather than expressing eagerness to 
understand, to share? 13 
According to Greene answers to these questions must be found within a field 
in which “masculinist assumptions about oppositions, hierarchies and justifications for 
neglecting contradictions and unknowability”14 is prevalent.  This requires that feminist 
teachers “demand critical examination of what lies below the surface.  They demand 
confrontations and discontinuities, particularities, and the narratives that embody actual 
life stories.”15 And further they insist that “we all attempt on a daily basis to create 
pedagogical situations which “empower” students, demystify canonical knowledges, 
and clarify how relations of domination subordinate subjects marked by gender, 
ethnicity, race, class, sexuality, and many other markers of difference.”16  Following 
their example, I asked Luke and Gore’s questions of postcolonial theory as a way of 
gauging the relationship between theory and praxis that it allows for. Further, I have 
attempted to provide the opportunity for students within a classroom, magistrates and 
participants in a seminar, discussed in this thesis, to utilise “the narratives that embody 
[their] actual life stories” as part of a strategy for recognising, critiquing and 
deconstructing colonialist and racist knowledges and assumptions that their own praxis 
have been supported by, contributed to and, their identities formulated by. 
                                                          
12 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. x.. 
13 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. x. 
14 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. x. 
15 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. x. 
16 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 1. 
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My emphasis, in this thesis, on narrative as vital to productive social 
interactions is augmented by a discussion of relevant aspects of narrative theory, 
especially the role that personal narrative can play in energising change.  To this end, 
narratives are told and retold throughout this work. In thinking through the importance 
of personal narrative I found Allen Feldman’s powerful expose of the 'reign of political 
terror' in Northern Ireland, Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and the 
Political Terror in Northern Ireland, thought provoking.  He discusses the relationship 
between the narrator and what is narrated and writes: 
[i]n a political culture the self that narrates speaks from a position of having 
been narrated and edited by others - by political institutions, by concepts 
of historical causality, and possibly by violence.  The narrator speaks 
because this agent is already the recipient of narratives in which he or she 
has been inserted as a political subject.  The narrator writes himself into an 
oral history because the narrator has already been written and subjected to 
powerful inscriptions. 17 
This relationship between the self as narrator and as the subject is important 
in the context of this thesis.  Many similarities can be found between the experiences 
of dispossession, alienation and disempowerment, resulting from colonisation and 
cultural dislocation in Northern Ireland and for Aboriginal people in Australia, though 
this is not specifically addressed within this thesis. 
The narrative concerns of this thesis are found in the intersection of personal 
and official narratives.  I want to know how one influences the other, or rather how 
one becomes the other.  It is largely through a critical engagement with postcolonial 
and anticolonial theory that I do this.   Postcolonial and anticolonial theory is also 
employed as a way of rethinking notions of ‘equality’, ‘justice’, ‘rights’ and ‘ethics’ 
as they actually operate in the lives of colonised people.  My rethinking of these 
notions is articulated through a discussion of the Western legal system and its 
relationship to Indigenous people in Western Australia. I am specifically interested in 
the ways it has and does determine how people live; contributes to public knowledges 
and opinions; and responds to critiques of its own praxis, such as that of the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 
                                                          
17 Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence: The narrative of the Body and the Political Terror in 
Northern Ireland, Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 13. 
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The forthcoming special issue of the Third World Legal Studies Journal 
“Postcolonialism and Law” is dedicated to exploring the relationship between 
postcolonialism and law.  The Third World Legal Studies Association explains that 
their decision to bring together these fields of study is a recognition of the challenges 
that postcolonial theory presents to law but that law is only just now beginning to 
engage with.  The editor for this edition Dianne Otto asserts that, “while ‘post’ colonial 
theories and praxis have received serious critical attention in many disciplines, law has 
lagged behind, despite its centrality in constructing and reconstructing relations of 
social and economic power.”18  And, postcolonialism is being ‘looked to’ by a number 
of legal theorists and practitioners as a means of critiquing legal praxis and acting as a 
safeguard against law being implicated in recolonisation of Indigenous people at a time 
when the “rights to self-determination by formerly colonised peoples has, in many 
views, led to further projects of colonisation rather than the liberatory outcomes that 
were anticipated.”19 
However, while postcolonialism is an organising theme in this thesis I have a 
very ambivalent relationship to this theoretical position, specifically its 
appropriateness in considerations of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relationships in 
Australia?  This ambivalence arose largely from Indigenous people’s responses to it. 
It must be remembered that all theoretical positions have competing uses and 
limitations within a single moment.  As a consequence, I find myself being critical of 
the term ‘postcolonial’ particularly its capacity to be divisive and conservative, to 
theorise the political but maintain a distance from political praxis, rather than being 
conciliatory and transformative.  Hence the term ‘postcolonial’ is interrogated to 
determine its potentialities and limitations.  As might be expected the term is 
productive for some, particularly academics working within literary and cultural 
studies, and less productive and even inhibiting for others, in particular many 
Indigenous people. 
The questions of praxis and theory and the cogency of postcolonialism as a 
framework for this endeavour are the recurring themes of this thesis, which will be 
addressed and returned to through detailed and specific analysis of personal narratives. 
                                                          
18 Dianne Otto, “Postcolonialism and Law”, Third World Legal Studies: Special Issue 1998-99, Call 
for papers, 1998. 
19 Otto, 1998. 
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Chapter One provides a ‘mapping’ of my own identity through the telling of several 
significant stories as a way of demonstrating that narratives determine who people are; 
they determine “our social action as agents of history and the constraints we place on 
the identities of others.”20 It highlights the necessity of placing self within a broader 
social and cultural context. 
Chapter Two examines the importance of narrative to daily life.  It makes a 
distinction between the ways official and personal narratives function and the 
credibility that is ascribed to both.  The point is made that official narratives such as 
law, anthropology, education, as they operate within the museum, classroom and law 
court define who can, and how, people perform in each of these sites.  The claim is 
also made that they determine ‘what is knowledge’ and ‘what functions as truth’.  
Further, official narratives define the spectator, curator, museum guide, student, 
teacher, defendant, lawyer and magistrate and stipulate how each must act. 
“Such inscriptions are”, according to Luke and Gore, “key in the production 
of pedagogical encounters.”21  Or, as they argue, “subjectivity, identity and knowledge 
are the work of schooling”22 and I would add the museum and the courtroom.  That 
this is so is demonstrated through personal histories, life stories and dialogue between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.  I argue that narrative can function in a 
manner, which is beyond anecdotal or simple auto-ethnography.  It can make a set of 
expressed knowledges powerful and productive within a postcolonial discourse. 
While the field of postcolonial studies is global, in Chapter Three I pay 
particular attention to the work of local theorists and to the applicability of 
postcolonialism to Australia and specifically Western Australia.  This is a political 
choice that reflects postcolonialism’s concern with the local and the personal.  The 
necessity of understanding history, in this instance the lived effects of colonialism on 
the lives of Indigenous peoples, as part of the postcolonial project is foregrounded. 
To “empower students” to “demystify” and deconstruct “canonical 
knowledges” as a way of understanding their relationships with ‘Aboriginality’ was 
central to my work with a group of Indigenous and non-Indigenous primary school 
                                                          
20 McLaren, 1995, p. 89. 
21 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 2 
22 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 2 
 
10 
students who were attending the Primary Extension Academic Challenge class that I 
co-ordinated and taught in 1992 and 1993.  In Chapter Four, “Knowledges of the 
Museum”, I provide an analysis of the Perth Museum’s “Patterns of Life: The Story 
of the Aboriginal People of Western Australia” exhibit and the responses of this group 
of primary school students to it and to the museum guide’s framing of the exhibit.   
Several significant consequences of the museum visit, and the subsequent 
deconstruction of the exhibit and the students’ responses to it, are analysed.   This 
process assisted students to understand the importance of their own history and 
knowledges in informing their interpretation of the exhibit and the colonialist and 
primitivist representations of Aboriginal people that it provided. 
The primary function of Chapter Five is to demonstrate that grand narratives, 
in this case Western Australian legislation from 1848 to 1972, have ‘real’ effects on 
‘real’ people.  They act on bodies.  The bodies that Jacqui Lo wants to be in evidence 
within postcolonial theory. I do this by reading this legislation against Alice Nannup’s 
life story When the Pelican Laughed. 
Chapter Six provides a brief overview of the Western legal system.  It 
suggests that law is a grand narrative, resistant but not impervious to change. The 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody is posited as a postcolonial or 
anticolonial critique of law that provides a forum for the telling of personal narratives. 
Chapter Seven is itself a ‘site’ or forum for the telling of and listening to 
personal narratives.  It provides a synopsis of several aspects of the “Aboriginal Culture: 
Law and Change” seminar for magistrates.  A discussion of the introductory session, 
often a formality in seminars, demonstrates the importance of people meeting each other, 
not only as magistrates and community representatives but also as people wanting to 
find common ground. This is followed by a brief overview of several sessions with 
particular focus on the story of Robin Eades and his account of juvenile crime. 
It is my thesis that utilising the power of personal narratives may facilitate the 
integration of theory and praxis in a postcolonial context.  This is illustrated in the 




Chapter One  
 
Maps of Place: Maps of Identity 
The Ancestors, frequently in the form of animals (water goannas, salt water 
crocodiles, dugongs and the like), travelled from place to place, hunted, 
performed ceremonies, fought and finally turned to stone or ‘went into the 
ground’, where they still remain.  The actions of these powerful beings 
created the world as it is known today.  They gave the world its forms, and 
its identities—its names. 
The bush is criss-crossed with their lines of travel, and just as a person’s 
or an animal’s tracks are a record of what happened, the features of the 
landscape—hills, creeks, lakes and trees—are the record of the story of 
what happened in the Dreaming.  While particular actions give name and 
identity to each location, the fact that together, in a certain sequence the 
named places constitute journeys by particular Beings, who themselves are 
related in particular ways, links all identified places into a whole.  It is not 
only the landscape that assumed its identity at this time; all things gained 
their identities, their places in the scheme of things.1 
1.1 Who am I?  Who are you? 
I am the stories that I tell about myself, the stories that others tell of me and those yet 
to be told.  I am the place where I was born, the places I have been and are yet to go.  
I know you as a relationship to my stories and places and to those you tell me.  And, 
this is how you can know me. 
Who I am is also a function of the communities which I belong to.  The telling 
of stories has traditionally been an important function within communities.  One that I 
suggest we often over-look and certainly undervalue today.  According to Walter 
Benjamin: 
[T]he storyteller worked primarily in an oral tradition.  He gave ‘counsel’ 
to his listeners; he was bound to place; he was ‘corporeal’; he had presence.  
He transmitted something ‘useful’ from which his listeners could benefit; 
he was wise and authorising; and he spoke from a lifetime’s experience.  
                                                          




He involved his listeners – who, it is assumed, do not have what he has; 
who lack – in a direct relationship with himself.2 
The storyteller has “wisdom”, “authority” and a “direct relationship to his or 
her listener.” 3  S/he is embodied, in-place, grounded.  Each of us is a storyteller, yet 
the importance of our stories and listening to those of others is often disregarded or 
dismissed as ‘new age’ self-indulgence. Consequence social interactions and 
relationships between people are maintained ‘at arms length’ and, I suggest this is 
especially the case between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. 
In this chapter I illustrate the importance of personal narratives and place in 
the construction of identity, or more correctly identities.  This claim is of course an 
enormous oversimplification.  Identities are never ‘just constructed’, never static, 
never complete.  We are never only one.  Rather, as Deleuze and Guattari write of 
themselves in the opening lines of A Thousand Plateaus, “since each of us was several 
there was already quite a crowd.”4  Deleuze and Guattari are not being frivolous.   
Recognising the multiplicity of our identities, the ways we become other to ourselves 
is productive for facilitating relationships with others, including those with quite 
different cultural heritages.5 
To illustrate the significance of identity, narrative and place in this process I 
offer several stories of my own.  While each story is personal, in that it is drawn from 
my own experience, its intersections with official narratives are clearly locatable.  
They at least partially explain my desire and concern with facilitating productive 
relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people and hence my 
engagement with anti-colonial or postcolonial praxis.  The importance of place, or a 
relationship to country, in the formation of non-Indigenous identity and relationships 
with ‘Aboriginality’ in Australia is of particular interest to me.  I argue, the spatial 
facets of our personal narratives, expected in Indigenous life-stories, but often 
neglected in non-Indigenous accounts, are critical to identity. 
                                                          
2 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller”, Illuminations, (trans) Harry Zohn, London: Fontana, (1931) 
1973. 
3 Ken Gelder and Jane M. Jacobs, Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in a Postcolonial 
Nation, Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 1998, p. 108. 
4 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (trans) Brian 
Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 3. 
5 I am indebted to the work of Spivak, Kristeva, Bhabha and many others for their insights on 
subjectivity and identity formation. 
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Personal identity is thus a function of narrative, that is of real sequences of 
events, chronological and re-ordered, the (equally real) interpretations we make of 
them and the spaces in which they are grounded.  Country6 or place is thus vital to 
everyone’s identity and inter-relationships.  Where we are born, grow up and live are 
important factors in determining identity.  In Reading the Country, a book about 
Benterrak, Muecke and Roe’s relationships with Roebuck Plains an area around 
Broome, in the north-west of the state, the authors suggest that “place is not neutral or 
passive, it is active and contestable, it is the site of politics,”7 of personal politics.  
Further they suggest that “the study of specific, local places puts things more on the 
scale of everyday living”.8  I am arguing that such a specific study facilitates 
recognition of the significant relationships between people and places that produce 
identities.  It makes obvious that who we are depends on where we are, and where we 
have been, in very specific ways.  In “Remembering Fanon”9 Homi Bhabha in making 
this same point writes that, “identification … is the elusive assignation of myself with 
a one-self, the elision of person and place.”10 
In Can These Bones Live? A book concerned with the possibility of 
reconciliation in Australia, Veronica Brady, in writing about the first English settlers 
suggests that people must make meaning of the place in which they live. There needs 
be an “elision of person and place”.  A becoming person, a becoming place.  “In a new 
and unmapped country” devoid of familiar signposts: 
… it is quite understandable that people would take refuge in a system of 
meaning which seemed to offer not only total explanation but also total 
justification.11 
While Brady is referring to religion the refuge that Georgiana Molloy, an 
English woman living in isolation from other English women, found solace in, it may 
well be any other refuge – “a cartography, of an imaginative and spiritual, rather than 
                                                          
6 ‘Country’ is used by Indigenous people to describe not only the area from which they come but also 
their relationship to that land.  See Denise Groves, New Aboriginalities: Creating Multiple Sites, 
Murdoch University: Masters Thesis, 1995 for a greater appreciation of the complexity and richness 
of ‘country’.  While I do not want to usurp Indigenous peoples use of this term I most certainly invest 
‘place’ with similar resonances. 
7 Krim Benterrak, Stephen Mueke, Paddy Roe, Reading the Country, Fremantle: Fremantle Art Centre 
Press, 1984, p. 11. 
8 Benterrak et al, 1984, p. 11. 
9 Homi Bhabha, “Remembering Fanon” in Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory, Williams 
and Chrisman (eds), Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 119. 
10 Bhabha, 1993, p. 119. 
11 Veronica Brady, Can These Bones Live?, Sydney: The Federation Press, 1996, p. 46. 
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a physical kind.”  She cites Paul Carter who suggests however, that many colonial 
settlers achieved this by weaving “a fabric of self reinforcing illusions”12.  Brady’s 
point is that the fabric, the life woven, has its own integrity.  It cannot be easily 
dismissed as mere illusion.  Rather she understands that: 
[h]uman beings cannot live in a state of meaninglessness.  They need to 
construct a system of meanings to install them in imaginary relations to 
their actual situation – this system of meaning can be related to reality in a 
double way, to the facts of reality and to the experiences which give rise to 
them.13 
Most certainly it is about finding “the way to survival.”14  This 
accommodation of mapping (both in its strictly cartographic sense and then as a 
metaphor for identity) has been productive as a means of articulating the relationship 
of people to places. 
In the following section I reflect on the map as a western cartographic 
representation of landform, “a symbolic and technical” representation of space prior 
to “deterritorialising”15 it, in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense, to make it productive of 
many other meanings.  In a sense the map produced is not itself an object or a result 
but rather an indicator of a mapping process,  an act in the dialectic between personal 
identity and the sensed world. 
Cartography is the science of map-making concerned with the representation 
of landforms, vegetation, mineral and administrative boundaries in unbiased ways.  
Through “a tacit set of rules and conventions (contour lines, symbols, projection, 
orientation, graticular grid etc)” 16 the cartographer imparts specific information about 
the landscape and the topographic features.  These features include “not only visible 
and tangible items such as hills, valleys, buildings and roads, but also important 
arbitrary information, invisible features such as administrative boundaries and 
frontiers, place names and such.”17  The information shown on the map may not always 
be physically evident in the topography either.  Or, the land surveyor may not have 
                                                          
12 Brady, 1996, p. 46. 
13 Brady, 1996, p. 47. 
14 Brady, 1996, p. 47.   
15 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 9. 
16 Wayne Tinlin, Dreamtime Mapping School of Surveying and Land Information, Bentley: Curtin 
University, 1995, p. 4. 
17 GRP Lawrence, Cartographic Methods, London: Methuen, 1971, p. 3. 
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mapped an object such as a pipeline that does not yield a continuous line on the ground, 
but is there under the ground.18 
Although a map may aim to depict as much of the ground information as 
possible there is always a demand to balance the need to fulfil the map’s purpose and 
conform to cartographic conventions. Obviously “maps are selective.”19  Maps are 
drawn for particular purposes, for instance, demarcating state and shire boundaries or 
the building of roads.  Decisions about what information to include or exclude are 
made according to the purpose of the map.  This means that the completed map is, in 
effect, a cartographic model. 
In Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson pushes this further when he 
claims that: 
[a] map anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa.  In other words, a map 
was a model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent ... 
It had become a real instrument to concretize projections on the earth’s 
surface ... [my emphasis]20 
“The act of mapping is thus both a spatial and social construction.”21  That 
the map is “a model for” rather than “a model of” space is understandable, the 
cartographer represents what s/he is trained to see.  S/he must then prioritise what the 
specifications for a series of maps dictate.   The map as a model and its political 
potential can be understood through a consideration of the direct relationship between 
“the cartographic project, the acquisition of knowledge and the wielding of power”. 22   
While it is not my intention to provide an analysis of cartography and colonialism I do 
want to make the claim that colonialism is fundamental to the production of nations 
and further that it impacts directly on the lives of individuals through the construction, 
albeit indirectly, of certain social categories and the drawing of maps. 
                                                          
18 Lawrence, 1971, p. 31. 
19 Tinlin, 1995, p. 4. 
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, 1995, pp. 173-4. 
21 Jane Jacobs, Construction of Race, Place and Nation, Peter Jackson and Jan Petman (eds), London: 
UCL Press, 1993, p. 102.  Jane Jacobs, a research fellow in the Department of Geography at the 
University of Melbourne, has published on the cultural politics of heritage designations in both 
Australia and Britain.  Her current research focuses on postcolonialism and space.  Jacobs says of 
geography it “has long been seen as a discipline complicit with imperial intent.” 
22 J.B. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power” in (D. Cosgrove and S. Daniels) (eds), The Iconography 
of Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.27. 
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According to critical geographer, Jane Jacobs, the “technical form [of the 
map] belies a political potential which is complicit in the continuing negotiation of 
power and identity in settler states such as Australia.”23   The fiction of terra nullius 
while never denying the presence of Indigenous people, did assert that Australia was 
a land devoid of a recognisable system of law and land ownership.  This resulted in 
the: 
British appropriation of the land we know today as Australia [being] 
implemented by establishing boundaries within that land mass and by 
naming the areas thus created.  This new partitioning, while socially 
meaningful to Europeans, did not incorporate, indeed failed even to notice, 
pre-existing boundaries sanctioned by daily usage, confirmed over 
millennia, and sacred, in the religious sense, to a sizeable population.24 
In effect because Indigenous land use activities were presumed not to have 
transformed the natural (space) into the cultural (place), Aboriginal sovereignty was 
not officially recognised. 
In his piece “Aboriginal Country: Not a Construction, a Way of Being”, Hugh 
Webb makes a similar point when writing about the cultural positioning of wetlands 
by insisting that “the Aboriginal ‘map’ has been massively overwritten with alien 
names and alien divisions.”25  And Benterrak, Muecke and Roe make the point that: 
[f]or the nomad, Australia is still not divided into eight “states” or 
territories, it is criss-crossed with tracks.  The smooth space of these 
invisible and secret tracks has been violently assaulted by the public 
checker-board grid of the states.  This means boundaries to be patrolled.26 
It was the imposition of State boundaries, marking of sites significant to 
English settlers and the use of English names “within the colonial project [and] the 
making of maps that constructed a possessable ‘other’ place (and people) and provided 
a practical guide for dispossessing ‘others’ of their place.”27  One result of this colonial 
mapping was the homogenisation of approximately six hundred different language 
                                                          
23 Jacobs, 1993, p.102. 
24 Helen Watson with the Yolngu community at Yirrkala and David Wade Chambers, Singing The 
Land, Signing The Land, Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1989, p. 43. 
25 Hugh Webb “Aboriginal Country: Not a Construction, a Way of Being” in Western Australian 
Wetlands, The Kimberley and South West, Rod Giblett and Hugh Webb, Perth: Black Swan Press, 
1996, p. 62. 
26 Benterrak et al, 1984, p. 219. 
27 Jacobs, 1993, p.100. 
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groups into one ‘Aboriginal’ people.  Or as Graham Huggan in “Decolonising the Map: 
Post-Colonialism, Post-Structuralism and the Cartographic Connection” writes: 
The “contradictory coherence” implied by the map’s systematic inscription 
on a supposedly “uninscribed” earth reveals it, moreover, as a palimpsest 
covering over alternative configurations.28 
This politically expedient construction, partially enacted through mapping, 
was a means of organising, regulating, and controlling the lives of Indigenous peoples. 
But of course, it is not just Indigenous lives that are organised and regulated.  
Every life is regulated.  Every life is mapped.  I transgress momentarily in my 
discussion of colonial mapping to mention something of my own experience of space. 
Until recently I paid little conscious attention to the narrativity of my own life.  Hence, 
for the most part it is difficult to determine what catalysts influence both the 
experiencing and narrative self.  Space is certainly one catalyst.  For instance, my 
experience in The Home of the Good Shepherd, is a case in point. 
At nine years of age I lived in The Home of Good Sheperd.  My personal 
space was a bed, a bedside locker and enough floor space to make the bed, dress and 
kneel to pray.  There were a group of slightly older girls – though the same age as 
many others who shared the dormitory – who had rooms downstairs where there were 
only two or four in a room.  These girls were to me privileged.  It was not just that they 
had so much privacy that made me feel they were privileged, they were also exempt 
from waxing and polishing the enormous dormitory and veranda floors.  At nine 
though I did not question their privilege. 
For many years, I did not think of the girls with their privacy again.  Then in 
my mid-teens, no longer in the institution, I realised they were not privileged, they 
were isolated.  Not only that, they were different.  Some catalyst triggered my 
understanding that those girls were ‘Aboriginal’ and that they were treated differently 
as a consequence.  This recognition created a link in a narrative for me, one about 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships. 
                                                          
28 Graham Huggan, “Decolonising the Map: Post-Colonialism, Post-Structuralism and the 
Cartographic Connection”, in Past the Last Post, Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin (eds), Hertsfordshire: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, p. 128. 
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Much later the correlation between State policy and legislation that 
determined even the personal lives of individual girls became apparent.  The 
trajectories that their lives had taken were markedly different from my own because 
the official and cultural narratives that determined their lives were different from the 
ones that determined mine.  But we were in the same place.  In that moment we shared 
a similar map.  For the ‘privileged girls’ the link between personal and official 
narratives, between the way they lived their lives and government legislation is 
obvious.  Though I would not want to claim that similarities could be drawn between 
their experiences and mine, there are connections that need to be understood. 
These connections need to be understood for significant relationships to be 
formed.  For in the same way that official cartography can be part of an ongoing colonial 
enterprise, so too can personal mappings.  People can engage with Australia as a 
European entity.  They can travel through the country never meeting or talking with 
Indigenous people.  They can leave unquestioned histories of Australia that rely on 
notions of terra nullius.  Or, they may retain primitivist notions of Aboriginality or 
paternalistic attitudes.  There are those people who feel angry at what they see as unequal 
treatment in favour of Indigenous people and those who are opposed to land rights.  
Some people want a relationship with Indigenous people and their understandings of 
Australia but have no mechanisms for securing that and are consequently locked into 
what is ‘given’ to them, a colonial identity, a map of estrangement. 
Jane Jacobs argues for the deconstruction of the colonial map as a way of 
foregrounding “the construction of certain social categories” and subsequently of 
unmasking Indigenous mappings.  The possibility for such a deconstruction, according 
to Graham Huggan is possible once the “contradictory coherence” of the map is 
“brought to light, [in turn] indicat[ing] both the plurality of possible perspectives on, 
and the inadequacy of any single model of, the world.”29  Deconstruction then involves 
“focusing on the inevitable discrepancy between the “natural” and the “imitated” 
object, “30 that is on the map as model.  Huggan continues, asserting that this will 
“displace the ‘original’ presence of the west in such a way as to undermine the ideology 
that justifies its relations of power.” 31  This is in agreement with Jacob’s claim that 
                                                          
29 Huggan, 1992, p. 128. 
30 Huggan, 1992, p. 129. 
31 Huggan, 1992, p. 129. 
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“uncovering the politics of the maps production can be a step in excavating its complex 
role in the continuing practice of colonialism and hints at the subversive spatialities of 
postcolonialism.”32  As she points out, “the traditional authority of the colonial map is 
disrupted by anticolonial nationalisms and minority insurgencies” 33, such as 
Aboriginal land rights claims. 
1.2 A metaphor of mapping 
At this point I want to rethink mapping.  I want to imbue it with the “imaginative and 
spiritual” of Brady’s metaphor.  In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, I want to 
deterritorialise it as a precursor to employing it differently.  In this section I use 
mapping as a way of understanding and articulating the construction of identity, which 
of course does not preclude colonial identities, but is productive of many other 
identities.  In part my decision to do this is generated by the obvious inseparability of 
space and people in both the process of mapping and its deployment which, in turn, 
points to its potential as a point of mediation or a means of negotiation, just as it is 
often a point of conflict. 
Pile and Thrift, in their book, Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural 
Transformation, claim that “the difficulty of deploying the representational metaphor 
of mapping is its history of subordination to an Enlightenment logic in which 
everything can be surveyed and pinned down.”34  Such a claim is justified when what 
is meant is the rigid, colonial map described by Jacobs (which many Australians still 
adhere to it).  Here I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of mapping in A 
Thousand Plateaus.  They regard the colonial map as a tracing, and, make significant 
distinctions between tracing and mapping.  They liken a tracing to “a photograph or X 
ray that begins by selecting or isolating, by artificial means such as colorations or other 
restrictive procedures, what it intends to reproduce.”35  For them it is a violation of 
mapping in that it neutralises the multiplicities or the production of knowledges about 
a place or places.  It produces and reproduces nothing but itself, a linear progression 
from one point to another, a marker of distance and time, not places and people.  An 
                                                          
32 Jacobs, 1993, p. 102. 
33 Jacobs, 1993, p. 102. 
34 Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift (eds), Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural Transformation, 
London: Routledge, 1995, p. i. 
35 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p 13. 
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example of such a tracing is the colonial map of Australia that overrides and denies 
pre-existing Indigenous mappings. 
For Deleuze and Guattari the map is about performance; for them it is “an 
experimentation in contact with the real.”36  They go on to describe it in detail: 
The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, 
reversible, susceptible to constant modification.  It can be torn, reversed, 
adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or 
social formation.  It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, 
constructed as a political action or as a mediation ... it always has multiple 
entryways, as opposed to the tracing which always comes back “to the 
same.”37 
Thus it is that the usefulness of the map as a metaphor for identity “lies in the 
implication that [it] does not simply describe what is.  It is rather that the strings of 
meaning produce the holes in the material world in such a way that what is represented 
is as much a product of the unsaid as of the said”38 allowing for the effects of the 
personal.  As such it is “an articulation with the real” and is consistent with the ways 
that Benterrak, Muecke and Roe make meaning of Roebuck Plains.  They perform 
their own identities, create their own maps for they are aware that the country has no 
inherent meaning. 
 It is not heavily signposted so that visitors can be quite clear where they 
are and which way they should go to fulfil their purposes.  Rather, the 
meanings of the Plains are constructed in language, that is, in dialogues 
which have a certain purpose or direction based on the sorts of signs, 
appropriate to their knowledge, which different people see in the country.39 
Neither is the country, or their reading of it, the same for each of them.  
Rather, it and their book is “an attempt to construct a theory of place, to find a method 
of charting the meanings of those specific places in which people [they] must find a 
way to live in one manner or another.”40  What is suggested is that individuals must 
perform their own mapping, construct their own meaning, make their own sense of the 
                                                          
36 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p 12. 
37 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p 12. 
38 Rosalyn Diprose and Robyn Ferrell, Cartographies Poststructuralism and the Mapping of Bodies 
and Spaces, North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991, p. viii. 
39 Benterrak et al, 1984, p. 12. 
40 Benterrak et al, 1984, p. 12. 
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place and subsequently self.  And so it is that Benterrak, Muecke and Roe too have 
influenced the use of mapping as a metaphor in this work. 
When maps are understood as dynamic social formations and works of art, as 
suggested above, they are necessarily productive of the “synthesis of human and 
physical elements.”41  This synthesis insists on dynamism, for while landscapes may 
be misunderstood by some as relatively fixed, when overlaid with human and spiritual 
interactions this misconception is exposed.  One need just consider the ways in which 
Aboriginal landscapes are “at one level a map of a real landscape, at another level a 
simple and decorative depiction of objects and creatures in that landscape and, at a 
third level, a telling of a sacred myth.”42 
Deleuze and Guattari’s definitions of tracing and mapping are productive at 
a number of levels, as a way of articulating the complex relationships between the 
many personae that are each person, other people and places.  These metaphors are 
further augmented by their concept of the rhizome, which they liken to couch grass.43  
It spreads in all directions, on the surface and below ground, it can be broken into 
segments, develop new roots and continue to grow.  Deleuze and Guattari write that: 
[a] rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up 
again on one of its old lines, or on new lines ... Every rhizome contains 
lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialised, 
organised, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialisation 
down which it constantly flees.  There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever 
segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part 
of the rhizome.  These lines always tie back to one another.44 
Huggan suggests that “if the map is … conceived of as rhizomatic (‘open’) 
rather than as a falsely homogeneous (‘closed’) construct, the emphasis then shifts 
from de- to reconstruction, from mapbreaking to mapmaking.”45 
A person’s life is similar.  There is a progression from birth to death, marked 
by significant events: birthdays, school and children.  Relationships with parents, 
                                                          
41 Tinlin, 1995, p. 25. 
42 David Chambers, Imagining Nature: Nature and Human Nature, Geelong: Deakin University, 
1984, p. 53. 
43 For further discussion of the usefulness of Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphors of the map and 
rhizome see Diana Brydon, “TroppoAgitato: Reading and Writing Cultures in Randolf Stow’s The 
Visitants and Ruby Weibe’s The Temptations of Big Bear”, ARIEL 19.1, 1988, pp. 13-32. 
44 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 9. 
45 Huggan, 1992, p. 133. 
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grandparents and others, including, places enrich and influence the trajectories that 
each person follows.  Some of these relationships may be maintained over years, others 
may be fleeting; the sight of an unknown woman crying or a short stay in a place.  
These relationships are like the rhizome that breaks up.  They are potentials for new 
interactions; they are possibilities for engaging with other people and places.  Every 
relationship has the potential to produce many others; each is like the “segmentary line 
that explodes” that “forms lines of flight”.  And, each adds to the repertoire of stories 
that is us. 
Through the relationships with people and places we construct, deconstruct 
and reconstruct our identities, we map who we are.  It is not that identity is: 
... just an ideology of a particular set of social practices.  The values, 
conflicts, histories, and ambiguities which characterise our identities are 
not arbitrarily constructed from possibilities in the social realm.  They are 
embodied through the process of engaging with our external and internal 
worlds.  Cultural identity is a symbolic marker for a complex array of 
experiences, memories and emotional histories which become situated 
within our transforming bodies.46 
This in many ways may sound like little more than postmodernist play.  The 
idea that people can take on, or discard identities, that is to construct and deconstruct 
subject positions, has been criticised.  This is apt criticism when people get caught in 
the rhetoric of ‘Otherness and difference’ without engaging with people or place.  But, 
I do argue that we construct and deconstruct our identities all the time, as is obvious 
in the different personae we adopt in private and public spaces.  These personae 
perform functions, they are complex, multiple, ever changing and embodied.  They too 
are rhizomatic segments. 
There is after all no ‘authentic’ self.  There are ways of being in the world, of 
interacting with people and places that are productive of identities.  So it is naive logic 
that may lead to the conclusion that “if constructions are ‘artificial’ they lack ‘reality’ 
or do not ‘exist’.”47  Subjects are constructed, construct and reconstruct ourselves, 
focusing in particular, on the role of place in this process, and “placing the subject”48 
                                                          
46 Ian Anderson, “Speaking Positions”, in Aboriginality, Gender and Ethnicity in Australian Cultural 
Studies (eds), Penny van Toorn and David English, Melbourne: Dept of Humanities, 1995, p. 37. 
47 Peter Jackson and Jan Petman (eds), Construction of Race, Place and Nation, London: UCL Press, 
1993, p. 3. 
48 Pile and Thrift, 1995, p. i.   
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in Pile and Thrift’s terms.  ‘Placing’, here, is not, as they also say, presumed to be 
either merely and exclusively about someone’s real location or free of metaphorical, 
imagined and symbolic significance.  Place however is local.  It is also the starting 
point for every map.  It is the site from where the cartographer begins.  Place identifies 
the cartographer. 
1.3 Mapping “Lines of Flight”49 
In this section I recount several personal stories.  The events narrated and the places in 
which they have occurred are significant to the construction of my identity, they 
determine who I am and how I relate to others.  Of course the significance that I now 
assign to each event was not necessarily apparent at the time.  It is as Webb suggests 
in “Soyinka’s Novelistic Autobiography” that “the past experience can attain a degree 
of symbolic relevance that was not obvious at the time it happened.”50  However, there 
are equally experiences that are instantly recognisable as significant. 
Each experience or narrative has a rhizomatic relationship to other narratives.  
They are “lines of flight” that “tie back to one another”.  Which set of trajectories I 
choose to follow, which stories I narrate are motivated by particular desires.  Because 
relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people are central to this thesis 
I revisit trajectories that account for my relationship with Indigenous people.  So it is 
that a feeling of connectedness with a particular people and place has a history.  For 
instance my own relationship with people in Roebourne in 1998 has a history.  I 
consider a particular relationship, that with Marshall Smith, a Bunjima man who I 
worked with and with whom I have developed a friendship.  He and his family have 
been directly influenced by the 1905 Aborigines Act, the pastoral industry, the 1967 
referendum and citizenship, loss of land, widespread community alcoholism, 
Aboriginal deaths in custody, mining and more recently the High Court’s Mabo 
decision and native title claims.  I, on the other hand, am a white Australian woman, 
and my grandparents and great grandparents have been gold prospectors, miners and 
railway workers in and around Kalgoorlie – a Western Australian town significant for 
gold – and banana plantation owners.  I am an academic teaching in the field of 
                                                          
49 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 3. 
50 Hugh Webb, “Soyinka’s Novelistic Autobiography”, in New Literature Review, W.D. Ashcroft (ed), 
No. 5, 1978, p. 12. 
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literature and working when the opportunity arises, on social justice issues.  
Relationships with people in Roebourne were facilitated by childhood experiences in 
Hoe of Good Sheperd, a holiday to visit a friend in 1991, and a chance encounter with 
a Bunjima woman while on that holiday.  As an adult I remember Derby, have 
nostalgic connections to Kalgoorlie, and work when possible in Roebourne where I 
renew old friendships and acquaintances and embark on new relationships. 
I try to think now about my own history in relation to this country and people 
I have relationships with, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, as a way of mapping rather 
than constantly tracing and retracing it.  Doing this is a production, a performance of 
my own identity, a “becoming”.  I become Irish gold prospector and railway worker 
through family stories and photographs; child explorer of mangrove swamps through 
living memories; visitor to ‘white by invitation only areas’ through Yamagi and 
Nyoongar friends; a north bound traveller through a desire for connectedness and a 
sense of self; problematic tourer of Pilbara mine sites through academic privilege.  Of 
course this list is arbitrary.  I could also become mother, teacher, conference-goer and 
so travel many other trajectories, recreate many other histories and so draw quite 
different maps. 
1.4 Learning to trace 
My formal knowledge of what Australia might be began in my fifth year of primary 
school.  We were each given a green plastic template (or map), of what was described 
as an island continent, to trace around.  Tasmania had to be drawn freehand, if it was 
remembered at all.  Little wonder many students thought Australia consisted of five 
States and two Territories.  A sharp pencil was prodded through dotted holes that 
marked State boundaries.  The name of each State and capital city was thereafter 
appropriately inscribed.  In subsequent lessons we traced in rivers, mountain ranges, 
soil and vegetation types, climatic regions and finally population densities. 
I remember at the time struggling to connect all the parts.  I could not see the 
relationship between the world I lived in – Kelmscott, a small Perth suburb nestled at 
the foot of the Darling Scarp, in the south-west of the state and Derby – in the 
Kimberley region in the north-west of the state, my once short lived but much loved 
home.  To suggest that Melbourne and the Snowy Mountains were also part of this 
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same world certainly did not make sense.  These lessons in geography were abstract, 
they were mere tracings, in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense, and they omitted the stories 
that connect people to other people and to places. 
Like most other children, including Indigenous children, I learnt that the Dutch 
and the British ‘discovered’ Australia.  Most importantly, Captain Cook landed on the 
East Coast in 1770 and claimed the land for Britain.  We were taught that the individual 
States were formed as the country was explored and opened up to settlement.  This 
colonial history was always incomplete.  For instance, although we were taught that 
Australia had been a penal colony, we were told little of English imperialism in Ireland, 
which accounted for the large Irish population in Australia.  It is therefore not surprising 
that Indigenous histories were not taught51.  Clearly Australia was not ‘discovered’ by 
the Dutch and British and there was a recorded history prior to 1770.  However, for the 
most part, colonial teachings have masked Indigenous and other histories.52 
In these lessons, there was no discussion of Indigenous sovereignty, land 
rights and customary law, nor was it mentioned that the term ‘Aboriginal’ was imposed 
upon Indigenous peoples as a way of homogenising them.  No account was given of 
the approximately six hundred language groups that existed in Australia prior to 
colonisation or to the cultural differences between these groups of people.  It is only 
now when I look back at geography lessons that included any mention of Aboriginal 
people that I realise just how limited, romantic and primitivist these lessons were.  In 
part this realisation is based on my never having connected Aboriginal friends in my 
classes with the people we studied.  I can only imagine what it has meant for 
Indigenous children to learn this same history and trace the same map of Australia.  As 
a child, I did not understand the colonial implications of the map we learnt to trace.  
As an adult, I realise many Indigenous children understood and lived those 
implications. 
                                                          
51 Aboriginal Studies is still not compulsory in Australian schools, there are still not enough qualified 
teachers who have the knowledge required to teach in this field, Aboriginal people without teaching 
qualifications are usually only asked to speak to students on special occasions.  In Western Australia 
in the 1960s these options were not available. 
52 As Eve Mumewa Fesl, Conned St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993 points out most 
Anglo-Australians retain the view that their ancestors were the first outsiders to reside in Australia, 
although Koorie records, in the form of paintings and oral history, attest to the fact that the Macassans 
were frequent visitors prior to the British arrival.   
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The piece of hard green plastic is a colonial stencil or a tool of a colonial 
enterprise.  It is a mimetic representation of Australia.  It appears neutral and 
ahistorical, an innocent representation of space.  In this sense the map is, as Jane Jacobs 
says “a symbolic and technical language of space.”53  It demarcates spaces, names 
them in particular ways.  It is inflexible, it imposes its colonial ideology on all who 
trace around it and fill in state names and capital cities.  It masks Indigenous histories 
by insisting upon state boundaries that have no respect for relationships between 
Indigenous people and places.  It allows no scope for the student who wants to do more 
than merely trace one particular history. 
1.5 Irish gold prospector 
In the early 1970s I travelled by train across the Nullarbor Plain, from Perth to 
Adelaide.  The journey allowed me a glimpse of the extreme isolation that early mining 
and railway workers families lived with.  My own family had moved from the 
Victorian to the Kalgoorlie goldfields in the 1880s and several of them had later 
worked to lay the transcontinental railway line that I was now travelling on.  My 
grandmother had recounted stories of life on that isolated track.  I realised later that 
her stories were carefully selected, they provided a particular history without ever 
overtly signalling the omissions. 
My grandmother never spoke of any relationship with Indigenous people.  
Their most frequent visitors, on the train line, would however have been local 
Aborigines and cameleers.  And, in the 1880s, as families such as my own were 
moving to the goldfields, Aboriginal families were moved off their lands, often 
becoming fringe dwellers dependent on government ration depots.  These Irish 
refugees became wealthy at the direct expense of, for the most part, Wongi people. 
When I return to Kalgoorlie now, the history of dispossession and poverty is 
impossible to ignore.  Children laugh as some Indigenous people stagger along the 
streets.  Adults look with disgust or perhaps pity at the same people.  Developers of 
new housing areas replicate Perth suburbs in all their antisepticness.  These are 
obviously not meant to be the homes of the dispossessed.  Other developers, usually 
state funded, build inadequate housing for Indigenous families.  There is a perverse 
                                                          
53 Jackson and Petman, 1993, p. 3. 
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pleasure however to be had from contemplating the narrow streets of Kalgoorlie’s new 
suburb, Lamington – Kalgoorlie is one town renowned for having the widest roads in 
Australia – the possibility that gold might be buried beneath these organising grids has 
created a demand for a new ‘economy’ that only allows for streets barely adequate for 
two cars to pass. 
With each return to Kalgoorlie I accumulate more stories, and new 
knowledges are, as Foucault says, disinterred.  Through them maps are produced – not 
the tracings learnt in school – but, ‘postcolonial’ maps: ones that connect people and 
land; that tell of Aboriginal deterritorialisations and Irish reterritorialisations (though 
of course they are never only Irish).  It is not the case that these territorialisations are 
either merely positive or negative – though of course they are often either or both – 
they are productive.  Knowledge of Wongi dispossession does not cause me to disavow 
my Australian-Irishness, it does not negate my connectedness, even love of, 
Kalgoorlie, it causes me to re-imagine or re-map this place taking into account its many 
other stories.  It teaches me that there are many ways to be in the world. 
1.6 Child explorer of mangrove swamps 
It was on the Kangaroo, a State Ship, that we journeyed, when I was almost seven, 
from Fremantle to Derby.  We traced the Western Australian coastline in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s sense of a tracing described above.  On disembarking in Derby I was utterly 
perplexed by the world; city, cars, noise and multitudes of people were replaced by 
empty spaces, red earth and black faces.  Had we travelled by road the distance and 
changes in land, climate, flora, fauna and people would have been observable, we 
would have mapped a ‘becoming’ Derby.  The lack of mapping resulted in Derby 
initially being diagrammatic, “having neither substance nor form, neither content nor 
expression.”54   It meant that in year five geography Derby and Perth had little 
relationship with each other. 
An ‘explorer of mangrove swamps’ may well not appear to be a grand 
profession, it meant however to be the most fortunate explorer of all.  We, my sister, 
the neighbourhood kids and myself, ran unchecked and bare footed through what I 
now consider to be dangerous, snake infested grounds.  We knew boab trees – one of 
                                                          
54 Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 141. 
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the biggest divided our yard from that of the neighbours – as we knew every hiding 
place and certainly the best spots from which to execute an ambush.  We knew that if 
we went to the park and found an old man drinking we could cadge money for ice 
cream, or most often lollies that could be more easily shared.  We knew the country 
and its people as children do. 
Derby was no longer a mere tracing, a diagram, an abstract mark on a map.  
It now had “substance and form, content and expression.”  Although it was an isolated 
mapping it became the impetus for many more mappings.  There is always a danger 
that childhood experiences become romanticised, larger than life, but their importance 
as a catalyst in creating significant relationships should not be ignored. 
1.7 A trip to Roebourne 
For generations of Western Australians, the name Roebourne conjures up images of 
‘violent, drunken Aborigines who do nothing to better their situation.’  On page 15 of 
the Western Australian newspaper, Saturday March 1, 1997 there was an article titled 
“Meeting bridges cultural divide”55 written by Wally Eves, an ‘average family man’ 
on holiday with his family.  He describes his encounter with Roebourne and some of 
its inhabitants: 
We parked the car, got out and stood around talking.  The dominant scene 
was one of countless Aborigines in various stages of inebriation – some 
staggering around the street, others lying in the grass area opposite the 
hotel block, some sitting on the footpath, a few yelling at each other ... 
Then the man got to his feet, and seeing us looking in his direction, flew 
into a rage.  Throwing his arms in the air and yelling abuse, he headed 
towards us.  With Aborigines everywhere and a possible danger of 
confrontation, I suggested we get back in the car.56 
Although Eves goes on to explain that there was no altercation and rather that 
he and his family enjoyed a conversation with their ‘potential aggressor’ this article 
re-inforces the ‘well known fact’ that Roebourne is a violent town that few whites 
would want to visit.  Although there are many other readings of Roebourne, as 
Benterrak, Muecke and Roe remind us “...the readings of a place are not infinite.  They 
                                                          
55 Wally Eves, “Meeting bridges cultural divide” in The Western Australian, Perth March 1997, p. 15. 
56 Eves, 1997, p. 15. 
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are perhaps theoretically infinite, but in practice, through history, certain readings 
appear, proliferate, then fade away when history no longer provides for them.”57 
That the Ngulama, Injibarndi and Bunjima peoples from the coastal plains 
between Karratha and Whim Creek, the tablelands south of Port Hedland through 
Millstream National Park to Tom Price were all forced into one small town by the 
pastoral and mining industries is ignored in this account.  So too is the personal and 
cultural devastation caused to people and place by the overnight arrival of two 
thousand miners into the town during the 1960s mining boom.  These histories fade or 
have never been considered.  Certainly, experiences that are ‘Iremugado’,58 Ngulama, 
Injibarndi and Bunjima, are rarely, if ever, allowed to mediate Eves account.  These 
are the experiences that “history no longer provides for” adequately. 
For me, the description of Roebourne provided by Eves bears little 
resemblance to my experience of the same place, because I have travelled quite 
different trajectories.  In October 1991 Cherry Hayward, our children and myself drove 
from Perth to Roebourne to visit Reg Yates, Cherry’s partner.  Reg was working with 
the Department of Education Employment and Training and had been living in 
Wickham, a mining town ten kilometres north-west of Roebourne for three months 
trying to negotiate employment opportunities for local Indigenous people with 
Hamersley Iron.  We spent a night in Carnarvon and picked up Cherry’s sister and her 
daughter.  It was the school holidays and on this trip we were tourists.  We were going 
to explore an area of country relatively unknown to me, to enjoy swimming, hunting 
and meeting new people. 
This was not all that happened however.  Our visit to Roebourne was 
extraordinary, not merely a holiday.  We heard stories and saw incidents that to the 
residents were everyday occurrences but to us as visitors were remarkable, perhaps 
uncanny or sublime59.  This visit was a significant event in my life, it became a catalyst 
for understanding many of the complex enduring ramifications of past and present 
legislation on the lives of Indigenous people and most importantly my relationship to it. 
                                                          
57 Benterrak et al, p. 12. 
58 This is the local name for Roebourne. 
59 To suggest that this was sublime in the Gothic sense may be to invest these occurrences with an 
unspeakability that is belied by my recounting of the events.  However, it is a notion of unspeakability 
and unbelievabilty, or perhaps from Lyotard, incommensurability, that I do want to suggest. 
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I discuss several of these incidents here, not to shock, but to demonstrate the 
ways they acted as a catalyst for the concerns of my work, including this thesis.  It was 
while we were staying in Wickham, for instance, that we met a Bunjima woman60 
whose story prompted me to do a great deal of thinking about the role and 
responsibilities of white academics in the fields of postcolonial theory and Indigenous 
studies.  I experienced some of the anger and pain felt by Roebourne people about the 
death of a sixteen-year-old youth61 at the hands of the police.62  Further, I witnessed 
some effects of the Commonwealth Government’s designation of the Millstream area 
as a National Park and, the result of mining activities, including the dispossession of 
land, on the lives of local people.  Each of these events are features on a map, or a 
series of maps, that produce my understandings of Roebourne.63 
1.8 “In Memory Of” 
Our first activity as tourists was to visit Cossack, the first European town built in the 
Pilbara, now a tourist attraction.  While we were there we went inside the old gaol.  It 
always surprises me how gaols become art galleries and museums.  It is perhaps even 
more surprising that tourists, such as us, visit these places etched as they are with 
peoples’ sufferings.  We looked through the cells.  Cherry stood in one, peering out 
through the bars as a prisoner might.  We photographed her laughing, as only someone 
who is playing can do. 
Still in our role as tourists we drove from Cossack to Roebourne.  Here too we 
visited the old gaol.  I stood and read through the visitors book, the catalogue of names 
of visitors who like us, or unlike us, had come to this place for their own purpose.  I read 
aloud.  There was the usual list of comments that accompany names and addresses in 
such books – “interesting”, “glad we came”, “what dreadful conditions people were kept 
in”.  Then an unexpected entry, one that that shocked me, made me feel complicit in an 
                                                          
60 See my Introduction for details of this account. 
61 Many Indigenous people do not speak the name of those who have died.  Although this practice is 
not something that I must observe it is a custom that I respect.   
62 The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, which has investigated the deaths of 
many Aboriginal people in Australia is discussed in some detail in Chapter Six.  It must be noted that 
despite the Royal Commission deaths in custody are still occurring. 
63A quite different map of Roebourne was presented to myself and other members of the 1995 
Chamber of Mines Pilbara Mines tour.  It could be described as a type of tracing or a sterile, self-
interested map of the interests of several mining companies.  My description of it as self-interested 




un-condonable history.  It read, “in memory of J.P.,” dated “the anniversary of his death, 
and signed, “the ghost of J.P.”, the youth who had died in police custody.  As I finished 
speaking the words a voice behind me warned that as I was white I should not be heard 
saying that name.64  I was overwhelmed by a sense of vulnerability.  It might seem to be 
a strange response, but later as I re-thought that moment and tried to understand my 
feelings I felt responsible.  No wonder I felt vulnerable. 
1.9 Green ‘picket’ fences 
Later as we were driving through the village, built in 1975 to house the Ngulama, 
Injibarndi and Bunjima people who had been living on the old reserve, Reg pointed to 
rows of newly erected fences.  They were approximately three feet high, extended 
across the width of each house and were freshly painted in apple green.  The fences 
were truly something to look at.  They were so out of place.  For me they were the 
‘picket’ fences from many a ‘feel-good’ sitcom.  They demarcated the public space of 
the verge from the private space of homes in a way, which disrupted a sense of 
community that usually characterises Indigenous living areas.  These fences had been 
recently erected.  In front of most fences were piles of uncollected rubbish, behind 
them were tables and chairs bought out from the houses so that people could sit in the 
cool afternoon and evening air. 
At various times, when I have spoken to people about the green fences, I have 
been asked for photographs.  This is of course not an unusual request.  Taking 
photographs of places we visit is most often taken for granted especially when we are 
tourists.  A photograph of the fences without any context would however have been 
meaningless.  And a photograph of the fences framed by Indigenous people drinking 
and piles of rubbish would presumably elicit several responses, few of them focusing 
on the inappropriate imposition of western ways of living and values on Indigenous 
people.  Here I am reminded of Eric Michaels’ question: “What truth are we to see in 
this picture?”65. 
                                                          
64 This reversal of common practice, I as a white person not being able to use the name of someone 
who had passed away, was a marker of the anger and despair that the community felt about this death.  
It also foregrounds the way in which members of the Roebourne community recognised that this death 
was not merely the result of the actions of a few violent police.  It had much broader connotations. 
65 Eric Michaels, Bad Aboriginal Art. Tradition, Media and Technological Horizons, St Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 12.  I have discussed this in more detail in a review of Bad Aboriginal Art in 
Alternative Law Journal Vol 21, No 1, February 1996. 
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1.10 No dogs allowed 
Millstream National Park is just two hundred and thirty kilometres east of Roebourne.  
It is a remarkable place.  It is an oasis on the edge of the desert where large pools or 
streams of water are surrounded by cotton palms, ferns and paper bark trees.  Enormous 
lily pads float on the water.  Birds, insects and many other animals live within the park.  
If you sit beside one of the pools and look at the lily pads long enough it is possible to 
imagine that you are in the lush tropics not the desert country of the Pilbara. 
We drove into Millstream and parked at the visitors’ centre, once a station 
homestead.  While there we were approached by a ranger and told that we should not 
be in the park because we had a dog with us.  In 1989 Millstream was declared a 
national park.  It became one of many protected areas.  People could no longer take 
dogs into the park, thus protecting animal life.  At the time this seemed reasonable.  
We agreed to leave our dog locked in one car at the visitor’s centre, have everyone 
squeeze into the other car and do just a quick trip through the park.  We would come 
again without the dog. 
As we left the park and drove back towards Roebourne someone commented 
on the groups of people living under small clumps of trees.  The sparse, hot, dry 
conditions there were a stark contrast to the oasis we had just left.  Reg explained that, 
since Millstream had been designated a National Park people who had lived in the area 
for centuries, if not millennia, were no longer allowed to live there.  Presumably 
because they kept dogs.  A tracing for dogs!  A tracing for people! 
Since 1996 my own relationship with Roebourne, the village and Millstream 
has been considerably enriched.  No longer do I visit any of these places as a tourist 
but rather as a friend and a colleague.  In December of that year myself and a friend 
and colleague, Andrew Turk, also from Murdoch University, began to work with a 
group of Ngulama, Injibarndi and Bunjima people who were setting up a cultural 
awareness group.  This group, Ngurra Wangkamagayi, provides cultural awareness 
training for miners, teachers, students and people interested in Indigenous culture.  In 
the process of preparing courses and manuals for participants we spent an ever-
increasing amount of time in the village and at Millstream. 
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Now in the village it is not the fences or rubbish I am aware of, except as the 
ghost of an older less connected relationship to this place.  Certainly, there is no question 
of taking photographs, except those that are part of relationships.  The village is now the 
home of friends.  It has a history that I understand.  When we visit Millstream, it is now 
with the knowledge that it is the traditional land of the Injibarndi people and to them it 
is Jindawarru, a sacred place where much of the Injibarndi law is situated.  There is an 
enormous sadness for people who are not ‘permitted’ to freely visit, live, hunt in and 
therefore care for the land.  When we are there however I have little sense of this 
alienation because during those visits people continually ‘sing the country’. 
1.11 Travelling north again 
Nine of us drove together from Perth to Broome and then to our final destination, One 
Arm Point and friends at the Bardi community.  Reg Yates, who we had visited on our 
last trip north, our travelling companion this time understood the country quite 
differently than I did.  The map Reg produced for us did not, for instance, explain New 
Norcia, a small town that we passed through on the way north and home to a Jesuit 
monastery and art gallery.  It is a place that many Indigenous people do not like to 
drive through at night.  It is a place where children stolen from their parents had been 
incarcerated and where many had passed away.  The grounds and buildings that I had 
previously enjoyed, as a tourist, were not on our itinerary.  Neither did he explain 
Moore River as the holiday destination that it has become for many.  Rather, for him 
and other Indigenous people, it was the ‘native settlement’ in which many ‘half-caste’ 
Aboriginal adults and children were confined. 
South of Carnarvon, Yamagi country, Reg said we could camp for the night 
near a creek, though he and Amy, his daughter, would not sleep with us.  He thought 
it would be great fun to leave us with the woodarchies or featherfoot, ‘supernatural’ 
beings that might have fun with a group of wadjellas.66  Not only was Reg enjoying a 
joke at our expense, he was also quite seriously explicating a spirituality that we had 
no access to.  One that nevertheless exists and determines how, even urban people67, 
map the land.  This is a particularly important point today when Indigenous people 
                                                          
66 Wadjellas is a Nyoongar term for white people. 
67 The use of this phrase is obviously forced.  I use it in some ways ironically to critique those who 
suggest that urban Aboriginal people no longer have claims to land. 
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have to prove a continuous relationship with land before they can participate in native 
title claims.  The joke functions to care for the land in similar ways to the Injibarndi 
stories told at Jindawarru, though couched as it is in the form of a joke, it challenges 
naive stereotypes about the format and purpose of Indigenous stories. 
We arrived at One Arm Point mid-morning.  There were now eleven of us.  
Cherry, Reg’s partner, and Allan, a Nyoongar friend up north on holiday, joined us in 
Broome for the last leg of the journey.  We were greeted by friends and taken to the 
community hall that was to be our home for the next two weeks.  Several significant 
events occurred while we were there.  We came away with a number of different maps. 
One Arm Point is home for the Bardi community.  It is situated on the tip of 
Cape Leveque.  The Bardi people are initially from Sunday Island, three kilometres 
from where they now live.  Missionaries moved them to the mainland.  The 
community’s main source of income is from the collection and selling of trochus shells 
to the Fisheries Department and tourists, as polished shells or jewellery. 
We arrived three days after the death of an elder.  Community members spent 
the week in mourning prior to the burial, which involved both traditional and Christian 
customs.  Although we visited friends (particularly Francine, Tony and their children) 
during that first week, for the most part we occupied ourselves by exploring the 
community and driving down to Beagle Bay, a neighbouring community. 
We spent the day of the funeral in the community hall aware that our very 
presence was an intrusion.  At about 3pm a line of men and boys, all wearing formal 
suits, paraded from the elder’s house up the hill to the community cemetery.  As we 
sat in the hall we saw part of this procession.  It struck me as surreal, yet it had a 
specific history.  One woman with us picked up a camera and began to walk outside.  
I stopped her.  Photographs of a procession of ‘Aboriginal’ people, all in formal suits, 
is most likely to act as a catalyst for stories about the exotic ‘Other’ rather than 
accounts of colonial history or even of cultural adaptation.  And so.  Lines of suits.  
Maps of grief. 
As part of the anti-colonial project of this thesis it is necessary to try to 
understand and to thereby respect the identities of Indigenous people.  This process is 
facilitated if we first understand our own identity – not as a direct equivalent of 
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Indigenous identity but as a ground from which to observe similarities and differences.  
(This is an individual and national imperative for the 1990s in Australia.) 
“Narratives form a cultural contract between individuals, groups and our 
social universe.  If narratives give our lives meaning we need to understand what those 
narratives are and how they come to exert such an influence on us”68 according to Peter 
McLaren in his discussion on the importance of narrative for the construction of social 
identities.  Again from McLaren “my position is that we need to be able to read 
critically the narratives that are already reading us” because “all cultural identities 
presuppose a certain narrative intentionally and are informed by particular stories.”69  
To do this we need to be aware of these narratives, recognise how they “place us as 
subjects”.70  For this to occur we need to understand the differences between 
narratives, personal and official and, why it is that we “sanction certain narratives and 
discount others”.71  Why do we do this?  What are the political, ideological and 
emotional motivations for this?  To answer these questions, it is necessary to theorise 
the relationship between official and personal narratives.  This is the task of the 
following chapter. 
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69 McLaren, 1995, p. 98. 
70 Pile and Thrift, 1995, p. 19. 
71 McLaren, 1995, p. 98. 
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Chapter Two  
 
"We Live Our Lives by Telling and Listening to Stories" 
The writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original.  
His [sic] only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, 
in such a way as never to rest on any one of them.1 
This chapter reinforces for the reader the importance of narrative in the formation of 
identity, subjectivity, and relationships between people and institutions and, the inter-
relationship between grand and personal narratives in this process.  I am concerned 
with written narratives or grand narratives and with local, personal and oral narratives 
about who we are and what we do.  In part, I take Madan Sarup’s question in Identity, 
Culture and the Postmodern World (“Does identity exist independently of the 
narratives which speak it?”2)  as a catalyst for a discussion of narrative that insists that 
“stories structure the meanings by which a culture lives.”3 I further suggest that failing 
to appreciate the importance of narrative robs us of a powerful mechanism for 
understanding and negotiating relationships with others.  My interest in personal 
stories is augmented by postcolonial theory; itself concerned to challenge the validity 
of grand narratives, particularly of imperialism and colonialism, by providing a 
theoretical and political platform from which to challenge colonial structures and 
practices through the telling of and listening to personal narratives. 
Narrative is fundamental to society and everyday life so that, “the self is 
always the artefact of prior received and newly constructed narratives.”4  It is woven 
into the very fabric of life and is, I suggest, constituent of that fabric.  Michael Butor 
writes of narrative that it is: 
                                                          
1 Roland Barthes in Krim Benterrak, Stephen Muecke, Paddy Roe, Reading the Country, Fremantle: 
Fremantle Arts Press, 1984p. 19 
2 Madan Sarup, Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1996, p. 24. 
3 Steven Cohan and Linda Shires, Telling Stories: A Theoretical Analysis of Narrative Fiction, 
London: Routledge, 1988, p. 1. 
4 Feldman, 1991, p. 91. 
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a phenomenon which extends considerably beyond the scope of literature; 
it is one of the essential constituents of our understanding of reality.  From 
the time we begin to understand language until our death, we are 
perpetually surrounded by narratives, first of all in our family, then at 
school, then through an encounter with people and reading.5 
It could be suggested that people are born into an historical process in which 
official, personal and cultural narratives compete and inter-relate in the production of 
subjectivities.  The state’s recording of birth details – name, date, place of birth – is 
part of a mechanism for identifying individuals within grand narratives, it contributes 
to an official identity. So too legislation that governs where people live and how they 
behave is further productive of identity.  Relationships between the private and the 
public, the personal and the official are mediated through the narratives people tell.  
The point can thus be made that “narratives serve to provide an economy of movement 
to the way we survey our surrounds and the way we structure disparate images and 
readings of the world into a coherent story.”6  For instance, the ‘child explorer of 
mangrove swamps’ from Chapter One, through the accumulation of experiences and 
narratives about place and people, transformed Derby from a “mere tracing, a diagram, 
an abstract mark”, to a map in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari posit, “an experience 
in contact with the real.”7 
Often a tracing or an abstract mark is the result of a disjunction between 
official and personal narratives.  It occurs when they do not connect in meaningful 
ways.  Because official and personal narratives operate and are valued in quite different 
ways, an understanding of their differences and inter-relatedness are important for 
facilitating mapping rather than tracing.  Official, or public, and personal narratives 
can be understood in Emile Benveniste’s terms as ‘histoire’ and ‘discours’, “two 
different planes of utterance.”8   Ann Banfield translates these terms, in Unspeakable 
Sentences, as “narration Vs discourse.” 9  Discours refers specifically to “the linguistic 
context of communication.  It can be heard, requires a speaker and a listener, and “the 
desire of one to influence the other.”10  Histoire is the “content or materiality of 
                                                          
5 Horst Ruthrof, Semantics and the Body: Meaning from Frege to the Postmodern, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997, p. 34. 
6 McLaren, 1995, p. 92. 
7 Deleuze Gilles and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (trans) 
Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 12. 
8 Emile Benveniste “Problems in General Linguistics”, in Cohan and Shires, 1988, pp. 92-3. 
9 Banfield, 1982, p. 142. 
10 Cohan and Shires, 1988, p. 93. 
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events”11 that make up the story.  For Ann Banfield histoire “is negatively 
characterised by the absolute exclusion of a speaker (first person) and an 
addressee/hearer (second person).”12  It is this apparent exclusion that official 
discourses, such as history, education and law, rely on to appear seemingly ‘given’ or 
unmediated.  But perhaps it is more appropriate to understand the speaker as ‘removed 
or distant’ than excluded.  The materiality of a text is dependent, after all on it utterer.  
The result is that such official discourses are considered factual, objective and 
impersonal and often repressive or prohibitive.  The following quotation from Proust’s 
Remembrance of Things Past captures this sense of the repressive or prohibitive: 
I noticed ... that whenever he spoke of serious matters, whenever he used 
an expression which seemed to imply a definite opinion upon some 
important subject, he would take care to isolate, to sterilise it by using a 
special intonation, mechanical and ironic, as though he had put the phrase 
or word between inverted commas, and was anxious to disclaim any 
personal responsibility for it.13 
On the other hand, personal narratives are characterised by the immediacy of 
what is said and how.  They are invested with emotion and uncertainty.  Within 
Western cultures these narratives are not traditionally accorded the same status as 
official narratives, which is itself a function of the public or official.  In part this is due 
to the fact that  “we use different kinds of narratives to tell different kinds of stories ... 
we also sanction certain narratives and discount others for ideological and political 
reasons.”14  What must not be lost, is the fact that official and personal narratives are 
“intertwined and interdependent, and above all overlapping streams of historical 
experience.”15  It is imperative that official and personal narratives are not set up as 
opposites, either good or bad; the issue here is facilitating their productive inter-
relationships to advance postcolonial or anticolonial practices. 
There are “rules of discursive formation”16 for narratives that determine what 
can be said and consequently what is said, is engaged with.  As Sarap asserts, in his 
discussion of narrative and identity, these rules include “the place where the narrative 
                                                          
11 Cohan and Shires, 1988, p. 93. 
12Ann Banfield, Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction, 
London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 142. 
13Marcel Proust, Rememberance of Things Past (trans) C.K. Scott Moncrieff, New York: Random 
House, vol. 1, 1934, p. 74. 
14McLaren, 1995, p. 89. 
15 Sarap, 1996, p. 169. 
16 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Tavistock, 1972, p. 31. 
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is spoken [and] the medium used”17 is also vital.  In making this point he draws on 
Foucault’s work and writes: 
In any society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organised and redistributed.  According to Foucault, there are a number of 
‘procedures of exclusion’ operating, the most obvious being prohibition.  
We know very well that we are not free to say anything, that we cannot 
speak of anything where and when we like, and that just anyone, in short, 
cannot speak of just anything.”18 
As is demonstrated in Chapter Six, there are rules applied to seminars, rules 
that govern who speaks, when, how, and what it is appropriate to say.  Among other 
things the rules provide a certain ‘security’.  When the rules are breached, for example 
if for instance a woman speaks emotionally about her experiences of domestic violence 
in a way that causes seminar participants to be uncomfortable or personally confronted, 
what she says may well be discounted.  This occurs because she has transgressed the 
bounds between the personal and the official that are consistent with an academic 
seminar.  The rules of the seminar are invested with the necessary authority to facilitate 
this.  The seminar participants actualise or bring into play the rules and thereby 
sanction particular types of narrative. 
The narratives recounted in the previous chapter demonstrate that no clear 
demarcation can be drawn between grand and personal narratives.  The lessons we 
learn in Social Studies at school are part of the foundation from which we develop our 
knowledges and attitudes. That we are often unconscious of this is particularly so 
because narratives are intrinsic to “the practice of everyday life”19 and consequently 
become ‘naturalised’ and ‘taken-for-granted’.  For instance, we do not always reflect 
upon where our attitudes to a situation or group of people have come from.  Further, 
because grand narratives appear to be without agency they are often characterised as 
homogeneous, unchallengeable, unchangeable and therefore solely repressive.  But 
this is not the only way to regard them.  
By “making strange” the grand narratives of law, history and education for 
instance they cease to be seamless, their “narrativity”20 is thereby revealed and they 
                                                          
17 Sarap, 1996, p. 18. 
18 Sarap, 1996,p. 18. 
19 This phrase is the title of Michel de Certeau’s work, The Practice of Everyday Life, London: 
University of California Press, 1988. 
20 De Certeau, 1988, p. 78. 
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are recognisable as accounts of what is and does happen.  That ‘men’ make them is 
also highlighted. What is made apparent is that official narratives are not devoid of 
agency either historically or in their contemporary re-iterations.  They are purposeful, 
constructed and interpreted and may consequently be challenged and re-interpreted. 
This does not undermine the ‘Truth’ value or the power of official narratives to 
determine peoples’ lives.  They still function as ‘Truth’, but perhaps as only one of a 
set of truths.21 
One effect of “making strange” and exposing the “rules of discursive 
formation” of official narratives, demonstrates that they, as with all narrative, are 
mediated, politically motivated and are not agentless.  This renders them tractable for 
inter-relating to personal narratives because they then have parameters commensurate 
with those of personal narratives.  The rules that govern the relationship between 
speaker/narrator and listener/reader, including protocols about who speaks, when and 
in what tone, which are themselves functions of the rules of formation, are thus 
exposed. When it is this relationship, between the rules and what can be said that is in 
question, then the content of history, law, and other discourses can be a secondary 
concern to ‘who is telling the story to whom’ for the purposes of directing change by 
empowering people to intervene.  It is not that ‘what is recounted is dismissed’ rather, 
in this process there is an emphasis on the ‘who, why and how’ of telling. When who 
is speaking is of concern then “the significance of the story is determined less by its 
actual content than by the point of its being told, that is, the relationships mediated by 
the act of narration.”22  The importance of this for negotiating productive relationships 
between people who might not usually form these connections is illustrated in Chapter 
Six through a discussion of a cross cultural awareness seminar for Western Australian 
magistrates. 
That what can be said in a place is determined by the “rules of discursive 
formation”, is generally accepted.  But, that a person’s response to an official narrative 
is frequently already “coded” in the discourse of the narrative23 is perhaps less obvious.  
However, my experience of taking a group of students to the “Patterns of Life. The 
                                                          
21 Feminist interventions into patriarchal discourses are an important example of this. 
22 Chambers, 1984, pp. 3-4. 
23 In Ruthrof, 1997, p.14, he writes: 
The difference lies in the way in which the stipulated reader’s response is coded in each case.  In the 
scientific piece we are presented primarily with definitions and linking propositions which invite 
proper response and undermine concretisations. 
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Story of the Aboriginal people of Western Australia” exhibit at the Perth museum, 
theorised in Chapter Four, demonstrates that this is so.  The students initially read the 
exhibit, a display of traditional artefacts, body markings and photographs, as one might 
a scientific report, that is, as if it had an intrinsic authority that was beyond question. 
This occurred, I believe, because anthropological, ‘museumised’ text presented to 
them encouraged a propositional reading.  However, in later discussions, away from 
the museum, the students modified their readings of the “Patterns of Life” exhibit 
according to their lived experiences. 
The official museum narrative prompted critiques and discussion that enabled 
the students to challenge the official representations and rethink their own 
understanding of the knowledges presented.  The message is clear: “while some grand 
narratives serve absolutist and authoritarian roles this should not suggest that all 
historical narratives are [always] of destructive import.”24  Rather, while they can be 
destructive, the same narratives can be “politically enabling of social 
transformation”.25  It is therefore important not to merely foster negative attitudes to 
grand narratives.  And, to remember, from Foucault, particularly in his work on power 
and knowledge, that official narratives are never only repressive, they also productive.  
What is important is the processes for reading the grand narratives and whether these 
can be mediated to produce responses, other than stereotypical responses, for example 
by a juxtaposition of appropriate personal narrative with the grand narrative. 
Many critiques of official narratives, the ways they are represented and the 
effects of them, have come from within postmodernism.  In some instances, they have 
taken the form of challenges to identity, particularly those that are officially validated.  
We are left asking, is the subject the agent of her or his own being?  Peter Mclaren 
engages with this question in other forms in Critical Pedagogy and Predatory Culture.  
In the introduction to his text he takes two questions from (“Complex, ontology and 
our stake in the theatre”), an article written by David Holt,26 “Does meaning generate 
life or does life generate meaning?”  McLaren’s interest in these questions derives 
from his own concern with being “both the subject and object of meaning”27 a dilemma 
                                                          
24 McLaren, 1995, p. 93. 
25 McLaren, 1995, p. 89. 
26 David Holt “Complex, ontology and our stake in the theatre”, in Texts of Identity, J. Shotter and K. 
Gergen (eds), London: Sage, 1989, cited in McLaren, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 15. 
27 McLaren, 1995, p. 15. 
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he locates in postmodernity or more precisely “within the tension”28 between 
modernism and postmodernism.  He writes as explanation to these questions that: 
[t]he first question is posed within the discourse of modernity in which it 
is assumed that our lives should be lived out as an explanation of a meaning 
prior to life, a transcendental meaning that is codified in a conception of 
metaphysical truth.  The second reflects the advent of postmodernity and 
the shattering of the notion of “truth” based on metaphysical assumptions.  
To live life as if it generated meaning is to live within the contingency and 
uncertainty of the present in which ethics, tradition and agency are revealed 
to be social constructions or cultural fictions.29 
Holt’s questions and McLaren’s explanation highlight a significant and 
welcomed shift in the status of official narratives in Western societies. They re-echo 
what Lyotard identifies as a “crisis in legitimacy”, exemplified for him by Auschwitz 
and which is manifested in a distrust of grand narratives that he identifies as having  
“the goal of legitimating social and political institutions and practices, laws, ethics, 
ways of thinking.”30  In many ways, throughout this thesis I take up the question posed 
by Lyotard after Auschwitz, “How could the grand narratives of legitimation still have 
credibility in these circumstances?”31 but ask it of  anthropology, as it functions in the 
Perth Museum, Western Australian State legislation, and in the Western legal system. 
Postmodern narratives, including postcolonialism and many areas of feminist 
theory, are responses to this “crisis in legitimacy”, they challenge official assumptions 
about truth, justice and equality.  As such they represent a ‘calling into being’ or 
interpellation of other stories, other ways of knowing and personal critiques.  The 
meta-narratives of postcolonialism and feminism, are instrumental in providing a 
forum for the articulation of local and personal experiences.  Under the influence of 
such developments grand narratives such as law and anthropology are also engaging 
with local stories. This engagement can be understood in several ways.  Institutions 
such as law, education and anthropology that have traditionally determined notions of 
truth, justice and equality are not immune to critique.  Importantly, neither are they 
agentless, that is, people operate within them, though the power of these institutions 
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29 McLaren, 1995, p. 15. 
30 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained to Children, Sydney: Power Press, 1986, 
 p. 29. 
31 Lyotard, 1986, p. 31. 
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often suggests otherwise, and these people may themselves be involved in 
postcolonial, feminist and other critiques.32 
It is also the case that modernist institutions and grand narratives can co-opt 
and dis-empower the very critiques set against them through the incorporation of 
emancipatory rhetoric and fields of knowledge into their own discourse.  In Chapter 
Six a discussion of the Western legal system as it operates in Australia and the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody demonstrates this point.  The lesson to 
be learned here is articulated by McLaren.  In his discussion of critical pedagogy as a 
tangible strategy for empowerment, he asserts that “without regard to the 
transformation of those social structures which shape the very lineaments of the self”, 
that is, the grand narratives of law, education, religion and others, it “is not 
empowerment at all but a naif sojourn into a version of humanistic therapy where 
catharsis is mistaken for liberation.”33 The warning here is clear.  The value of 
emancipatory narratives such as that provided by the Royal Commission, 
postcolonialism and other personal narratives are limited if all they do is expose the 
injustices and racism of colonialism without providing alternative practices.  For 
McLaren, ensuring these alternatives involves “establish[ing] new moral and political 
frontiers of emancipatory and collective struggle, where both subjugated narratives 
and new narratives can be written and voiced in the arena of democracy.”34  Thus it is 
necessary not only to have a meaningful juxtaposition of grand and personal narratives, 
but also for this to be embedded in a reformed meta-narrative which ensures that each 
type of contribution is valued.  A new “becoming” of the rules of the narrative game. 
2.1 Deterritorialising the official 
Postmodernism has challenged the validity of grand narratives and undermining their 
claims to objectivity by foregrounding the human agency that is so often denied.   This 
challenge is clearly articulated by Godzich in the introduction to Story and Situation, 
a text that discusses the importance of context and the reason for telling stories.  He 
writes: 
                                                          
32 That this change is usually slow and conservative is discussed in detail in the following chapters 
where specific examples of challenges to grand narratives are discussed. 
33 McLaren, 1995, p. 83. 
34 McLaren, 1995, p. 83. 
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… once upon a time it was claimed ... that “men made history,” that human 
beings were the subject of history.  Now, with the equation of history and 
narrative, that claim becomes the derisory one that “men make stories,” 
that human beings are the subjects of stories. ...  We do tell stories.  It also 
shifts the focus away from what stories are about, from what they recount, 
to who is telling the story to whom ... stories relate speakers and listeners 
in an act of communication they constitute.  The question of what is 
recounted will not, however, be so easily dismissed.  Even when the focus 
is shifted onto the communicative act, it persists, but under a new guise: 
by virtue of what does the speaker, the storyteller, spin the tale?35 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault directs a similar challenge at the 
grand, or in his terms “totalising”, narratives of Western history.  For Foucault, it is 
the grand recit or “the ‘face’ of a period”36 that: 
… seek[s] to reconstitute the overall form of a civilisation, the principle – 
material or spiritual – of a society, the significance common to all the 
phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their cohesion37 
and in doing so ignores the microscopic knowledges and experiences of the 
same period.  It ‘forgets’ the experiences of minorities.  Yet, as McLaren asserts, all 
the while there is a relationship or an “exchange between History and its subjects.”38  
To make obvious this exchange and to distinguish between the microscopic and the 
macroscopic scales upon which histories are written Foucault draws on the work of 
Canguilhem and the history of science.  This distinction is foregrounded as part of a 
strategy for exposing the discontinuities, ruptures and transformations that are 
concealed beneath the apparent seamlessness of the grand recits.  So, for instance, he 
writes of the history of science that: 
… a discovery, the development of a method, the achievements, and the 
failures, of a particular scientist, do not have the same incidence, and 
cannot be described in the same way at both levels; on each of the two 
levels, a different history is being written.39 
The consequence of engaging with both the micro and macro levels of history 
or of knowledges is that “the possibility of a total history begin[s] to disappear”.40 I 
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36 Foucault, 1972, p. 9. 
37 Foucault, 1972, p. 9. 
38 McLaren, 1995, p. 90. 
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demonstrate this later by analysing ways in which official (macro) and personal 
(micro) narratives intersect through a discussion of Western Australian legislation that 
determined the lives of Aboriginal people from 1848 to the present.  Bringing together 
these two accounts of the same historical period and legislation illustrates very clearly 
that on “each of the two levels a different history is being written” or told and that 
identity and subjectivity are a function of history.  This is a process that McLaren 
identifies as “critical narratology, reading personal narrative (our own and those of our 
students) against society’s treasured stock of imperial or magisterial narratives.”41 
Life stories and personal accounts of experience make clear that grand 
narratives – history, law, education – are not dissociated from personal narratives, 
rather they have substantive effects on people’s lives.  When these narratives are told 
and heard their role in the formation of identities can be appreciated.  In Western 
Australia, for instance, many non-Indigenous people accept that Aboriginal people 
have been ‘looked after’ by the state.  Until the 1980s little information that 
contradicted this view was available to the general public.  This limited understanding 
has changed somewhat with the publication of life stories, and the telling of personal 
experiences through the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and 
more recently the Bringing Them Home and Telling Our Stories,42 both reports on the 
lives of Aboriginal children taken from their families.  The point that needs to be 
reiterated is that both Indigenous and non-Indigenous identities are formed through 
official narratives and can be re-formed through the interplay of these and personal 
narratives.  That the results of this process were subsequently undermined and at least 
partially rejected by the State government demonstrates that the over-arching grand 
narrative is not yet reformed. 
It is my contention that the importance of personal narratives in Western 
culture is consistently undervalued and they are therefore afforded quite different and 
unequal status to that of history.  However, with postmodernism, official ‘memories’ 
of the past are being ruptured, made discontinuous, through life stories, 
autobiographies, biographies and oral accounts. Consequently, personal accounts of 
history and knowledge are being re-validated as a way of re-evaluating history.  
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Further, postcolonialism insists that personal stories contribute to understandings of 
identity (and subjectivity), and to vital ethical issues.  As is illustrated in Chapter Five, 
where the purpose of Western Australian government legislation is compared with 
experiences that demonstrate its affects, it is by understanding the ways official and 
personal narratives intersect that the affects of injustices and inequities on peoples’ 
lives are realised.43 
Horst Ruthrof in The Reader’s Construction of Narrative, provides a useful 
key to unlocking this inter-relationship.  He suggests that we need to consider the ways 
in which readers receive information.  Ruthrof makes the claim that “our knowledge 
of things is intimately linked with the way in which we are able to encounter and use 
them.”44  This is productive, for me, as a way of thinking about the reception of 
personal as opposed to official narratives in situations such as law courts or academic 
seminar where they are not usually sanctioned. 
Official narratives have a ‘particular social standing’, which frequently results 
in them being accepted as truth, often without their validity being tested or authority 
challenged.  However, if these official narratives are juxtaposed with personal 
narratives that provide quite a different account of the same ‘facts’ and, in a non-
routine context, they may be received differently.  This is borne out by the experience 
of a Western Australian magistrate who was profoundly affected by the personal 
account of institutionalisation and social deprivation that he heard at the “Aboriginal 
Culture: Law and Change” seminar in December 1994.  Although he had heard this 
same information many times before, on this occasion the venue was different, he was 
not in a courtroom, and therefore the rules governing his listening had altered.  Within 
this context, the magistrate appreciated that this account of institutionalisation was 
both deeply personal and common to many Indigenous Australians.  In that moment, 
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he appreciated the interplay between past government legislation on the lives of many 
individual people.45 
This magistrate’s experience can be explained through what Hugh Webb 
suggests is the creation of a world-view that “blends the private and public 
experience”.46  He explains what he means through a discussion of Wole Soyinka’s 
account of the brutal treatment he received as a prisoner at the hands of the Nigerian 
government.  Soyinka’s description of this experience avoids the suggestion that the 
treatment was a response by the government to him.  According to Webb, had Soyinka 
suggested that this was “a strictly personal experience”47 he would have constructed 
himself as a martyr and the point that “the experience is not an isolated example of 
official violence but rather a ‘regime of violence’”,48 would have been lost.  The power 
of the personal story comes partially from the storyteller’s ability to bridge the divide 
between private and public, thereby situating “the self as a product of history”49 and 
ensuring its political efficacy. 
A similar critique of When the Pelican Laughed, the life story of Alice 
Nannup, can be made.  While this book is largely an account of Nannup’s own life, 
the project is much broader.  She too uses her personal experience strategically, to 
engage the reader in a critique of the ways Aboriginal people have been treated in 
Western Australia because of racism and racist, paternalistic legislation.  Accounts of 
being taken from her mother and later fighting to protect her own children cause the 
reader to empathise with Nannup, and by extension other Aboriginal people, rather 
than simply align her/himself with the legislation. 
2.2 Becoming personal 
The term ‘autobiography’ is most commonly used to refer to the written account of a 
person’s life.  In this section of the chapter I discuss autobiography and extend the 
general use of the term to include the oral accounts of peoples’ lives.  To do this I 
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begin with a definition provided by James Goodwin in Autobiography The Self Made 
Text where he explains that: 
... understanding the genre is to consider the components of the 
combinative word auto / bio/graphy.  The combining stem auto means self, 
self-acting, or self-caused.  Bio derives from the root meaning in Greek: 
“mode of living” or, simply, “life”.  Graphy is another combining form; in 
English this is derived from Greek, with the root meaning “to write.”  By 
definition then, autobiography brings into direct association self, life, and 
writing, with each component in dynamic, reflexive relationship to the 
other two. This root definition does not require that personal history 
provide the shaping form for the interrelationship between self, life and 
writing, though one long tradition within the genre is historical in 
function.50 
“Autobiography [thus] brings into direct association self, life, and writing”, so 
there is “a moving, changing relationship between the author as narrating self and the 
author as experiencing self.  For, of course, the autobiographer is both at once narrator 
and narrative subject.”51  It is at this point that I want to broaden the definition to include 
speaking.  It is, after all, through speaking that self and life most often ‘articulate’.  
Autobiography in this case is obviously not a written text but the store of personal 
narratives that make up a person’s life.  It is this repertoire of personal narratives I argue 
that are relied upon to make meaning while not necessarily acknowledged as such, nor 
as a political strategy.  It is not unusual, for instance, to have several stories about oneself 
that are told and retold at family gathering or reunions.  Photographs are often produced 
as evidence of the events recounted.  The stories and photos are part of the way we 
represent ourselves and re-invent who we are.  They are also tangible links between 
family members and friends, just as they are often links with broader social contexts.  It 
is through the telling of and listening to stories that people relate to individuals, groups 
and in the public domain.  As Peter McLaren explains, narratives form “a cultural 
contract between individuals, groups and our social universe.”52  Of course it is 
commonly understood that our personal experiences intersect with the experiences of 
others, we are always inter-relating.  New experiences not only add to the repertoire of 
our own experiences, they change how the past is understood, how it is narrated.  
Likewise, they determine how future experiences, including relationships, will be 
                                                          
50 James Goodwin, Autobiography The Self Made Text, New York: Macmillian Publishing, 1993, p. 3. 
51 Webb, 1978, p. 12. 
52 McLaren, 1995, p. 89. 
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determined.  A “new metaphor of self (and, implicitly a new socio-political stance)”53 is 
thus always in the process of becoming. 
By extending the boundaries in this way it is possible to appreciate that story 
is about recounting an event or sequence of events to someone else as a means of 
relating to each other not merely to tell our story. So: 
 [t]he storyteller takes what he tells from experience – his own and that 
reported by others.  And he in turn makes it the experience of those who 
are listening to his tale.54 
The story is always told for the self as well as the other.  It is a thread within 
the fabrication of one’s own life and thus the ‘placing’ of oneself within a broader 
social context.55  As Mclaren writes “personal identity is linked to the coherence of 
one’s life story.” 56  To take on the “burden of being the storyteller of one’s own life is 
not only to give life coherence, it is to preserve one’s identity.”57 
Autobiography is “a weave in which self-consciousness is delicately threaded 
throughout interrelated experience.”58  The threads of the autobiographer’s experience 
are taken up and used in various ways, like a tapestry.  However, while the weaver 
may have a plan of the finished piece the texture of the threads; whether they break 
and need to be knotted; whether the dye lot has altered all; are in some senses beyond 
the weaver’s control and so the work has its own impetus and its own integrity.  It 
becomes in this sense a work other than the one the weaver designed.  Often it is “a 
retrospective account of a man’s [sic] whole life (or a significant part of a life) written 
as avowed truth and for a specific purpose by a man who lived the life.”59 
                                                          
53 Webb, 1978, p.13. 
54Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller” in Illuminations (trans) Harry Zohn, London: Fontana, (1931) 
1973. 
55 This is particularly important for the discussions of Alice Nannup and Robin Eades’ accounts of 
their lives in Chapters Five and Six. 
56 Julie Dowling, Yamajti artist, asserts the importance of coherence in a person’s life by ‘painting in’ 
the faces of family who are absent from photos because they had been taken away.  For Dowling, this 
“painting in” is a recognition of the need for evidence of ones belonging.  The “missing person” needs 
to be able to say “these are my people, this is where I belong”. Personal conversation. 
57 McLaren, 1995, p. 93. 
58 Karl Weintraub, “Autobiography and Historical Consciousness” in Critical Inquiry, June 1975, 
Vol. 1 No. 4, pp. 821-48, cited in Webb, 1978. 
59 B.J. Mandel, “The Autobiographer’s Art” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, xxvii, 1968, p. 
217, cited in Webb, 1978. 
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Significantly it is an ordered telling of the events, or more correctly a selection 
of the events of a person’s life. But: 
 [i]t is not simply the narration of the voyage but also the voyage itself.  
There must be in it a sense of discovery ... the voyage itself in 
autobiography is a remembering activity.  More than any other narrative 
genre, autobiography testifies to remembering’s role in the construction of 
a narrative identity.  What is more it reveals conclusively that such 
remembering cannot be limited to a mechanical reproduction but must be 
understood as a creative process in which what is created is precisely the 
autobiographer’s identity.60 
The role of remembering is of course multiple.   For “even as the 
autobiographer fixes limits in the past, a new experiment in living, a new experiment in 
consciousness ... and a new projection or metaphor of a new self is underway.”61  Here 
Olney makes the point that while remembering functions as an agent for the construction 
of identities fixed in the past, its real importance and particularly I add, when it takes the 
form of everyday verbal stories of self, is as an impetus for future projections, trajectories 
or “lines of flight”.  For instance, as a child playing in mangrove swamps in Derby I 
could not imagine how that might relate later to learning about ‘Aboriginal’ people in 
Social Studies lessons.  Years later this memory augmented relationships with people in 
Roebourne.  They were a becoming Roebourne. 
What events are selected, to be told or are highlighted as significant, depends 
on the purpose of the narration.  There are events that are repeated, often in different 
ways.  Significantly there are also exclusions.  Why are certain stories withheld?  What 
story do we want to tell?  What effect do we want to elicit?   These questions are 
catalysts to produce a variety of narratives.  They may be productively thought of as 
rhizomatic nodes, the “point from which segmentary lines explode into a line of 
flight”.62  That they are catalysts re-inforces the idea of identity as constructed.  That 
they are rhizomatic reinforces identity as multiplicitous. 
Clearly, autobiography is mediated truth or fiction but a discourse generally 
held to have a stronger, more direct connection with events, the human experience and 
the record of a life.  The autobiography combines the functions of both the literary and 
historical text and is therefore generically hybrid.  It is this hybridity that ensures the 
                                                          
60 B. Deconconi, Remembering a Hermeneutic Narrative Time, U.S.A.: University Microfilms, 1980. 
61 James Olney, cited in Hugh Webb, 1978, pp. 12-13. 
62 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 9. 
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power of autobiography as a representation of one’s life rather than the ‘mere telling 
of stories about self and others’.  It embodies within it an acceptable and readily 
absorbed form of integration of grand and personal narratives – the figure in the field 
of history.  As I have written elsewhere, “distinctions between historical and literary 
texts are generally made on the premise that history is factual, therefore authoritative, 
while literature is fictional, therefore entertainment.”63 Autobiography explains the 
emotional elements of experience including love, suffering, displacement, and the 
search for meaning and identity. And, ironically the ‘truth value’ of autobiography is 
increased by this appeal to very powerful emotions. 
The reader of autobiography, like the listener and the critic may well have 
ambiguous responses to the text.  After all: 
 … [a]re we to ignore the generic constrictions of event and character, the 
rhetoric of the fiction, in favour of interpretation of the text as straight 
history?  And if we question the motives of this or that character will our 
comments be taken as criticisms of real people?  This is still more difficult 
to deal with when juxtaposed with a certain amount of personal courage in 
the narrator’s effort to express the unsayable, to tell the risky story of 
oppression.64 
Muecke is correct in highlighting the difficulty a reader might have when 
dealing with autobiography.  This is multiplied when it is the autobiography of a 
woman, such as Alice Nannup, from a minority group who has had little opportunity 
to speak within a public arena. 
The informed reader of autobiography, however, realises those details such 
as the clothes people were wearing, or in what activities they were engaged on a given 
day is not always the unmediated memory of the author.  That these details may be 
inaccurate or constructed does not cause the work to be regarded as a work of fiction.  
Rather the metaphors, images and dialogue presented to the reader are used to ensure 
that the story reflects a reality.  As the narrator reveals the events of his or her life, the 
reader can accept that these events and conversations have been reconstructed so that 
the ‘truth’ may be conveyed in a plausible way. Thus, reconstruction or construction 
of images and dialogues in isolated passages within an autobiography can be accepted 
                                                          
63Kathryn Trees, Counter-Memories: History and Identity in Aboriginal Literature, Murdoch: 
Murdoch University Honours Thesis, 1990, p. 8. 




as ‘truths’ even though they are fictional.  This acceptance ensures that the author is 
not constantly challenged, while readers feel that they have been privileged with the 
‘truth’ about a person.  A willing suspension of disbelief. 
While it is generally the case that autobiography is about the self or mapping 
one’s own identity, the boundaries of the genre have been extended, particularly in the 
case of Indigenous peoples’ life-stories, to include a greater emphasis on the 
relationship of self to the broader social context.  Kateryna Longley in “Aboriginal 
Biographies” explains that the genre of autobiography has been adapted for the writing 
of Aboriginal life-stories.  She points to two recurring features that set Aboriginal 
autobiography apart from western autobiography: 
one is the sense of communal life that is evoked through the individual 
story and the other is the intimate relationship with tribal land.65 
From the reading of Alice Nannup’s life-story, When the Pelican Laughed, 
offered in Chapter Five, that the individual is of secondary importance to the wider 
Indigenous community is apparent.  Nannup situates herself in relation to the 1905 
Aborigines Act of Western Australia, that is, within History, and in doing so 
demonstrates that her experience is, while unique, common to thousands of Indigenous 
people within the State.  As such it is “a self-conscious construction of a narrative at 
different levels, a narrative that deals with change, both personal and social, 
psychoanalytical and historical.”66 
In Aboriginal life-stories the confluence of place, time and the inter-
relationship with others in the formation of identity is clearly marked.  All definitions 
of self for Indigenous people include their relationship to country, the land belonging 
to their tribal group.67  Nannup powerfully portrays this relationship to country when 
she describes her final trip back to Deep Reach, a large pool in Millstream National 
Park, part of her country and a sacred area for the Injibarndi people.  Nannup writes: 
This is the place where the old snake lives, and I’d always been told by my 
mother that we mustn’t go to a pool without making our peace.  If you’ve 
                                                          
65 Kateryna Longley. “Aboriginal Story Telling by Aboriginal Women” in De/Colonising the Subject:  
Politics and Gender in Women’s Autobiographical Practise, Minnesota: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1992, p.370. 
66 Sarap, 1996, p. 19. 
67 Although there are Indigenous people who do not use terms such as ‘tribal’ because of negative 
associations with primitivism, I use the term because the Ngulama, Injibarndi and Bunjima people use 
it.  For further discussion of this and other terms used to define Indigenous people see Fesl, 1993. 
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been away you can’t just go back there and walk around or do what you 
like, that’s the law. 
When we got to the edge of the pool Noel went down and got some water, 
put his hands into mine, and I took it.  I put the water into my mouth and 
blew hard towards the sun.  As I blew this big rainbow came, and I said, 
‘Yinda ngurra – I belong.’68 
This relationship to country is co-extensive with relationships to all people 
who share that country.  Mappings of country.  Mappings of people.  The significance 
of inter-community relationships for the construction of identity is foregrounded in 
Indigenous communities by asking a personal question such as, “what are you like?”  
The response is often, “you would be better asking off asking nanna”.  Thus, for 
Aboriginal narrative, the personal and the grand elements are integrated through the 
shared elements of community and the grounding of ‘country’. 
 
                                                          
68 Alice Nannup, Lauren Marsh, Stephen Kinnane, When the Pelican Laughed, Fremantle: Fremantle 
Arts Centre Press, 1992, p. 223. 
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Chapter Three  
 
A Postcolonial Story? 
But with three authors one cannot imagine that the book is guided by any 
poetic unity or harmony.  On the contrary, the poetry is of a different sort, 
one that responds to our times.  It is a poetry of fragmentation, 
contradiction, unanswered questions, specificity, fluidity and change.1 
Here Stephen Muecke is writing about Reading the Country, a book that he co-
authored with Krim Benterrak and Paddy Roe, which describes a journey into Roebuck 
Plains near Broome in Australia’s far north-west.  It seems to me that he could just as 
easily be writing about postcolonial theory.  “Fragmentation, contradiction, 
unanswered questions, specificity, fluidity and change”, a response to the times, are 
all productive descriptions of this problematic theoretical position; imbued as it is 
“with all the ambiguity and complexity of the many different cultural experiences it 
implicates”.2  By virtue of being about the specific or local within a global frame, 
postcolonial theory is necessarily multi-faceted, fragmented and contradictory.  
Explanations that apply to the historico-cultural conditions of one group of people will 
almost certainly have things in common with others but will also contradict them. 
This work of Benterrak, Muecke and Roe’s might be considered a ‘model’ 
postcolonial text, written as it is by three writers from quite disparate backgrounds - an 
Indigenous Australian elder and storyteller, a ‘white’ Australian academic and a 
Moroccan artist who together represent the complexity of relationships in a ‘settler-
invader’3 society such as Australia.  The text is a rich tapestry of story, theory and art. 
Benterrak, Meucke and Roe each contribute their talents and knowledges ensuring that 
it is varied in colour, texture and weave.  And the threads are interwoven so that there 
                                                          
1 Benterrak, Muecke, Roe, Reading the Country, Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1984, p. 11. 
2 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (eds), The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, London: 
Routledge, 1995, p. 2. 
3 The term ‘settler-invader’ is taken from Diana Brydon and Helen Tiffin’s Decolonising Fictions, 
Sydney: Dangaroo Press, 1993, p.12.  They use the term to define countries such as Australia to which 
the English language and culture were transported and internalised and were instrumental in 
“militating against developing an Indigenous identity”. 
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is a seamless relationship between them and the country they represent.  The text is 
introduced as “an exploration of the meaning of place, an attempt to chart the 
relationships between people and those specific places in which they must find a place 
to live.  It is a journey through landscape into language and ideas, and personal and 
cultural location.”4 
Muecke explains the central role of the Indigenous voice: 
[t]hese are the words which most clearly and consistently tell of the country.  
They are set in the context of a babel of other voices – writings – from the 
past and present which clamour around and are, in contrast, quite ephemeral.  
Restricted to particular historical periods, they are other discourses on the 
country.  There will be more to come, following in Paddy Roe’s footsteps, 
or ignoring them.  But one ignores the local guide at one’s own peril, for he 
is telling us how to survive in this country, and survival depends not just on 
the right sort of physical treatment of the country, but also on what one says 
about it, writes about it, and the images one makes of it.5 
The reader is counselled about the importance of listening to local people or 
guides (in this case Paddy Roe) if a non-Indigenous person is to find her or his way 
around and, indeed, even survive in unfamiliar country.  However, the local voice, the 
one that can provide the necessary knowledge, easily ‘gets lost’ or is unable to be heard 
in the “babel of other voices”, in this case those of the ‘newcomers’.  There is a timely 
lesson here.  It is necessary to listen and to take advice from the locals.  This lesson 
should be central to postcolonial theory with its unfortunate propensity for 
recolonisation or reterritorialisation, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, of the very 
‘voices’ it is trying to hear and spaces it seeks to open. 
The timely lesson.  The need to listen to the local guide.  Surviving in the 
country.  Muecke’s caution is re-echoed by Stephen Slemon in his article, “The 
Scramble for Post-Colonialism”.  Slemon warns that: 
We need to remember that resistances to colonialist power always find 
material presence at the level of the local, and so the research and training 
we carry out in the field of post-colonialism, whatever else it does, must 
always find ways to address the local…6 
                                                          
4 Benterrak, et al., 1984, Inside Front Cover. 
5 Benterrak, et al., 1984, p. 23. 
6 Stephen Slemon, “The Scramble for Post-Colonialism”, in De-Scribing Empire Post-Colonialism 
and Textuality Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson (eds), London: Routledge, 1994, p. 31. 
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This concern with the local is central to my engagement with postcolonial 
theory, because what I am interested in are relationships between people and institutions 
in Western Australia.  I want to know, for instance, how Western Australian legislation, 
such as the 1905 Aborigines Act, affected the lives of Indigenous people and what the 
repercussions of that are now.  And, I want to explore ways in which I, as a white 
academic within the field of postcolonial studies, can contribute to a process of political 
and social change that challenges continuing colonialist practices and values.  Slemon 
also suggests that if we neglect to apply our research then “we risk turning the work of 
our field into the playful operations of an academic glass-bead game.”7  ‘Trinkets for the 
natives.’    Academic privilege to the theorists. 
In the discussion that follows I situate postcolonial theory within a global 
context prior to interrogating its local application.  My motivation for this is twofold.  
First, colonialism, what in part can be understood as “political, economic and 
discursive oppression”8 of much of the world’s people, is global in nature.  While all 
forms of colonialism are oppressive, it is also the case that “the forms of colonialist 
power differ radically across cultural locations”9 and therefore elicit quite different 
responses.  Hence the need to engage with postcolonial theory locally while 
understanding it globally.  And, secondly, postcolonial theory has its own antecedents, 
one of these being postmodernism.  Appreciating the relationship between the global 
and the local further ensures that colonial experiences are not understood as isolated 
occurrences or detached from broader philosophical movements.10 
                                                          
7 Slemon, 1994, p. 32. 
8 Slemon, 1994, p. 31. 
9 Slemon, 1994, p. 31. 
10 Paolo Friere, in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Ringwood: Penguin, 1972, p. 111 discusses what 
he perceives to be a real danger in focalised views of oppressive situations that exclude understanding 
it within the broader context.  He writes: “One of the characteristics of oppressive cultural action 
which is almost never perceived by the dedicated but naïve professionals who are involved is the 
emphasis on a focalised view of problems rather than seeing them as dimensions of a totality.  In 
‘community development’ projects the more a region or area is broken down into ‘local communities’, 
without the study of these communities both as totalities in themselves and as parts of another totality 
(the area, region and so forth) – which in its turn is still part of a larger totality (the nation, as part of 
the continental totality) – the more alienation is intensified.  And, the more alienated people are, the 
easier it is to divide them and keep them divided.  These focalised forms of action, by intensifying the 
focalised way of life of the oppressed … hamper the oppressed from perceiving reality critically and 
keep them isolated from the problems of oppressed people in other areas.” 
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3.1 Interpolating the postcolonial 
I begin my engagement with the postcolonial by posing several questions.  Why was 
the postcolonial called into being?  Moreover, who did the calling and why?  And, of 
interest to me, is postcolonialism a useful strategy for challenging continuing colonial 
practices in Australia and therefore facilitating relationships between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people?  Many responses to these questions might be offered, each 
one providing a quite different map of the postcolonial terrain.  The quite markedly 
different responses to postcolonialism discussed later in this chapter reflect these 
potentially different maps. 
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge Lyotard suggests that 
postcolonialism is a postmodern interpolation.  The relationship that Lyotard suggests 
postmodernism and postcolonialism share is appreciable when postmodernism is 
understood as the result of a crisis in legitimacy and disillusionment with the grand 
narratives or Enlightenment ideals that underpin modernism.  This disillusionment is 
exemplified for him by the horror of Auschwitz, for it is here that “legitimation 
becomes visible as a problem and as an object of study” 11  Lyotard’s horror of the gas 
chambers causes him to denounce the Enlightenment project insisting that the potential 
for freedom, equality and justice that it promised could no longer be believed in.  
Postmodernism is an expression of the scepticism that followed, a critique of the grand 
narratives, including law and history, but he warns that it does not involve a “radical 
break” with “culture”, “aesthetic” or “socioeconomic organisation”12.  Rather, Lyotard 
has “characterised postmodernism ... as a cyclical moment that returns before the 
emergence of ever new modernisms,”13 a continual tracing or many tracings.  
Becoming postmodern, becoming modern. 
Recognising that we have not somehow left modernism behind and, more 
importantly, that “ever new modernisms” continually come into being, is vital to 
political action and social change.  It is not yet time to be complacent.  Williams and 
Chrisman are right to claim that while: 
                                                          
11 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. viii. 
12 Lyotard, 1988. p. vii. 
13 Lyotard, 1988, p. xvi. 
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... the issue of periodising remains relevant to ... postmodernism [because] 
the prefix suggests succession, temporal break, a new period (if not a new 
start); ... the idea of historical discontinuity has been challenged: 
postmoderism has been seen as the latest variant of modernism.14 
Deleuze and Guattari to provide a way of understanding postmodernism as 
yet “the latest variant of modernism” though of course it may well mean many other 
things.  I quote here from their conclusion to A Thousand Plateaus: 
The function of deterritorialisation: D is the movement by which “one” 
leaves the territory.  It is the operation of the line of flight.  There are very 
different cases.  D may be overlaid by a compensatory reterritorialisation 
obstructing the line of flight: D is then said to be negative.  Anything can 
serve as a reterritorialisation, in other words “stand for” the lost territory; 
one can reterritorialise on a being, an object, a book, an apparatus or system 
... For example, it is inaccurate to say that the State apparatus is territorial: 
it in fact performs a D, but one immediately overlaid by reterritorialisations 
on property, work and money ... .15 
Importantly, what is foregrounded here is the State’s ability to co-opt the 
processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, and by extension 
postmodernism.  In other words, the State supports and employs the very critical 
strategies developed to undermine its power and autonomy.  When postmodernism is 
considered in terms of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation or within a 
Lyotardian frame (and when the “diversity of ways of understanding 
contemporaneity” that it offers are foregrounded) productive conjunctions are 
certainly to be found between this and postcolonialism.16 
As postmodernism does not constitute “a radical break” with modernism, so 
too postcolonialism does not mark the end of colonialism.  Rather it is always a 
response to, and therefore in relationship with, the colonial and by extension with 
                                                          
14 Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, (ed), Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory, 
Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 12. 
15 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (trans) 
Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 508. 
16 While it is not my purpose here to debate the usefulness of postmodernism as a political strategy, or 
to defend it from charges of being apolitical, some caution is required.  For further discussion of the 
relationship between postmodernism and postcolonialism see Diana Brydon, “The White Innuit 
Speaks: Contamination as Literary Strategy” in The Post-Colonial Reader, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth 
Griffith, Helen Tiffin (eds), London: Routledge, 1995.  In this article on ‘contamination’, a term she 
uses to describe postmodern and postcolonial bringing together of differences in creative ways, she 
makes a poignant statement.  Brydon writes: “If postmodernism is at least partially about ‘how the 
world dreams itself to be ‘American’ (Stuart Hall quoted in Ross 1988: xii), then post-colonialism is 
about waking from that dream, and learning to dream otherwise”. 
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modernism.17  Becoming postcolonial, becoming colonial.  Postcolonialism, the 
demand for local histories, the stories of the once marginalised, is thus one 
postmodernist response to modernism’s crisis of legitimacy. Some would argue that it 
too represents a desire for legitimacy or perhaps an ‘absolution’ for the horrors of 
colonialism, and in Australia, of prison cells.18 
Postcolonialism can thus be understood as the theorisation and actualisation 
of that interpolation or calling.  It is the becoming other of colonialism.  This becoming 
maintains the trace of its predecessors so that, according to Williams and Chrisman, 
“neo-colonialism has been suggested as a more appropriate term for 
postcolonialsim.”19  This proposal corresponds to the views of a number of 
Australians, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, as is exemplified through a 
discussion of the “Postcolonial Fictions” conference, later in this chapter. 
In terms of certain ‘sites’ of contestation, I want to focus on some key areas 
in subsequent chapters.  In Chapter Six I discuss the Western legal system, a modernist 
institution, and the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar for magistrates, 
which might be understood as a postcolonial critique of that institution.  This 
discussion foregrounds the complex, inter-relationships between modernism, 
postmodernism, colonialism, and postcolonialism that I have argued for here.  The 
Western legal system as it operates in Western Australia is a modernist institution that 
relies on laws and precedents handed down from Britain over centuries and have been 
instrumental to colonial practices.  These laws, practices and the values they uphold 
are, at least in part, perpetuated by legal formalism, analogous to structuralism, which 
provides the frame in which law is taught and practiced.  Can a critique from within 
this system effectively challenge it, or is it merely a ‘negative reterritorialisation’? 
Though it may certainly appear that the law is intractable, and certainly its 
modernist foundation principles have remained fixed, it is important to recognise that 
it can be dynamic and respond specifically to the context in which it is practiced.  The 
                                                          
17 A useful discussion of this relationship between colonialism and postcolonialism is found in 
Suzanne Baker’s PhD Thesis, Clowning Seriously: The Political Force of Magic Realism in 
Postcolonial Fiction From Australia and Canada, Murdoch: Murdoch, 1997.  While Baker focuses 
primarily on the use of magic realism as a strategy for intervening in colonial texts, she also provides 
a useful discussion of postcolonialism as a “political and subversive force”. 
18 This reference to prison cells refers to the tragedy of the large and continuing number of Aboriginal 
deaths in custody in Australian prisons and police lock-ups.  It is discussed in Chapter Six here. 
19 Williams and Chrisman, 1993, p. 12. 
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“Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar is one example of this function.  Sir 
Anthony Mason, Chief Justice of Australia in an address for the inauguration of the 
Faculty of Law at Wollongong University in New South Wales in February 1991, also 
makes this point.  He said: 
to treat the law as a discrete set of principles in a vacuum and without a 
context is to misconceive its dynamic and ubiquitous nature and, more 
importantly, to undervalue or even to overlook the manner in which it 
contributes to the fundamental fabric of modern society.20 
The law is integral to societal change in that judges, magistrates, lawyers and 
other legal representatives can take on board feminist, Indigenous21 and Human Rights 
issues in their ways of dealing with people who come before the court and in their 
sentencing options. 22  My later discussion of the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and 
Change” seminar demonstrates the willingness of individual members of the judiciary 
and the legal system to engage with critiques of their own practice and, the system in 
which they operate, though it needs be said their willingness to change is not radical 
or immediate.  However, this same discussion also reveals ways in which the State has 
undermined the potential for change by looking for solutions within the legal system.  
The State has thus co-opted the process, it has performed a deterritorialisation but one 
immediately overlaid by reterritorialisations. 
Williams and Chrisman also express concern about the potential for change 
promised by postcolonialism and postmodernism.  They rightly warn that this 
“apparent newness” in thinking masks “an underlying continuity” that is unpalatable 
to many”23.  They draw on Walter Benjamin’s description of “commodity production 
as ‘the always new in the context of the ever the same’ where the need for the 
commodity to present itself as always new, different, desirable, masked the underlying, 
unchanging nature of capitalist relations of productions” 24 to make their point.  They 
further suggest that “both post-modernism and postcolonialism are bound up with the 
workings of contemporary capitalism, the one as ‘its cultural logic’, in Jameson’s 
                                                          
20 Stephen Bottomley, Neil Gunningham, Stephen Parker, Law in Context, Leichdart: Federation 
Press, 1991, p. 2. 
21 The law and how it acts in modern, postmodern and postcolonial ways in relation to Indigenous 
peoples in Western Australia is discussed in Chapters Five and Six. 
22 However, it can certainly be argued that there are too few practitioners in Australia who exercise the 
prerogative to be innovative so that most often modernist, legal formalist approaches to law are re-
enacted. 
23 Williams and Chrisman, 1993, p. 12. 
24 Williams and Chrisman, 1993, p. 12. 
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phrase, and the other as a specific form of its global ambitions” and “their need to 
represent themself as other than they are [thus] becomes readily comprehensible.”25  
Becoming postcolonial, becoming global, becoming colonial. 
Despite the limits of postcolonialism, arising from its “underlying, 
unchanging [colonial] nature”, it is still a powerful and productive force for 
challenging colonial accounts of history.  It demands the telling of, and listening to, 
personal stories and has thus facilitated the “revival of an essentially narrative view of 
‘truth’.”26  This has resulted in historians, anthropologists and judges being confronted 
with the need to explain human atrocities and sufferings, such as the gas chambers in 
World War II and Aboriginal deaths in custody in Australia, and to give assurances 
that they will not recur.  Reports such as the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths 
in Custody and Taking Them Home in Australia and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa are part of this process and this reassurance. 
Further, the critical practices that postcolonial theorists employ to interrogate 
colonial discourses are, like postmodern knowledges for Lyotard, “not simply ... 
tool[s] of the authorities; [they] refine our sensitivity to differences and reinforce our 
ability to tolerate the incommensurable.”27  So that, while it would be naive to over-
rate the power of local stories to effect change, in and of themselves, the “vitality of 
small narrative units at work everywhere locally in the present social system”28 means 
that the stories and life experiences of colonised people are being told in the public 
sphere from their own point of view.29  When narratives are told in the public sphere 
they attain legitimacy and can then be strategically employed not only to challenge 
official versions of events but also to be employed as a mechanism for demanding and 
effecting substantive social and political change.  Indigenous peoples’ submissions to 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody are a case in point.  This is 
Slemon’s point: “postcolonialism ... must always find ways to address the local.”30 
                                                          
25 Williams and Chrisman, 1993, p. 12. 
26 Lyotard, 1988, p. xii. 
27 Lyotard, 1988, p. 25. 
28 Lyotard, 1988, p. xii. 
29 It is not possible to suggest that there is an equivalence between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people’s telling of their stories within the public domain.  Non-Indigenous people have access to a 
greater variety of public forums and while it is not usual practice to discuss one’s own life within 
these spaces, a principal point of this thesis, the different power relationships and social status, still 
most often result in the objectification of Indigenous people. 
30 Slemon, 1994, p. 31. 
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3.2 Postcolonialism: becoming local, becoming personal 
In the “General Introduction” to The Post-Colonial Reader, Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin “address the local” by explaining that the purpose of the book is to determine 
how a “genuine post-colonial literary enterprise might proceed.”31   They do this by 
focusing on the literary which for them, has been “a critical site of political and cultural 
struggle”32 in the academy.  It is also a means for them to foreground the role of 
teaching and the need to revise teaching practice in the field.  This is in keeping with 
my own encounter with, and relationship to, postcolonial theory, in that I teach within 
this field and have always been very concerned with how what I teach in a 
“Postcolonial Writing”33 course – identity politics, theories of race, literary criticism, 
ethics and responsibility – connects with everyday lived ‘realities’.  Both within the 
course and in other aspects of my work the ‘realities’ that I focus on are the 
relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in Australia and more 
particularly in Western Australia.  As has already been indicated, of specific interest 
to me and a central focus of this thesis, is the strategic use of narrative, both personal 
and official, in decolonising or anti-colonial processes within specific local sites. 
In the following chapters, specific examples of the interrelationship between 
official narratives – anthropology, government legislation, the Western legal system – 
and the life experiences or life-stories of Aboriginal people are discussed.  For 
instance, the discussion in Chapter Four will reveal ways in which the “Patterns of Life 
Exhibition” at the Perth Museum perpetuates primitivistic and colonialist 
representations of Indigenous people and the grand narrative of anthropology.  
Through a discussion of a group of Indigenous and non-Indigenous students’ responses 
to the exhibit and the museum guide’s introduction to it, I foreground the importance 
of personal experiences and knowledges – a postcolonial strategy – to deconstruct 
those representations.  The Western legal system and local narratives including 
Customary law, the personal stories of young offenders, and women’s accounts of 
domestic violence will be discussed in the following chapter to demonstrate how these 
have been deployed to challenge official legal narratives.  In this context, local and 
personal narratives are productively thought of as postcolonial skirmishes or “lines of 
                                                          
31 Ashcroft et al., 1995, p. 4. 
32 Ashcroft et al., 1995, p. 4. 
33 “Postcolonial Writing” is a course taught in the English Programme at Murdoch University. 
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flight”.  When mobilised they can undermine, unsettle, even effect some change in the 
way that official narratives are played out.  Effectively the postmodern, postcolonial 
and critical writer, critic or teller of stories can assert some form of agency or political 
challenge.  Personal narratives are deployed by individuals as a way of mediating 
relationships with others and with grand narratives.  It is through this mediation, I 
suggest, that we cease to “tolerate the incommensurable”. 
Although it is not always possible to work simultaneously in the field of 
literature and in overtly political and, or practical arenas, I argue that teaching in 
courses framed by the term ‘postcolonialism’ requires a commitment to bring these 
sometimes disparate entities together in meaningful ways.  One means of facilitating 
this is by extending the parameters of literary courses to include relevant historical and 
political information that contextualises and expands upon the issues writers are 
concerned with.  At the same time, providing readers with access to a range of 
knowledges and strategies for increasing their potential to engage with the text. 
Several life-stories or personal narratives written by Indigenous people in 
Western Australia were published during the 1980s and are studied in Australian 
literature and postcolonial courses alike.  These texts included Glenyse Ward’s 
Wandering Girl and Unna You Fellas, Sally Morgan’s My Place and Wanamurraganya 
The Story of Jack McPhee, Alice Nannup, Stephen Kinnane and Lauren Marsh’s When 
the Pelican Laughed, Nugi Garimara’s (Doris Pilkington) Caprice – A Stockman’s 
Daughter and others.34  Each of these books provides significant information about the 
lives of Aboriginal people and their relationships with colonial practices and non-
Aboriginal people in this State during the twentieth century. 
Within the context of courses such as “Postcolonial Writing” there is the 
opportunity and, I suggest, the imperative to move beyond simply reading and teaching 
such life-stories as literary texts.  This assertion is made in response to a question I 
posed to myself and one response to it: “Should teaching and studying texts written by 
Aboriginal people be different for Australians than a text written by a South American 
                                                          
34 These texts were timely, published as they were in and around 1988, the year Australia celebrated 
its Bicentenary.  Indigenous protest about the inappropriateness of the celebrations and a 
corresponding recognition of this by many in the wider community and international attention focused 
on Australia resulted in a desire to know about and incorporate Aboriginal people’s experiences.  The 
desire ‘to know and to incorporate’ operated for many, including some official celebration organisers, 
as a means of ‘cashing in’ on Aboriginality. 
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writer for instance?”  “Yes!”  And not because of a naive belief that non-Indigenous 
Australians are necessarily able to more fully understand how Aboriginal people 
experience life in this country as opposed to Indigenous people elsewhere.  I am 
mindful here of Trinh T. Min-ha’s point that “the injunction to [and the belief that one 
can] see things from the natives point of view speaks for a definite ideology of truth 
and authenticity”35 and not one that I advocate.  Rather, ‘yes’ is an acknowledgement 
that by virtue of being white in Australia one is implicated in a colonial or 
settler/invader system that privileges non-Indigenous people36 at the expense of 
Indigenous people37 and that acknowledging this and interrogating this privilege is 
appropriate to the study of postcolonialism. 
In Chapter Five I discuss Alice Nannup’s When the Pelican Laughed as an 
exemplary critical narrative within the broader context of Western Australian state 
legislation that regulated and controlled the lives of Aboriginal people from 1848 to 
the present.  These two narratives, one official and the other personal, are brought 
together to demonstrate that reading this life-story with knowledge of the legislation 
that was instrumental in creating many of the experiences Nannup writes about may 
enrich the reader’s understanding.  It makes clear that this is not ‘simply a story’, 
neither should it be read as one might read the life-story of a non-Indigenous person, 
for they are not equitable.  Then, through a discussion of the Western legal system and 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, I seek to demonstrate that 
significant, positive changes occur in Aboriginal peoples’ lives and their relationships 
to non-Indigenous people and institutions when their experiences form the basis of a 
dialogue and a ‘will to change’.  What I am suggesting is that it is necessary to teach 
politically as opposed to merely teaching politicised texts.38  Hence, a nexus is formed 
between theory and praxis, one that transgresses the boundaries between postcolonial 
                                                          
35 Trinh T. Min-ha, When The Moon Waxes Red, London: Routledge, 1991, p. 149. 
36 In the face of class and gender distinctions it can seem almost gratuitous in some instances to 
suggest that a white Australian a person is automatically privileged in relation to an Aboriginal 
person.  In thinking about this I am reminded of a conversation a friend and I had many years ago.  
We were discussing our newly born daughters.  Maria made the comment that although I had spent 
time in a state institution as a child and had little supportive family infrastructure while she had a large 
supportive family I could expect my daughter to be better off than hers by virtue of the fact that her 
daughter is black while mine is white. 
37 For an example of the ways non-Indigenous people benefited from Aboriginal peoples’ labour in 
the formation of the pastoral industry see Paul Marshall (ed), Raparapa Kularr Martuwarra Stories 
From the Fitzroy River Drovers, Broome: Magabala Press, 1988. 
38 For a further discussion of the need to teach politically see, Carmen Luke, “Feminist Politics in 
Radical Pedagogy” in Luke Carmen & Gore Jennifer (eds), Feminisims and Critical Pedagogy, 
Routledge: London, 1992, pp. 25-54. 
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theory as literary critique, itself political, but largely confined to the academy, and 
overt politics. 
When Aboriginal peoples’ life-stories are read in isolation from the context 
of their production there is a danger that postcolonialism, while embracing a “politics 
of emancipatory self and social empowerment,” serves to maintain “the tradition of 
liberalism, the tenets of which already include an ethics of care, solidarity and 
liberation”39 which perpetuates inequalities.40  This occurs, I suggest, through the 
separation of theoretical and academic knowledges from practical strategies.  This 
inappropriate practice facilitates an easy transition between reading texts written by 
Indigenous writers within a postcolonial context or course, empathising with the 
experiences, recognising the injustices and social inequities, and finally believing 
(falsely) that this process, in itself, contributes to change.  Once again, a ‘negative 
reterritorialisation’. 
3.3 Postcolonialism: what’s in a name? 
I now want to turn to a discussion of the term ‘postcolonial’ itself.  While in some 
contexts, in the late 1990s when postcolonialism is a well-established field of inquiry, 
it may seem unnecessary to interrogate the meaning of the term, doing so demonstrates 
that it is a contested field in which much work still needs to be done.   Clearly the need 
to critique definitions and theoretical perspectives within the field is a response to 
many concerns that have been raised about it.  These concerns are foregrounded in the 
introduction to Contemporary Postcolonial Theory where the editor Padmini Mongia 
begins by posing two questions about the definition of ‘postcolonialism’.  She asks: 
“Does the term refer to texts or to practices, to psychological conditions or to concrete 
historical processes?  Or does it perhaps refer to the interaction of all these?”.41 
Mongia makes the point that writers in Contemporary Postcolonial Theory, 
including Ella Shohat, Sara Suleri, and many others, deploy postcolonialism as an 
umbrella term that signifies “both changes in power structures after the official end of 
colonialism as well as colonialism’s continuing effects, particularly as they are 
                                                          
39 Luke, 1992, p. 29. 
40 This is discussed as it occurs in law in Chapter Six. 
41 Padmini Mongia (ed), Contemporary Postcolonial Theory, London: Arnold, 1996, p. 2. 
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manifested discursively.”42  Homi K. Bhabha, at the “Critical Fictions” conference 
asserted that: 
... the term postcolonial is increasingly used to describe that form of social 
criticism that bears witness to those unequal and uneven processes of 
representation by which the historical experience of the once-colonised 
Third World comes to be framed in the West.43 
Of critical importance in these definitions is the focus on discursive 
manifestations and processes of representation.  For while postcolonialism is a 
practical performance at the level of political intervention, it is also always about 
engaging with representations, positive or negative, and responding to them. 
Certainly, postcolonialism is, as Williams and Chrisman assert, “far from 
being a unified field;”44  neither is it a limited field.  Its extent is articulated by Anne 
Collett in a paper called “Perspectives on Home Ground, Foreign Territory” in 
Teaching Post-Colonialism and Post-Colonial Literatures.  Collett’s paper is largely 
about her experience as “a fourth generation Australian, of white, middle class, 
Protestant school-teacher parents”45 teaching postcolonial literature at the University 
of Aarhus.  She writes: 
Post-colonialism is about becoming self-determining.  In terms of both 
community and self, post-colonialism is about choosing, selecting – 
deliberately, consciously examining the past, the present and deciding a 
course for the future.  In terms of community it is about economic, 
governmental and ideological independence – of the people by the people 
for the people.  In terms of self, it is a process of becoming consciously 
aware of history – what has made me what I am, and how can I become 
actively participatory in that creative process?  In terms of literature and 
the creators of that literature it is primarily about taking possession (or re-
possession) of the language(s) of discourse, and it is also about 
encouraging community participation in that creative energy.  In terms of 
literary criticism, post-colonial theory moves out of a process of de-
construction to one of re-construction.  Post-colonialism is about creating 
and asserting identity at the same time that it seeks to undermine the 
                                                          
42 Mongia, 1996, p. 1-2. 
43 Homi K. Bhabha, “‘Caliban Speaks to Prospero’: Cultural Identity and the Crisis of Representation” 
in, Critical Fictions, Philomena Mariani, (ed.), Seattle: Bay Press, 1991, p. 63. 
44 Williams & Chrisman, 1993, p. 5. 
45 Anne Collett, “Perspectives on Home Ground, Foreign Territory” in Teaching Post-Colonialism 
and Post-Colonial Literatures, Anne Collett, Lars Jensen & Anna Rutherford (eds), Denmark: Aarhus 
Press, 1997, p. 15. 
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generality of stereotype – most often the stereotype nurtured by 
colonialism.46 
This definition of Collett’s shows some of the breadth of the ideal postcolonial 
field – political action to literary theory – and the inter-relatedness of its different aspects.  
It is ambitious, inclusive as it is of social action, literary criticism and all that choose to 
be “self-determining”.  It articulates an ideal politics – “in terms of both community and 
self, post-colonialism is about choosing, selecting – deliberately, consciously examining 
the past, the present and deciding a course for the future.” 
Collett’s ideal allows for an “imagined community”.47  It does not, however, 
explicitly take account of the lived experiences of people that undermine their ability to 
be ‘self-determining’, to “choose, select ... and decide a course for the future”.  Further, 
she fails to problematise and explain what is meant by the concept of self-determination 
other than to define it as the “economic, governmental and ideological independence – 
of the people by the people for the people”.  ‘Self-determination’ has been a political 
catch-cry in many situations, including in reference to Aboriginal peoples in Australia, 
and for quite disparate purposes. While people may be empowered by such rhetoric, 
some qualification is required.  The need for this qualification can be appreciated when 
a common catch-cry applied to Aboriginal people, ‘why can’t they do it (stop children 
truanting, run successful bureaucracies, become self-sufficient etc.) themselves?’ is 
considered.  One simplistic response would be, ‘some do’ but ‘others are limited by their 
inculcation in a system of state welfare’.48 
But Collett is concerned with more than community self-determination.  She 
is also concerned with individual self-determination and it is this area in which I am 
particularly interested.  She poses the critical question: “what has made me what I am, 
and how can I become actively participatory in that creative process?” 49  ‘Me’ is the 
crucial term in this question.  It allows each reader to situate her/himself as the subject 
within the postcolonial process that Collett describes.  Too often there are easy 
slippages within postcolonial theory that cause identity to be overtly ascribed to 
                                                          
46 Collett, 1997, p. 19. 
47 From Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, 1991. 
48 See Chapter Five for a discussion of Western Australian legislation, Aboriginal people and the State 
welfare system. 
49 Collett, 1997, p. 19. 
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Indigenous peoples with only limited focus on the identity of non-Indigenous people.  
Hence the need to ask what postcolonialism is, what it allows, and what it hides? 
There is no single answer to Collett’s question.  Rather, there is a plurality of 
responses that might be made, all dependent on national identity, socio-economic 
status, childhood experiences and many other factors.  How we participate in this 
process is clearly historically determined.  I have illustrated several catalysts for my 
own involvement in issues that focus on Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships 
and which partly explains my interest in postcolonial theory and praxis. 
3.4 Australian Demarcations 
In a field of study that exists because of the movement of people from one country to 
another (and the subsequent integration and oppression of cultures and people) 
demarcation of theoretical knowledges is both arbitrary and strategic.  For this work I 
am particularly interested in postcolonial theory as it is written, read and strategically 
applied in Australia and more particularly in Western Australia.  For this reason, I pay 
particular attention to the work of Australian theorists including Helen Tiffin, Vijay 
Mishra, Bob Hodge, Gareth Griffiths, Hugh Webb, Kateryna Longley and Bill 
Ashcroft.  However, Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, Stephen Slemon and Diana Brydon 
also play significant roles. Within the limits of this chapter it is not possible to engage 
fully with these theorists’ work.  Every engagement is necessarily partial, and might 
be more aptly described as a ‘raid’. 
The positioning of Australia as postcolonial is both useful and problematic.  
Postcolonial theory in this country often suggests that the central protagonists in the 
performance are Britain and Australia, or more specifically England and white 
Australia.  Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin have much to say about the 
term ‘postcolonial’ in The Empire Writes Back.  This work is important in any 
discussion of postcolonialism in Australia for several reasons: the book’s timing 
(published in 1989 one year after Australia’s Bicentenary celebrations), the fact that 
its three writers were teaching in Australia at the time, and, most importantly, its 
comprehensive engagement with and articulation of an important, growing critique 
which has subsequently generated much discussion in the field of postcolonialism in 
Australia.  They use the term ‘postcolonialism’: 
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… to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process from the 
moment of colonisation to the present day.  This is because there is a 
continuity of preoccupations throughout the historical process initiated by 
European imperial aggression.50 
While I accept their point that the colonial experience affected all literature 
written in, and the socio-political experiences of, people in countries such as Australia, 
South Africa, Malaysia and others, I find this use of the term too inclusive.  The 
flattening out of colonial and postcolonial experience in this deployment of the term 
allows for little distinction to be made between countries such as India and Australia 
for example. 
It does not differentiate between those numerous texts, and writers, that are 
unself-reflexively colonial yet written, and writing, in countries such as Australia that 
Ashcroft et al. identify as postcolonial.  Further, it must be noted that some earlier 
writers in Australia, who by the above definition are postcolonial, did not seek to 
establish their difference from Britain but rather to maintain it.  Some of these same 
writers have been responsible for creating stereotypes of Indigenous people that 
reinforce colonial beliefs and that have subsequently been instrumental in maintaining 
colonialism. (In “Doin the Post-Colonial Story?  Neidjie, Narogin and the Aboriginal 
Narrative Intervention… or Flagging the Post-Colonial: Hoisted on Whose Petard?”) 
Hugh Webb expresses his concerns with The Empire Writes Back and a “lack of 
cultural specificity” by posing the question: 
What cultural specificity (indeed, what cultural respect) can be 
acknowledged within a post-colonial category that is defined as covering 
“all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of 
colonisation to the present day”?51 
The fact is that Indigenous people, including Alice Nannup (whose work is 
discussed in some detail in Chapter Five), most often “write back” directly to white 
Australian texts, institutions and ideologies not British ones.  After all, while the 
British government invaded Australia and enacted initial legislation determining the 
lives of Indigenous people, it was the Western Australian government that enacted the 
                                                          
50 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths & Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back, London: Routledge, 1989, 
p. 2. 
51 Hugh Webb, “Doin the Post-Colonial Story?  Neidjie, Narogin and the Aboriginal Narrative 
Intervention… or Flagging the Post-Colonial: Hoisted on Whose Petard?” in Span, Journal of the 
South Pacific Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies, Jenny de Reuck and 
Hugh Webb (eds), Issue 32, Murdoch: Murdoch, 1991, p. 33. 
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1905 Aborigines Act.  This act, with all other legislation pertaining to Indigenous 
people “bears witness” to Australian governments and peoples’ complicity in 
colonialism, as colonisers in their own right.52 
A more recent example of Australia’s continuing acts of colonialism is to be 
found in the High Court’s 1992 Mabo decision.  I do not want to under-rate the 
importance of this decision or the land rights it has ensured for the Merriam people.  
However, several key passages from the Mabo decision suggest to me that the 
judgement and the native title process which has succeeded it are part of a continuing 
colonial discourse of dispossession.  All Justice Brennan does in his judgement is 
acknowledge that the colonisers were mistaken about the state of the land they 
occupied.  At point 38 within the judgement he simply rejects the assumed fact that 
there was no “settled inhabitants or settled law”53 in Australia at colonisation.  
Importantly this has not changed the fact of dispossession; it just led, in Mabo, to a 
different and retrospective explanation of how Indigenous people have been, and will 
continue to be, dispossessed.  This is clearly evidenced at point 60: 
When the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgement of 
traditional law and any real observance of traditional customs, the 
foundation of native title has disappeared.  A native title which has ceased 
with the abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition cannot be 
revived for contemporary recognition.  Australian law can protect the 
interests of members of an Indigenous clan or group, whether communally 
or individually, only in conformity with the traditional laws and customs 
of the people to whom the clan or group belongs and only where members 
of the clan or group acknowledge those laws and observe those customs 
(so far as it is practicable to do so).  Once traditional native title expires, 
the Crown’s radical title expands to a full beneficial title, for then there is 
no other proprietor than the Crown.54 
That this is part of a continuing colonial discourse was made clear to me 
through a conversation I had with an Injibarndi elder.  While talking about the 
Ngulama and Injibarndi native title claim that is currently in the Federal Court, 
                                                          
52 The relationships between the British Colonial Office and Australia were complex.  Colonisation of 
Australia coincided with anti-slavery debates that most certainly resulted in the British Colonial 
Office trying to convince Australian colonial administrations to respect more fully the rights of 
Indigenous Australians.  Henry Reynolds discusses this in detail in Law of the Land, Ringwood: 
Penguin, 1987.  See also Chapter Five, for a discussion of Western Australian state legislation that 
determined the lives of Indigenous people in this state from 1848 to the present. 
53 Mabo v Queensland (no. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
54 Mabo v Queensland (no. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
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Woodley King explained how the government had made them leave their traditional 
lands, send their children to school and insist that they learn English for their native 
title claim to be successful.  They were now required, however, to demonstrate that 
they live traditionally and that their children learn the Injibarndi and Ngulama 
languages.  A sad irony? 
My concern with Ashcroft et al’s use of the term ‘postcolonial’ comes out of 
the local focus of this work and the adamant disavowal of it by Indigenous people 
working in academic environments.  This is illustrated by a discussion of several 
Indigenous writers’ responses to the term ‘postcolonialism’ later in this chapter.  Further, 
working with Indigenous people in Western Australia throughout the time of the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, it was impossible to accept a broad 
definition of that the term ‘postcolonial’ was appropriate as a way of describing relations 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the State, as I will explain, later. 
The authors’ emphasis on the necessity to critique neo-colonial practices and 
the recognition of “unequal treatment of Indigenous peoples in settler/invader 
societies” is understated by Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin in The Empire Writes Back. 
In the “General Introduction” to The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, however, the 
authors clarify their usage of the term ‘postcolonial’ insisting that it is a process of 
resistance and reconstruction. They write: 
Post-colonialist critics and theorists should consider the full implications 
of restricting the meaning of the term to ‘after-colonialism’ or after-
independence.  All post-colonial societies are still subject one way or 
another to overt or subtle forms of neo-colonial domination, and 
independence has not solved this problem.  The development of new elites 
within independent societies, often buttressed by neo-colonial institutions; 
the development of internal divisions based on racial, linguistic or religious 
discriminations; the continuing unequal treatment of Indigenous peoples in 
settler/invader societies – all these testify to the fact that post-colonialism 
is a continuing process of resistance and reconstruction.  This does not 
imply that postcolonial practices are seamless and homogeneous but 
indicates the impossibility of dealing with any part of the colonial process 
without considering its antecedents and consequences.55 
I fully agree with them that it is not possible to deal “with any part of the 
colonial process without considering its antecedents and consequences”.  Given that, 
                                                          
55 Ashcroft et al., 1995, p. 2. 
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I find it surprising that they do not specifically address Australian Indigenous concerns 
with the use of the term.  Or, make a stronger claim for postcolonialism as a particular 
moment or set of practices that are strategically deployed. 
Kateryna Longley, another Australian academic, has also played a significant 
part in theorising the postcolonial in this country.  Her description of postcolonialism 
is considerably more useful than Ashcroft et al’s.  Of postcolonial theory and practice 
Longley writes that they “emerge out of and in reaction to colonial texts and colonial 
ways of reading.”56  She recognises that it cannot only be marked spatially or 
temporally, that it is a constant process of intersection, mutation and transformation.  
Longley provides an explanation of postcolonialism as temporal, anti-colonial 
resistance/counter-discourse and a critique of colonial forms of representation.  In this 
her work is similar to that of Marcia Langton’s (a discussion of which follows); 
however, they differ considerably in their faith in the possibility of decolonisation. 
When defined temporally, postcolonialism for Longley “refers to the period 
after colonial rule is over”57 and she cites the end of colonial rule in the Ukraine, in 
December 1991, as an example of this form.  She goes on to make the observation that: 
… while most theorists are quick to point out that this temporal dimension 
is often unimportant, or even irrelevant to the critical use of the term, I 
believe it is an essential one simply because, historically there are moments 
of political transition from colonised state to independent nation such as 
we are witnessing around the Russian state now and at these moments 
artistic production is a crucial barometer of change.58 
While she asserts the importance of temporal markers, Longley also 
acknowledges that a date such as December 1991 is merely that, a temporal marker 
that does not negate expressions of postcolonialism occurring before this time and 
further, does not suggest that all colonial practices cease at this point. 
Following this logic, it can therefore be argued, in Longley’s terms, that 
postcolonialism has little significance for settler colonies such as Australia where the 
invading group remained and retained power.  However, Longley does not make this 
point.  As I have written elsewhere, “Australia is a country where Aboriginal peoples’ 
                                                          
56 Kateryna Longley “Postcolonial Writing: Introductory Notes” in Post Colonial Writing, Jenny de 
Reuck (ed), Murdoch: Murdoch University, 1994, p. 19. 
57 Longley, 1994, p. 19. 
58 Longley, 1994, p. 19. 
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sovereignty is not recognised, where the majority of Australians know little about 
Aboriginal cultures or the actual socio-economic conditions that Aboriginal people 
live in, and where land rights are strongly opposed by most state governments,”59 the 
Federal government and Pauline Hanson’s party, “One Nation.”60  It is also a country 
where in 1997 the Prime Minister refused to apologise to Indigenous people for past 
government legislation, which sanctioned the removal of children from their families.  
To suggest that Australia is thus postcolonial in a temporal sense is certainly 
problematic as both Roberta Sykes, activist and writer, and Mudrooroo, a writer, both 
passionately declared at the Post-Colonial Fictions Conference held in Fremantle, 
Western Australia in December 1992.  I will return to this event shortly. 
The second form of postcolonialism identified by Longley is “anticolonial 
resistance/counter-discourse”.  Phrases such as “decolonising the mind”, 
“decolonising the subject” and “decolonising the text” are highlighted to demonstrate 
the ways in which postcolonial theory is, in this characterisation, about critiquing 
various systems of overlapping oppressions.  It is an active process, one which 
necessarily foregrounds agency.  Counter-discourse, within this second form, is in 
effect ‘counter-history’ and, as the term implies, is the writing of another version of 
history.  Life stories, such as Alice Nannup’s When the Pelican Laughed and Glenyse 
Ward’s Wandering Girl, written by Indigenous people in Western Australia, are 
examples of this counter-discourse. 
This second characterisation of the postcolonial identified by Longley is 
important for its emphasis on agency and decolonisation of the mind, the subject and 
the text.  However, according to Marcia Langton, decolonisation is an unrealistic goal, 
so that her own use of the term ‘anti-colonial’ does not suggest that decolonisation is 
a possibility.  Further, the relationship between resistance and decolonisation that 
Longley’s second criterion presupposes cannot be taken for granted.  Just what 
constitutes resistance and decolonisation, how they operate, what signals their effects 
is often left unstated.  The question therefore remains: how is decolonisation of 
colonial institutions and texts to be achieved?  This question is difficult to answer and 
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more particularly considering Longley’s suggestion that it is the “broad politics of 
resistance”61 that causes postcolonialism to be criticised as having “over-reached itself 
and unceremoniously taken over the legitimate territory of other theories for its own 
expansionist purposes.”62 
Stephen Slemon in “Unsettling the Empire: Resistance Theory for the Second 
World” asks three very important questions about literary resistance that are also useful 
in discussing and critiquing postcolonialism.  He asks: 
Is literary resistance something that simply issues forth, through narrative, 
against a clearly definable set of power relations?  Is it something actually 
there in the text, or is it produced and reproduced in and through 
communities of readers and through the mediating structures of their own 
culturally specific histories?  Do literary resistances escape the constitutive 
purchase of genre, and trope, and figure, and mode, which operate 
elsewhere as a contract between text and reader and thus a set of 
centralising codes, or are literary resistances necessarily embedded in the 
representational technologies of those literary and social ‘texts’ whose 
structures and whose referential codes they seek to oppose?63 
As I want to demonstrate by a discussion of When the Pelican Laughed (and 
as made clear by my comments on narrative), resistance is not something that abides 
in a text.  Certainly, a writer deploys methods of writing and content that challenge 
readers to engage with the text in a way that supports her or his project.  However, as 
we have learnt from Derrida, Foucault, Bakhtin and many others the reader’s own 
socio-historical background determines what the reader brings to a text and therefore 
what meanings are constructed.  This makes it possible for one reader of When the 
Pelican Laughed to be quite distraught and dismayed at Australian government 
legislation that allowed the removal of children from their families and another reader 
to merely feel compassion, dismiss it, or decide that it was “for their own good”.64  In 
any case, feelings alone do not effect change. 
The final characterisation of postcolonialism for Longley is the “critique of 
colonial forms of representation”.  Here “it is not the ‘content’ of a text which is of 
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paramount importance but the form, not text but textuality and text-production.”65  
Experimental writing, such as Kate Grenville’s Joan Makes History,66 can be cited here.  
In this novel Grenville disrupts the notion that Australia has only a white linear history.  
Through a series of leaps back in time several women, all named Joan, recount the part 
that they have played, but that has previously been unwritten, in the country’s history.  
Grenville plays with both form and content as a means of disrupting colonial narratives. 
This brief overview of Ashcroft et al. and Longley’s engagement with 
postcolonialism foregrounds reasons for concern with the use of temporality as a 
marker of this theoretical category, particularly in places such as Western Australia.  
Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra in Dark Side of the Dream: Australian literature and the 
postcolonial mind agree that “the prefix [which] seems to construct a simple version 
of history in which the ‘modern’ or the ‘colonial’ is totally superseded.”67  They 
suggest this implication arises from an uncritical use of the term that does not 
distinguish between “oppositional” and “complicit” postcolonialism.68  They use the 
phrase “the postcolonial complex”69, which, immediately critical, comes as a welcome 
relief as a way of signalling this field of disparate yet inter-related concerns. 
The distinction Hodge and Mishra make between “oppositional” and 
“complicit” is a vital one.  They write: 
...it is useful to distinguish between the postcolonial as an historical 
moment, and something broadly akin to Lyotard’s postmodernism, a 
postcolonialism (like postmulticulturalism) in which certain tendencies are 
always inherently present.  Postcolonialism in this second sense is the 
underside of any colonialism, and it can appear almost fully formed in 
colonial societies before they have formally achieved independence.  
Conversely, ‘postcolonialism’ as the period that follows a stage of 
colonisation is not necessarily subversive, and in most cases it incorporates 
much from its colonial past.70 
Hodge and Mishra are particularly concerned to point out that ‘settler’ 
countries cannot be considered postcolonial in the same way that India is, for instance. 
Frankenberg and Mani too ask, “What ... happened to ‘neo-colonialism’ in all this talk 
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of the colonial and the post?  In short, what do we too hastily elide when we involve 
the ‘postcolonial’, especially as an ‘ity’, as a condition, state, way or form of being 
spread evenly over an area without specified borders or unevenness or 
contradiction?”.71  Hodge and Mishra’s recognition that there are “certain tendencies 
[which] are always inherently present” allows for an articulation of the colonial and 
neo-colonial practices that continue to occur and be enacted in countries, such as 
Australia and which are the most serious obstacles to postcolonialism.  As we are 
reminded, Australia has “become in its own small way a colonising power in the 
Pacific region ... but more structurally in its formation it adopted the classic attitudes 
of imperialism in its treatment of the Aboriginal people of Australia.”72 
3.5 Postcolonial fictions: Indigenous writers on parade? 
While the contribution of postcolonial theory to changes in/to colonialist and 
imperialist attitudes should not be undervalued, an ongoing critique of postcolonial 
practice is vital.  One important component of this critique must be a dialogue between 
dominant and marginal groups to ensure that postcolonial theory does not itself 
become a tool for a “new elite” that fosters neo-colonialism and the “unequal treatment 
of Indigenous people in settler/invader societies.”73  In this section I therefore consider 
the response of several Indigenous people to the term. 
Ama Ata Aidoo in a paper presented at the “Critical Fictions” conference in 
New York in May 1991 concedes that ‘postcolonialism’ might apply to a certain extent 
to “the erstwhile imperial dominions”, including Australia.  However, while: 
… [p]erhaps the concept was relevant to the United States after its war of 
independence, and to a certain extent to the erstwhile imperial dominions 
of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  Applied to Africa, India, and some 
other parts of the word, ‘postcolonial’ is not only a fiction, but a most 
pernicious fiction, a cover-up of a dangerous period in peoples’ lives.  For 
unlike “neocolonial” for instance, “postcolonial” posits a notion of 
something finished.74 
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While for Aidoo postcolonialism may be applied to Australia, Alice Nannup, 
an Injibarndi woman from Western Australia, does not agree.  Nannup was invited to 
speak at the triennial “South Pacific Association for Commonwealth Literature and 
Language Studies” conference, “Postcolonial Fictions”, held in Fremantle, Western 
Australia, in December 1992.  The name of the conference was intended to 
problematise the term ‘postcolonialism’.  Nannup was unfortunately unable to attend.  
In responding to the invitation however she said, “my work is not fiction but perhaps 
postcolonialism is.”75  While she did not explain her dissatisfaction with the term, her 
use of ‘fiction’ in relation to it was telling. 
Each of the Indigenous and several non-Indigenous speakers at the conference 
reinforced Nannup’s opinion.  Roberta Sykes, writer, activist and a panel member 
discussing Indigenous responses to postcolonialism said, “What!  Have I missed 
something?  Have they gone?”.76  While such a comment is not necessarily meant to 
be taken literally, it does foreground the tensions that exist both politically and, I 
suggest personally, between many Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in Australia.  
And Mudrooroo described postcolonialism and its relationship to the writing of 
Aboriginal people as “a predatory beast, on the prowl, ready to eat up [these writings] 
and shit them out as turds of colonial bullshit.”77 
Roberta Sykes also expressed her anger at the way in which Indigenous 
people were “paraded out” at academic conferences, which she attributed to political 
correctness, a feature of postcolonialism.  She claimed that the Indigenous writers at 
the conference were like animals in a zoo, on display for the academic audience.  As 
the person who directly invited Roberta Sykes, Ruby Langford Ginibi and Ngahuia Te 
Awekotuku, my response was that responsibility for accepting such an invitation, for 
negotiating one’s own speaking position within the framework of such a conference, 
must then reside with those who choose to attend. 
Sykes’s response foregrounds some of the difficulties that are faced by 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people working within a postcolonial frame.  Though 
the title of the conference “Postcolonial Fictions” was, in part, selected to problematise 
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postcoloniality in relationship to Indigenous Australians, it was unsuccessful in this 
respect.  Many complex, interrelated and competing issues were at work. 
That the conference was an academic forum caused much tension and many 
challenges to white academics about their right to speak on what were seen, by some, to 
be Indigenous issues.  These challenges have their origin in the history of academic 
practice, particularly anthropology, history, literature and law that have perpetuated 
primitivistic representations of Aboriginality by “making statements about it, 
authorising views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, as a 
western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over it.” 78  The weight 
of this history is immense, making sense of Sykes’ observation that “Indigenous writers 
are on parade”, much like a ‘show and tell’;  ‘let us see what you can do’.79 
Much time and energy was spent at the “Postcolonial Fictions” conference 
debating the appropriateness of the term.  On day two of the conference an impromptu 
panel of Indigenous writers, Roberta Sykes, Ruby Langford Ginibi, and Mudrooroo 
from Australia and Ngahuia Te Awekotuku and Witi Ihimaera from New Zealand, all 
gave their responses to it, and some of these have already been discussed.80  Without 
exception these Indigenous speakers and writers forcefully made the point that 
postcolonialism is a white academic fiction.  It would appear, as Hugh Webb asserts 
in his discussion of postcolonialism as a super-narrative,81 that “[t]he ‘postcolonial’ is 
a confused misnomer in an Australian context.”82  Not only is it “confused” it is also 
“an oppressive misnomer”83 when applied to Aboriginal culture.84 
If the discussion of the term ‘postcolonial’ had generated constructive debate 
in this session it would have served as an “incitement to discourse”, a phrase coined 
                                                          
78 Edward Said, Orientalism, Ringwood: Penguin Australia, 1978, p. 1. 
79 In the five years since the “Postcolonial Fictions” conference there have been an increasing number 
of opportunities for Aboriginal people to speak in public forums.  At the “Aboriginal Culture and 
Copyright” conference held in Perth in 1996 similar objections were raised. 
80 This panel discussion has been recorded as a segment in a teaching video on postcolonial theory, 
called “Postcolonial Fictions” developed from the 1992 conference. 
81 This is a term that Webb has taken from Kateryna Arthur’s article “Beyond Orality: Canada and 
Australia”, Ariel 21, no. 3, 1990. 
82 Hugh Webb, “Aboriginal Writing: Twisting the Colonial Super-narrative”, in English 
Postcoloniality: Literatures from Around the World, (eds) Radhika Mohanram and Gita Rajan, 
London: Greenwood Press, 1996, p. 195. 
83 Webb, 1996, p. 195. 
84 It should also be noted that, ironically, during this panel discussion there was an anti-racism rally 
occurring in Perth, just fifteen kilometres away, that we did not attend. 
 
104 
by Foucault in The History of Sexuality.85  However, while there was much debate 
about the usefulness of the term throughout other sessions of the conference, this was 
silenced in the face of Indigenous people asserting that the term had nothing to do with 
them.  Why was it not possible for those in the wider audience to voice their support 
of the term?  In part, I suggest this has to do with the incommensurability of 
experiences and a lack of theorisation of this factor. 
3.6 “Undermining the colonial [and postcolonial] hegemony”86 
As has been noted, then, the ‘post’ in postcolonialism is problematic for many theorists 
and activists in part because it is unable to divest itself from the implication that 
colonialism is past.  One response to the use of the term is to assert that terminology 
is not the primary issue and theorists and activists alike should get on with the work.  
While there is obvious merit in this way of thinking, the response to the term from 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people at the “Postcolonial Fictions” conference 
clearly demonstrates that language matters.  It is fundamental to all forms of 
representation and as such it is an overt expression of societal politics and values.  
Marcia Langton’s work ‘Well I heard it on the radio and saw it on the television...’, a 
discussion of filmic representations of Indigenous people in Australia, is useful for its 
insistence on the need for “a practical commitment to the political consequences of 
representation”87 by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. 
In her Foreword to Langton’s text, Annette Hamilton writes: 
While the concept of post-colonialism has become fashionable of late, 
Marcia Langton’s insistence on an anti-colonial perspective changes the 
usual terrain.  An anti-colonial stance requires above all a practical 
commitment to the political consequences of representation.  Anti-
colonialism requires a rupture and a positive awareness of the way colonial 
representation has shaped, and misshaped, reality for coloniser and 
colonised alike.88 
Langton begins by describing her text as a “politics of representation”.89  It is 
intended to be a catalyst for an “extended debate on the need for an anti-colonialist 
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cultural criticism of representation...”.90  Her demand for an extended and continuing 
debate leaves no doubt that in her opinion colonial assumptions, institutions and 
representations still shape “reality for coloniser and colonised”.  Langton expresses no 
unrealistic hopes about the possibility of reshaping this reality.  This is reflected in two 
questions that she poses about the possibility of decolonisation.  She asks: 
Can we decolonise Australian institutions? Can we decolonise our minds?  
Probably not but we can try to find ways to undermine the colonial 
hegemony.91 
As a specific site of possible institutional decolonisation I will focus, in 
Chapter Six, on a critique of the Australian legal system and the “Aboriginal Culture: 
Law and Change” seminar for magistrates, one aspect of the Australian Institute 
Judicial Association’s response to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody.  Here the intention will be to foreground the interrelationship between 
discourses, in this case law and colonialism.  This interrelationship means that 
magistrates through their legal training and practice are always, already situated in 
both modernist and colonialist discourses.  From within such frames, while still 
administering the law, is it possible to decolonise either institution or mind?  It is 
possible to challenge colonialist knowledges about Indigenous people that inform 
decisions made by magistrates and, further, to enhance dialogue and respect between 
magistrates and people appearing before them.  This is where postcolonial or rather, 
anti-colonial critiques can, as Dianne Otto, editor of the Third World Legal Studies 
journal suggests, challenge current legal practice and make law mindful of its 
propensity to further colonise Indigenous people. 
Though Langton asserts that it is not possible to decolonise Australian 
institutions and that postcolonialism is not appropriate to representations of 
Aboriginality or Aboriginal peoples’ lived experiences, she acknowledges the role of 
postcolonial theory in generating debates about representation.  She does not denounce 
the concerns or achievements of postcolonial theorists.  Rather she writes, “most 
Aboriginal people involved in production of artforms believe that an ethical, post-
colonial critique and practice among their non-Aboriginal colleagues is possible and 
achievable.”92  This point is taken no further however and she provides no explanation 
                                                          
90 Langton, 1993, p. 7. 
91 Langton, 1993, p. 8. 
92 Langton, 1993, p. 26. 
 
106 
of postcolonial theory, of either it strengths or limitations.  It is an opinion that conflicts 
with those of other Indigenous people.  Moreover, it can be surmised, by her call for 
an anti-colonial critique, that postcolonialism is not viable for Langton. 
What I find important and empowering about Langton’s work is her assertion 
that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people need to work together in this anti-
colonising process.  This view is also one that former Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Social Justice Commissioner Michael Dodson has expressed on many 
occasions, including a television interview about the Bringing Them Home report.  On 
this occasion, he expressed the opinion that this report detailing the experiences of 
Aboriginal children who had been taken from their families was a call to white 
Australians to participate in a healing process.  Langton acknowledges that many 
people do not know how to engage with Aboriginal people or issues that relate to them.  
I would add that many people do not know how to understand their own complicity in 
such situations or the privilege that they have historically, both directly or indirectly, 
gained from them.  This means that a common response is to stay away, or abdicate 
any responsibility.  It is common to hear people make statements such as: ‘they can do 
it themselves, they don’t want help from whites, they won’t let you be involved 
anyway.’  Langton’s view is that “these are the responses of white Australians who 
want to abdicate their responsibility to avoid making the mistakes of history.”93  It 
must be said though that these are also the responses of people who do not think the 
previous treatment of Aboriginal people – the removal of children, or the 
disproportionate numbers in prisons – was a mistake.  There are people who simply do 
not care about issues that relate to Aboriginal people.  Still other people maintain the 
naive belief that each person is responsible for her/himself.  Such a belief is historically 
rooted in liberalism and itself maintains and generates racism. 
Whatever the reason for the abdication of responsibility, the central problem 
identified by Langton is: 
… the failure of non-Aboriginals to comprehend us Aboriginal people, or 
to find the grounds for an understanding.  Each policy – protection, 
assimilation, integration, self-management, self-determination and, 
perhaps, reconciliation – can be seen as ways of avoiding understanding.94 
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My concern, and part of the work of this thesis, is to locate grounds for 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous understanding, dialogue and working together.  The 
importance of dialogue and mutual understanding for undermining the colonial 
hegemony that so very clearly operates in Australia cannot be underestimated, 
especially if Langton’s assertion that it is “both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people 
who create ‘Aboriginalities’”95 is engaged with. 
Langton identifies three categories representing the “cultural and textual 
construction” of ‘Aboriginalities’.  The first comes from the experiences of Aboriginal 
people interacting together.  This is not to suggest that there are ever truly isolated 
interactions but there are certainly places and times where, and when, white Australian 
influences are less dominating, or are different, so that ‘Aboriginality’ is constructed 
differently.  In such instances, what constitutes ‘Aboriginality’ may be markedly 
different from general understandings. Perhaps an important point to make here is that 
‘Aboriginality’ may well not be a significant category in the everyday lives of many 
Indigenous people living in ‘remote’ areas.96  So for instance in Roebourne people 
define themselves as Ngulama, Injibarndi, Bunjima—these are the three main groups 
of people living in the town.  It is only people from outside and government agencies 
that cause identifications to be made in terms of ‘Aboriginality’. 
Through a discussion of the production of “Jindalee Lady”, a film produced by 
Briann Kearney and directed by Brian Syron in 1992, Langton makes the point that 
representations of ‘Aboriginality’ constructed by Aboriginal people are not necessarily 
any better or less offensive than those constructed by non-Aboriginal people.  She writes: 
There is a naive belief that Aboriginal people will make ‘better’ 
representations of us, simply because being Aboriginal gives ‘greater’ 
understanding.97 
Such a belief is based on racist premises similar to the classification of all 
Indigenous Australians as ‘Aboriginal’ or belonging to one undifferentiated group of 
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people.98  Underpinning such a belief, and the homogenisation of Aboriginal people, 
is the colonial notion of the “undifferentiated Other”.99  Further, this “naive belief” 
that an Aboriginal person will necessarily produce a ‘better’ representation ignores 
differences in class, gender, religion, education, and remote or urban living.  It is as if 
these differentiating characteristics are unimportant in such instances. 
But, as Frantz Fanon and many other theorists have strongly asserted, many 
colonised people wear the mask of the coloniser, internalise and therefore reproduce 
colonial thinking.100  Aijaz Ahmad in “The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality” makes 
a similar point.  He suggests that: 
[t]he ideational logic of this cultural differentialism is to privilege self-
representation over all other kinds of representation and to treat self-
representation as a moment of absolute authenticity, as if between the self 
and its representation there could be no moment of bad faith or false 
consciousness.101 
From the discussion of autobiography in Chapters One and Two here however 
we know that autobiography or self-representation is mediated.  Deliberate choices are 
made about what information to include or to exclude based on self-interest, community 
interest or the desired effect to be achieved. 
The second category of ‘Aboriginality’ for Langton is that of stereotypes, the 
imaginings of uninformed white Australians whose misunderstanding is built on primitive 
representations such as ‘stone age’ or ‘dirty and drunk’.  Aboriginal people who have 
internalised colonial thinking may also perpetuate stereotypes.  Evidence of this can be 
seen in some posters designed by Aboriginal artists that portray Aboriginal people solely 
in traditional ways, that is hunting and gathering for instance.  It is these stereotypical 
constructions of ‘Aboriginality’, or misrepresentations, according to Langton that form 
the basis of most relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.102 
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Langton’s final category of ‘Aboriginality’ includes those constructions that 
occur as the result of dialogue between Aboriginal people, and between Aboriginal 
people and non-Aboriginal people.  The sets of possibilities are endless and of course 
vary according to class, gender, and age.  As dialogue is motivated in numerous ways, 
times and context so numerous ‘Aboriginalities’ are manifested.  For Langton 
‘Aboriginality’ is a bankrupt concept unless it falls within this category and is 
“understood in terms of intersubjectivity, when both the Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal are subjects, not objects.”103  Most importantly, yet so often not discussed, 
are the ways in which dialogue, including dialogue between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people, allows for the making and remaking of non-Indigenous 
identities.104  The same point can be made about the construction of any identity; each 
of our identities is constructed through dialogue with others.  The lack of any 
articulation of these identities results in a lack of opportunity for honest, productive 
inter-relationships. 
The critical point that Langton makes is that constructions of Aboriginality 
that do not result from dialogue are merely constructions of objects.  These objects are 
the same as those historically produced by uncritical anthropology, literature, and 
history such as, the ‘noble savage’ or ‘promiscuous black’.  While different 
representations may now be produced, when this occurs in the absence of dialogue, 
objects not subjects are created.  The construction of people as objects is also evident 
in the objectification of women, sexuality and class.  Rey Chow, in a paper titled 
“Where Have All the Natives Gone?”105 makes a similar observation about the 
object/subject relation afforded to Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike.  
Drawing on Lacan’s work she describes the relationship: 
As the white man’s symptom, as that which is externalised in relation to 
the white-man-as-subject, the space occupied by the native is essentially 
objective, the space of the object.106 
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Chow asserts that postcolonial theorists, in attempting to renegotiate their 
relationship with the “native”, inevitably subjectivise her/him in such a way as to 
construct the ‘native’ as lack.  This occurs, I suggest, when texts written by colonised 
people are taught merely for this reason, in isolation from the historical and 
contemporary socio-economic conditions of their production. 
The misgivings many people have about the use of the term postcolonialism 
must be taken seriously.  To ignore the concerns expressed by Sykes, Nannup and 
others is to co-opt postcolonialism to colonialist ends.  At the same time, it is important 
to recognise the contributions that postcolonial theorists and theory make to critiques 
of colonialism.  Peter McLaren in discussing critical pedagogy and postcolonialism 
writes that: 
[t]hese “new times” are also reflective of the narratives we live by.  They 
mirror the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, stories that shape both 
the ecstasy and the terror of our world, disease our values, misplace our 
absolutes, and yet strangely give us hope, inspiration, and framework for 
insights.  We can’t escape narratives but I believe we can resist and 
transform them.107 
For McLaren there is a symbiotic relationship between “the stories we tell 
ourselves” and the times in live in.  Postcolonial narratives destabilise, subvert, 
confront, offer us new lines of flight, new becomings. 
In deciding where to from here, what trajectory to follow, Trinh T. Min-ha’s 
definition of a responsible work (from Woman Native Other) is a useful guide.  It is 
productive for determining what a “genuine postcolonial enterprise” might be and for 
implementing effective critical postcolonial pedagogy.  She writes: 
A responsible work today seems to me above all to be one that shows, on 
the one hand, a political commitment and an ideological lucidity, and is, 
on the other hand interrogative by nature, instead of being merely 
prescriptive.108 
The following chapters provide an account of the ‘practical’ work of this 
thesis, they represent a substantiation of the nexus of theory and praxis.  Postcolonial 
theory in action.  Importantly, it is work that brings together both Aboriginal histories 
                                                          
107 Peter McLaren, Critical Pedagogy and Predatory Culture. Oppositional Politics in a Postmodern 
Era, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 89. 
108 Trinh, 1991, p. 149. 
 
111 
and white Australian histories in ways that “acknowledge the difference between lived 
experience and representation; work that is careful not to turn a struggle into an object 
of consumption.”109  The accounts are necessarily only partial and do not fully 
articulate the complexity and richness of being involved in each of these critical 
moments.  But it clearly demonstrates the commitment on the part of Alice Nannup, 
an Injibarndi woman, students, magistrates, theorists – “without whose participation 
no solution emerges, for no solution exists as a given”110 – and myself to interrogate 
colonial sites and practices as a catalyst for facilitating change. 
In the following chapter a critique of the “Patterns of Life: The Story of the 
Aboriginal People of Western Australia” exhibition at the Perth Museum demonstrates 
several ways in which colonial representations and knowledges of Aboriginal people 
continue to be perpetuated and thus inform impoverished relationships between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.  These representations are exposed as 
fraudulent when students draw upon their own knowledges and experiences to 
interrogate them. 
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Chapter Four  
 
“Knowledges of the Museum” 
“Museums, and the museumising imagination, are both profoundly 
political.”1 
“What is often called the black man’s soul is a white man’s artefact.”2 
In 1993, I was invited to design and teach a course in the Primary Education Academic 
Challenge (PEAC) programme.  This programme is part of the state education services 
for primary school children.  While the courses are usually available to those children 
who are in the top ten percent of their class, I devised a ten week course overtly focusing 
on ‘traditional’ aspects of Aboriginal culture, such as art, storytelling and music, which 
was open to anyone who was interested.  Although there were seven Indigenous and 
nine non-Indigenous students in the group (a larger than normal group for PEAC) there 
were then, as now, more students keen to participate than there were places. 
The rationale for the course was that all Australians, regardless of cultural 
heritage and of contact with Indigenous people, have a relationship to ‘Aboriginality’, 
one that has for the most part been ignored or denied.  One aim was to have students 
explore their relationships with ‘Aboriginality’ and the wider community by being able 
to talk with each other and with visiting speakers.  It was my hope that such 
opportunities would provide both Indigenous and non-Indigenous students with ways 
of understanding and discussing issues that could equip them with a set of critical tools 
and strategies.  This would lead to recognition of and responses to colonial 
assumptions, and thus facilitate productive inter-cultural relationships.  The students 
could then develop strategies for anticolonial critique and reconciliation. 
During the first week of the course students got to know each other and I 
could gauge the types of existing student knowledge about Aboriginal cultures.  All 
the Indigenous students were Nyoongars.  One person explained to the group that this 
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was their correct name and that it meant that they belonged to the Perth and south-west 
area of Western Australia.  Each child spoke about their parents’ or relatives’ 
connections with Indigenous organisations as a way of explaining the types of 
information they could bring to the group.  Family connections through work and other 
relationships included the Department of the Family (specifically that section 
concerned with reconnecting families that had been separated by past government 
policies), a renowned artist (Lance Chadd), the West Australian Aboriginal Music 
Association and the Aboriginal Medical Service.  This was important information in 
terms of situating the children’s families within the wider community. 
Non-Indigenous students were encouraged to talk about their family heritages 
as a way of identifying themselves.  There was nothing said by these students about 
their national or cultural heritages.  However, they were all eager to talk about why 
they had chosen the course and expressed their desire to learn more and to meet 
Aboriginal people.  I was surprised by their awareness of several contemporary 
political issues such as the Brewery Site dispute3 and Aboriginal deaths in custody. 
I explained to the Nyoongar children that they could provide knowledge of 
Indigenous cultures for the group if and when they wanted to.  There was no naive 
assumption that all the children would feel they had cultural knowledges to bring along 
or that they would want to display what knowledges they had.  We also discussed the 
fact that the other students would have their own opinions and various degrees of 
knowledge to share and evaluate. 
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, a discussion of the difference 
between Aboriginal people in remote, as opposed to urban areas, was generated. This 
fed directly into one issue with which I was particularly concerned to deal with, that of 
authenticity; who is a ‘real’ Aborigine?  And further, how is ‘authenticity’ represented?  
These questions became central concerns of the course.  They stimulated sophisticated 
debates about identity and authority for the students and formed the central focus of 
week two of the course; a visit to the Aboriginal exhibit at the Perth Museum. 
                                                          
3 “On January 2nd, 1989, Aboriginal protesters set up camp on the Sacred Grounds of the Waugal, on 
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4.1 The museum 
Before it is possible to discuss the Primary Extension Academic Challenge class’s 
experience at the Perth Museum and the work that came out of that, it is necessary to 
consider just what a museum is and how it functions.  Michael Belcher in his book 
Exhibitions in Museums reproduces two extensively-used definitions from the 
International Council of Museums and the Museums Association.  According to the 
International Council of Museums a museum is: 
a non-profitmaking, permanent institution in the service of society and its 
development, and open to the public, which acquires, conserves, 
researches, communicates, and exhibits, for purposes of study, education 
and enjoyment, material evidence of man [sic] and his environment.4 
The Museums Association provides the following definition: 
A museum is an institution, which collects, documents, preserves, exhibits 
and interprets material evidence and associated information for the public 
benefit.5 
Belcher then deconstructs these definitions.  He points out that words such as 
“collect, documents, preserves” have fairly obvious meanings; things or information 
are kept.  However, just what is “evidence and associated information” is less clear, 
more open to interpretation.  Questions about who supplies the evidence, where it 
comes from, and who does the association are raised.  It is clear however, that all these 
terms suggest that the museum’s exhibits will be authentic cultural representations and 
authenticated by a process open to scrutiny.  The public will be given a ‘window’ into 
a particular world or culture and there is a general acceptance that the view through 
this window will be relatively frozen in time.  Relatively, because there may be 
information additional to museum exhibits that prompts the public to question what 
they are looking at and how they are situated in relation to the exhibits.  Belcher goes 
on to say: “interprets is taken to cover such diverse fields as display, education, 
research and publication.”  And then, with “for the public benefit” is the notion that 
museums are the “servants of society”. 
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As terms such as ‘interpret’ make clear, museums are not “the neutral and 
transparent sheltering space[s] that [they are] often claimed to be”6 and their exhibits are 
not disembodied institutional products.  They are produced by directors and curators.  
As Carol Duncan asserts, “While we may be reluctant to admit it, the production of an 
exhibition is more akin to the production of a theatre piece than any other form.  Like 
theatre, exhibitions are formed by a group of people who have highly individualised 
visions and styles, in a process in which compromise is the order of the day.”7  For the 
most part it is reasonable to assume that the content and methods of the display will 
reflect state and management values, “these are [however] compromised by the complex 
interactions of competing parties and interests that exist in any museum.”8 
The museum, in its function as servant to the public, has an “alleged innate 
neutrality”9 that facilitates its operation as “an instrument of power as well as an 
instrument of education and experience.”10  In Althusser’s terms it functions as part of 
the (State’s) Ideological State Apparatus or “institutions of ideology ... (the school and 
the university)”11 which, while apparently neutral are not.  Many students are taken to 
the museum as part of their formal learning experience.  Very often, and certainly in 
the case of younger students, little or nothing is done to problematise the neutrality of 
the museum, the exhibits, or themselves as spectators.  The experience is, for all intents 
and purposes, presented as being apolitical.  As can be understood from the experience 
of the Primary Extension Academic Challenge class, not all spectators are part of the 
'ideal community' which, in the case of the Perth Museum, might well be assumed to 
be white, Anglo-Celtic and colonialist.  Museums are political. 
Benedict Anderson usefully discusses just whose values are reflected in the 
museum.  First, out of respect for his work, it is important to note that his thoughts 
about this area have changed during the print runs of Imagined Communities.  In the 
original edition of the book he wrote: 
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8 Steven Lavine and Ivan Karp “Introduction: Museums and Multiculturalism”, in Exhibiting 
Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display, Lavine and Karp (eds), Washington: 
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Display, Lavine and Karp (eds), Washington: Smithsonian Institute, 1991, p. 14. 
10 Karp, 1991, p. 14. 
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... so often in the “nation-building” policies of the new states one sees both 
a genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm, and a systematic, even 
Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, 
the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth.12 
In the current edition of his book he explains that this definition is inadequate 
because he is discussing parts of Asia where state power is no longer, for instance, 
simply British, Spanish, Dutch.  In the case of Western Australia however, I want to 
claim that the state ideology remains rooted in British colonialism. 
Susan Vogel, a museum practioner who writes about the ways in which 
Western culture has appropriated African art, makes some insightful observations – 
similar to those made by Anderson – that can be applied more generally to museum 
exhibitions.  They are certainly useful for any analysis of the Aboriginal exhibition at 
the Perth Museum.  Vogel makes the point that exhibitions of African art have much 
more to do with the ways “Western outsiders have regarded African art and material 
culture over the past century”13 than with Africa or African artists.  Unless an audience 
understands that what is on show is a Western representation then they may mistakenly 
believe they are actually seeing, in Vogel’s case, ‘authentic’ African art. 
Anthropologist Marcia Langton, in writing about filmic representations and 
“racist stereotypes and mythologies which inform Australian understanding of 
Aboriginal people”, makes a similar point to Vogel’s.  She notes that: 
 … the most dense relationship is not between actual people, but between 
white Australians and the symbols created by their predecessors.  
Australians do not know and relate to Aboriginal people.  They relate to 
stories told by former colonists.14 
This can certainly be seen in the Perth Museum’s Aboriginal display.  It 
narrates a very particular story. 
It is my contention that what is exhibited, how it is exhibited, what is said, 
extra written information, and anything extraneous to the display (for example, the 
commentary provided by guides) will reflect and imply cultural, institutional and 
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Art, 1988, p. 11. 
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personal socio-political beliefs.  As a result, the exhibition is imbued with all these 
meanings; it becomes something other than itself.  The Aboriginal exhibit is thus about 
Western Australian ideologies, at the level of the State, the museum, popular myth, the 
curators and the guides.  It is an exhibit of Western Australia’s non-Indigenous 
response to ‘Aboriginality’.15 Does the museum invite everyone equally to view the 
exhibit?  Does it address the needs of each audience equally? 
If what is seen in museums are the curator's and director's representations, 
never ‘the real thing’, why are they such significant cultural institutions?  The answer 
is found in part in Anderson’s explanation of “nation-building” institutions, for 
museums have historically been, and remain, articulations of national identity.  This is 
overtly obvious in war museums, for example, where it is the Nation that is put on 
display.  But national identity is also constructed through what it is not.  Western 
Australia is not ‘uncivilised’, the public is not ‘primitive’.  So it is that art, artefacts, 
photographs (through the ways they are exhibited and commented upon) can be used 
to “serve masters other than the aesthetic and cultural interests of the producers and 
appreciators of art.”16   Ways of seeing, a museum effect, are an apparatus of power. 
The importance of decisions, both institutional and personal, that determine 
exactly what is exhibited (and how) should not be underestimated.  The ‘what’ and 
‘how’ and, just as importantly, what we do not see “reflect deeper judgements of power 
and authority”17 that presuppose an audience, public or community of spectators.  The 
identity of that community is directly related to the content and framing of exhibitions.  
By implication the public is determined, or certainly there is a preferred public whose 
values are reflected by the museum.  And, as will be seen from the following analysis, 
there are always spectators who are marginalised. 
Although it is not my intention to set up the museum as a ‘straw man’ to be 
burned, [as on Guy Fawkes night, or pushed over,] it must be critiqued.  For it is, in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, an articulation of the State.  Like a piece in the game of 
chess it codes and decodes, it striates.  Education for the “public benefit”, “for their 
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own good” is one ‘move’.  There are rules that determine how the ‘move’ is made: 
what and how information is presented to the public. 
The Perth Museum is in the heart of the city’s official cultural centre.  It is part 
of a ‘cultural circle’ which encompasses the Alexander State Library, the Perth Institute 
of Contemporary Arts, the Art Gallery of Western Australia and, the Museum.  Such a 
location is a testament to its importance within official Western Australian culture. 
While certainly changing to reflect contemporary national and political 
contexts, it is my belief that the Perth museum still plays a part in instilling nationalist, 
colonial ideologies and cultural identities.  This function is demonstrated by the way 
Aboriginal peoples and cultures are displayed in a ‘frozen moment’: they are 
‘primitive’, ‘exotic’, ‘other’, ‘object’.  Little mediating information is offered to 
deconstruct this representation. 
4.2 “The very nature of exhibiting, then, makes it a contested terrain.”18 
The Perth Museum’s Aboriginal exhibit “Patterns of Life The story of the Aboriginal 
People of Western Australia” is housed on the second floor.  It constitutes a narrative 
about Aboriginal people in Western Australia.  The story has remained unchanged for 
many years, as regular visits to the museum reveal.  It is about traditional cultures, 
people who lived ‘in another time and another space’.  It forms part of the colonial 
apparatus that produces particular types of ‘Aboriginalities’ and hierarchies.  
‘Primitive, traditional, even a dying race’ are manifestations of ‘Aboriginality’ 
maintained by the museum.  Clearly, decisions have been made about those elements 
of Aboriginal culture to include or omit: in Foucault’s terms, what ‘truths’ to assert 
and what to ignore.  It is a traditional exhibit, both in content and style. 
The exhibition is traditional in the sense that it displays ‘traditional’ 
Aboriginal cultures.  It is also what the public ‘traditionally’ expects to see in a 
museum.  Interaction with the exhibit is restricted to looking at it, listening to and 
asking questions of the guide, interacting with others looking at the exhibit, and filling 
in workbooks supplied by the curators. 
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As Vogel’s work on African art clearly articulates, exhibitions are not the 
domain of the ‘real’.  Although concrete objects and real images are displayed, they 
are always mediated by the audiences’ cultural and socio/political experiences and by 
the curatorial frames.  Objects are often chosen for exhibition because they are 
regarded as emblematic of, or abstractions of a particular culture or time.  The painting 
in the foyer of the “Patterns of Life” exhibit, described below, provides an example of 
such a scheme. 
In the foyer of the exhibit area there is a small display of tools and crafts and 
written texts that pay discursive tribute to the age and adaptability of Aboriginal 
cultures.  Information is also provided about the number of language groups that 
existed prior to the arrival of Europeans and some information about subsequent 
massacres.  Also in the foyer, on the wall at the entrance to the Aboriginal exhibit 
proper, is a large painting, approximately one by one and a half metres in size, of a 
group of sixteen Aboriginal people.  The untitled painting is a replication of a 
photograph of “a local group, East of Laverton, about 1900.” 19 No title or information 
about the people represented appears with the painting.  Neither is there any 
information about possible offence or pain which may be caused to some by personal 
knowledge of, or connection with, people in the painting. 
The group of people is posed in the classic European tradition with a row of 
people, usually men or the tallest of the group standing at the back, and a row of people 
seated in the front.  They are divided into two rows with the men standing in a line at 
the back, facing the camera.  Sitting on the ground in front of them, also in a line, are 
four women and five children.  The men are all ‘naked’, except for grass belts around 
their waists.  One man has a large bone through his nose and they are all wearing some 
form of necklace.  Six of the men have one arm extended above their head with their 
hand around the top of a spear.  The man in the centre of the line is holding a nulla 
nulla across his shoulders.  The women and children too are ‘naked’ except for 
necklaces.  A baby, sitting in the lap of one woman, has the woman’s nipple clasped 
in her fingers. 
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The painting is exceedingly important occupying, as it does, a large wall 
space at the beginning of the exhibit proper.  It acts as a frame, or point of reference, 
for how an audience looks at and interprets the next section of the exhibit.  As it is a 
stereotypical image of ‘natives on display’ –  the type of image that may have been 
sent back to England as an example of ‘primitive people’, an example of an 
anthropological find, or how truly uncivilised Australia was – it is important to 
consider not just the content of this painting but its size and where it is placed.  One 
effect of it is to place the museum and its ideal audience in a certain hierarchy to the 
people represented in the painting. 
In an essay called “Art Museums and the Ritual of Citizenship”, Carol Duncan 
suggests that museums work like temples or shrines, and visitors “bring with them a 
willingness and ability to shift into a certain state of receptivity,”20 to suspend disbelief.  
This is certainly borne out by the behaviour of the Primary Extension Academic 
Challenge class in both its interactions with the exhibit and response to the guide’s 
commentary.  It is not just the museum itself and the authority invested in it that makes 
this so.  Assumptions about who the audience is, explicated by the content of exhibits, 
determines receptivity: am I meant to be here, how am I meant to respond?  How then 
does the painting prompt an audience to look at the exhibit?  Through colonial eyes? 
The remainder of the exhibition follows a shallow semi-circle with glass 
fronted display cases on either side of a walkway.  The exhibit includes traditional tools 
such as a Kimberley spearhead, an adze and a southwest trap knife.  Each item is 
labelled.  In some cases, there is an explanation of how it is used.  There is a replication 
of a Kimberley cave painted with Wandjina figures. Wandjinas are creators, they are 
large bodied figures, often only the heads are depicted, with large staring eyes—as a 
demonstration of rock art.  Information about ochres and painting practices is supplied.  
Several different boats and fishing implements are displayed with an accompanying text 
about both fishing and contact between Aboriginal people and their close neighbours. 
Photographs make up a significant part of the exhibition.  Perhaps one of the 
most startling is that of three women with their backs to the camera.  They are displaying 
thick, deep vertical scars that run down their shoulders and across their buttocks.  There 
is an accompanying sign that explains that “these body scars are signs of maturity ... a 
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recognition of becoming women.”21  The photograph is a reminder that objects in 
exhibits are not neutral; spectators rarely look at any object without some response.  The 
women’s scars invite responses that range from fascination to horror.  It is important to 
understand that what cannot be determined is the type of response the scars would have 
generated in their original settings.  Further, how do Indigenous people respond to the 
photograph and to the responses of people around them? 
If we are to critically view such photographs, it is necessary to understand 
“the roles played in the creation process by the photographer, the photographic subject, 
and the viewer.”  After all a “photograph is a cultural artefact that articulates a 
photographer’s visions, biases and concerns.”22  The photographic subject is a silent 
participant.  There is no information in the exhibit to suggest that there was any 
reciprocity between any of the photographic subjects and the 
anthropologist/photographer.  The subject of the photograph is objectified for both the 
anthropologist/photographer and the viewer. 
The production of exhibits such as “Patterns of Life” is possible because of 
the state’s (or the museum’s) ability to obtain, and retain, Indigenous artifacts and 
images.  This process is further facilitated by the reproducibility of photographs and 
paintings so that they can appear in various sizes, at various sites.  For them to be 
exhibited for public consumption there must then be a belief on the part of the museum 
and its curators that the artefacts and images are not sacred and therefore not off-limits.  
Or, that their sacredness makes them appropriate museum items.  Or, it may well be 
that there is a disbelief in their sacred or possible sacredness.  This is a different point, 
it implies quite different values and levels of respect, or disrespect, for the displayed 
people and their culture. 
In the light of such important work as Eric Michaels’ Bad Aboriginal Art, 
Marcia Langton’s “Well I heard it on the radio and saw it on the television”, and pleas 
by many Indigenous people that respect be shown for themselves and their cultures, 
what is missing from the exhibit is an acknowledgement that the images displayed may 
cause offence or pain to some people.  There should also be some acknowledgement 
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that past anthropological practices have resulted in photographs and artefacts being 
available to the public that should not necessarily be available for public viewing. 
Michaels, in his essay “A Primer of Restrictions on Picture-Taking in 
Traditional Areas of Aboriginal Australia”23, raises vital issues about the secret/sacred 
domain.  He makes the point that what is sacred or public does not necessarily remain 
so over time and location; rather “the issues of secrecy and sacredness are not static, 
fixed facts but dynamic, changing negotiations:”24 
... The designation of an item as secret as opposed to public is locally made 
and enforced.  But a similar or identical item to that deemed public in one 
place may well be considered wholly secret and highly restricted in 
another.  Thus a photograph made in one place and authorised for public 
showing may be discovered to be quite offensive elsewhere.25 
The scars designating womanhood on the backs of the women were certainly 
not put there for the gaze of the non-Indigenous public.  Further, because there is no 
other information accompanying the photograph, it is not known whether all 
Indigenous people should be able to look at the women.  Neither is there any way of 
knowing if permission has been received from these people or their descendants.  If 
permission has been received, has this been reviewed?  This type of information should 
be available to the public as part of the display.  When it is not available it can only be 
assumed that this important cultural protocol has not been followed. 
Of great importance to many Indigenous groups is what Michaels has 
described as mortuary restrictions.  The passing away of an Indigenous person is often 
marked by restrictions on the use of his or her name, which means that in some 
instances that another person of the same name may have to be renamed so that hurt 
or offence is not caused.  Since the introduction of photographs, film and sound 
recordings, these restrictions have been extended to include these media.  This is 
complicated by desires to preserve knowledges, as well as the influence of Christianity 
and other Western traditions.  Indigenous communities are having to renegotiate their 
cultural practices in response to non-Indigenous influences.  This process takes time.  
This being the case, it is reasonable to expect that, if images are shown in museums, 
some appropriate caveat would accompany them. 
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From looking at the exhibit it can be assumed that the ideal public or 
spectators are not Indigenous people.  Neither are they people who find it problematic 
that Aboriginal people and cultures are presented as objects for consumption.  Indeed, 
the exhibit must seem appropriate to many viewers, including the State, or its 
representatives on the Museum Board, the Ministry of Education (students still visit 
as part of their education), museum administrators and curators, people who share the 
same attitudes as the exhibition maker.  It would not otherwise still exist in its present 
form.  What, precisely, did the Primary Extension Academic Challenge group see 
when faced with such a form?  I want to turn, next, to a specific description of their 
viewing experience(s). 
4.3 “Nor have we thought carefully enough about who participates in 
the forum.”26 
The students, another teacher and myself entered the museum, made our way to the 
second floor and entered the foyer of the exhibition.  Two guides who had been 
assigned to our group met us.  The principal guide, after introducing herself, invited 
the class to sit in front of the photograph of “A local group.  East of Laverton, about 
1900” while she described the procedure that would be followed.  Each student was 
given a workbook to fill in as they studied the exhibits, as a record of what they learnt 
for future reference and presumably as a way of focusing their attention on what were 
considered, by the museum, to be important aspects of the display.  The students were 
then divided into two groups and allocated a starting point. 
The guide began her commentary about the display of artefacts and 
photographs with an explanation of the painting.  It is this painting, her description of 
it and the students' responses to her commentary that are considered here.  At this point 
in the visit there had been no discussion of expectations and ways of reading the 
museum or the exhibit, for although I was familiar with it and assumed that it would 
be useful as a means of discussing colonial, anthropological and primitivistic 
representations it was not possible to pre-empt, with any certainty, the students’ 
response to it or the frame provided by the museum guide.  So it was that I too sat and 
listened as a student of the guide and the museum. 
                                                          
26 Vogel, 1991, p. 11. 
 
124 
The guide explained to seven Nyoongar and nine non-Indigenous students 
that this was a painting of a group of natives who had come out of the desert near 
Laverton, seeing and mixing with “white people for the first time”.  The lack of 
clothing, the beads and the scars that decorated the bodies of the adults were pointed 
out as proof of their authenticity.  She then explained that these people “were unspoilt”, 
they were “real” Aborigines who still had their “traditional” culture.  She made the 
point that they were not like those Aboriginal people who live in towns. 
The students sat and listened to this explanation without comment.  It was 
very difficult for me not to protest.  There was no apparent recognition by the guide of 
what she was, by implication, saying about the Nyoongar children in the class.  Neither 
were terms such as ‘unspoilt, real and traditional’ problematised in any way.  The two 
groups were then told they could start their tour of the exhibit.  Although they were 
asked to keep noise to a minimum, both she and the other guide would be happy to 
answer questions or supply extra comment.  Ample time would be given for filling out 
the workbooks. 
As described earlier, the exhibit was positioned as being ‘traditional’.  Artefacts 
were displayed in glass covered cabinets as objects of anthropological finds.  In a society 
that does preserve and value such objects the display itself cannot be regarded as merely 
negative.  It is not my intention to suggest that it is.  Students found many items of 
interest, some enjoyed filling in the workbooks as part of this process.  As the group 
examined rock paintings, tools, and boats (but also skin markings, with scarcely 
adequate descriptions of their significance), they constructed understandings of the 
‘Aborigines’ whose lives were on display here.  The interpretative frame, already 
supplied by our guide, gave the students little choice but to regard the exhibit as the 
remains or ‘essence’ of primitive cultures that now only existed in a ‘spoilt’ form. 
The ideological ‘framing’ of the exhibit is, of course, not accidentally in 
place.  It is, as Karp points out: 
... the mode of installation, the subtle messages communicated through 
design, arrangement, and assemblage, can either aid or impede our 
appreciation of the visual, cultural, social, and political interest of the 
objects and stories exhibited in museums.27 
                                                          
27 Karp, 1991, p. 14. 
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Presentation is not confined to the objects that are displayed or their 
arrangement.  For the objects themselves, while perhaps maintaining their own 
authenticity, have no innate authority “at least in this place”.  In such an instance, it is 
the curators who have authority as Crew and Sims so succinctly point out in “Locating 
Authenticity”.28  It is the curators and other officials who decide what and how 
information is given; it is they who both have and confer authority.  This is particularly 
so in the case of ‘official statements’, such as the guide’s commentary as they act as 
part of the exhibit, are conferred with institutional authority and determine the social 
contract between audience and exhibit / museum.  In this instance, what the guide said 
certainly determined the “messages communicated” to the group.  A frame of reference 
for reading the exhibit was supplied. 
Simply put, the frame of reference supplied by the guide’s description of the 
painting was a colonial one.  It inferred that the group was looking at objects and 
images of people that belonged to a time past.  The tools, implements and boats were 
markers of primitive people's ability to live in harsh conditions where survival rather 
than 'progress' was the central focus of their lives. There was some disquiet about the 
scars on the backs of the women indicating that undesirable practices were carried out, 
another marker of ‘lack of progress’.  They were valorised as exotic others, while 
consigned to the dustbin of History. 
4.4 Guiding the class 
When the ‘official statement’ was made to a group of students seated on the floor, 
facing the guide, the authority of the museum was re-enforced by a complex series of 
pedagogic norms and strategies.  Within the State education system the teacher 
occupies a position of power.  There is “a system of differentiation”, of “hierarchical 
subordination”, naturalised within the school system that determines the relationship 
between teacher and students.29  Although students often challenge the authority of 
teachers, in general this is confined to older students and more often within the school 
itself.  There are, after all, further codes, ‘be on your best behaviour’, that come into 
                                                          
28 Crew and Sims, “Locating Authenticity” in Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of 
Museum Display, Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine (eds), Washington: Smithsonian Institute, 1991, p. 
163. 
29 This is, of course, not a fixed relationship.  Neither are relationships of power confined to 
teacher/student.  They exist between teachers, teachers and the system, and between students. 
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play on class outings.  This was certainly true, to various degrees, for the students in 
the Primary Extension Academic Challenge class.  Although there had been no 
instructions as to behaviour, once in the museum the students automatically became 
focused on the guide and the exhibition in particular ways. 
Most obviously, they were seated on the floor facing the guide, who was 
seated on a chair close to the mural significantly higher and between them and the text.  
She explained that her function was to introduce the exhibit and to answer any 
questions that people might have.  Yet it was clearly not this simple.  The “system of 
differentiation” ensured that she occupied a position of power and that certain 
conventions, or codes of politeness, operated that allowed her to deliver an analysis of 
the mural that (although limited in the knowledges that it offered, and potentially 
offensive) initially went uncontested by the students and teachers, but was 
deconstructed later in the classroom.  This “system of differentiation” functioned not 
just at the level teacher/student but also at the level of anthropologist/Aborigine.  It 
was a discourse that was founded on the ‘expert’ anthropological position. 
At no point in the guide’s explanation of the painting did she acknowledge 
that her interpretation was limited to her own cultural background.  While this has not 
been common practice, for many there is considerable precedent for making such an 
acknowledgement.  There may well be several reasons for this lack.  Her position was 
clearly a colonial one.  In which case, she regarded her explanation as sufficient.  
Perhaps she knew nothing of contemporary Aboriginal culture, had rarely spoken with 
Aboriginal people, listened to or read texts written by them and therefore had only a 
limited frame of reference.  She may take the position that the photos and artefacts are 
anthropological materials that do not need to be located within their own cultural 
origins.  Or, she may have taken the stance that as a guide/teacher, a position of 
authority must be maintained.  There is little point in speculation however.  Whatever 
the reason for the omission, it affected the knowledges provided and the group’s 
response to the exhibit. 
What was absent from the commentary and display was any frame of 
reference that invited anticolonial readings of these exhibits.  The guide did not 
encourage the students to analyse what they saw or heard.  At no time was there a 
questioning of the relationship between the ‘traditional’ artefacts and images displayed 
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and contemporary Aboriginal cultures.  This was surprising considering the 
composition of the group.  The implicit assumption was that there is a socially agreed 
upon reality that simply exists.  Non-‘traditional’ Indigenous people are assimilated.  
They are not ‘real Aborigines’.  There was therefore no perceived need to ‘adjust’ the 
commentary despite the presence of Indigenous students.  The guide/teacher has a 
fixed pedagogic position, a fixed speaking position, a pre-arranged talk about the 
‘past’; for her there could be no intervention from the present (however represented).  
This was one example of the discourse that Hodge and Mishra have defined as 
Aboriginalism which: 
... insists that Aborigines as the Other cannot (be allowed to) represent 
themselves, cannot even be supposed to know themselves as subjects or 
objects of discourse.  This tactic deprives Aborigines of the possibility of 
authority, of being authors of their own meanings.30 
The guide, painting and exhibit ascribed a series of attributes to the people 
and cultures they represented in the “Patterns of Life” exhibit in such a way as to define 
‘Aboriginality’ as ‘traditional’, ‘scarred’, ‘unclothed’, and so on.  Certainly, a 
distinction was made between ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ Aborigines and those that live in 
towns.  Did the students make connections between themselves or their classmates and 
the ‘real’ Aborigines they had just learnt about?  For me there was certainly a feeling 
of deja vu.  I thought of my own failure to make similar connections in Social Studies 
lessons in Australia in the 1960s. 
A view such as the one given to the students is not just uninformed, it is 
indicative of a capitulation to primitivism, of a belief that ‘real’ Aborigines belong in 
a time past.  “What emerges is a damning indictment of the white man [sic] for his 
despicable discrimination, his injustice and intolerance, his ignorance and, above all, 
his failure to recognise the Aboriginal as a fellow human being...”  This comment from 
the back cover of Kevin Gilbert’s Living Black31 is equally applicable to this moment 
within the museum.  When it is considered that ‘Aborigine’ is a term imposed by the 
newly Federated states upon the many Indigenous groups living in Australia before the 
arrival of Cook, to then debate whether people are ‘real’ or not is an act of cultural 
                                                          
30 Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra, Dark Side of the Dream. Australian Literature and the Postcolonial 
Mind, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990, p. 74. 
31 Kevin Gilbert, Living Black, Ringwood: Penguin, 1986, Back cover. 
 
128 
viciousness.32  Former Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Justice Commissioner, 
Mick Dodson, in his Wentworth Lecture “The end in the beginning: re(de)finding 
Aboriginality” has the following to say: 
... Since their first intrusive gaze, colonising cultures have had a 
preoccupation with observing, analysing, studying, classifying and 
labelling Aborigines and Aboriginality...The obsession with distinctions 
between the offensively named ‘full bloods’ and ‘hybrids’, or ‘real’ and 
‘inauthentic’ Aborigines, continues to be imposed on us today.33 
Certainly, to use such potentially offensive terminology in speaking to the 
students is without doubt to define the Nyoongar students in the group as ‘inauthentic’.  
What does describing the group of people in the painting as ‘real Aborigines’ say to, 
and about, those Nyoongar students in the group whom the guide was addressing at 
that very moment; how were they being named?  Equally as important, what right of 
redress did they have?  If Commissioner Dodson is still calling on offensive naming 
practices to be stopped without, it seems reasonable to say, a great deal of success, 
what can these students expect? 
The guide’s commentary had (and continues to have) institutional authority.  
It acted as a statement made by the museum.  As such it reflects official opinion, 
assumed to be public opinion.  How are the non-Indigenous students, teacher and 
myself positioned by this commentary?  Are ‘we’ assumed to be likeminded?  What is 
‘our’ relationship then to Aboriginal people?  Importantly these questions became part 
of the group’s later critical work.  This work, as I will detail, raised a whole range of 
significant issues in terms of Australian cultural politics. 
4.5 “What [do] art museums say to and about our own culture – what 
political meanings [do] they produce and how [do] they produce 
them?”34 
Taking the Primary Extension Academic Challenge class to the museum, as the first 
official activity for the group, served several purposes.  It politicised and problematised 
representations of ‘Aboriginality’.  The question, just who is an Aboriginal person, was 
                                                          
32 For further discussion of use of language as a means of defining Aboriginal people, see Eve 
Mumewa D. Fesl, Conned, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993. 
33 Michael Dodson, The Wentworth Lecture “The end in the beginning: re(de)finding Aboriginality”, 
Australian Aboriginal Studies, Number 1, 1994, p. 3. 
34 Duncan, 1991, p. 91. 
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raised for the students. Can you be ‘half-Aboriginal’?  Are official versions of cultural 
history always true?  Students could question institutionalised statements.  Most 
importantly the experience gave students, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, the 
opportunity to begin questioning, discussing and redefining their own assumptions about 
‘Aboriginality’, their relationships to ‘Aboriginality’ and to each other. 
The work expected of the class was difficult.  It involved what Foucault has 
described in his texts as “negative work”.  This process involved divesting themselves 
of concepts such as ‘tradition’, ‘primitive’, and even ‘Aboriginal’ by seeking “below 
what is manifest”, the colonial bedrock, “the half silent murmur of [colonial] 
discourses”35 to perform what Marcia Langton describes as an anticolonial critique.  
Although the students were quite able to take on board deconstruction and anticolonial 
critique, the practice of applying this process or critique to the guide’s commentary 
needed to be negotiated.  The museum as institution and the guide as teacher were, 
after all, hierarchies that have been cemented within the school and broader social 
system in ways that usually protect them from critique. 
“Institutional discourses define the classroom, the teacher and the student.”36  
Luke and Gore, in the introduction to Feminisms and Critical Pedagogy, foreground 
ways in which students are examined and graded while teachers are not.  Teachers 
determine who speaks, when and within what parameters.  They make the further point 
that “such inscriptions are key in the production of subjectivity, identity and 
knowledge in pedagogical encounters ... subjectivity, identity and knowledge are the 
work of schooling.”37  Here “schooling” can be extended to include the teaching of the 
museum guide. 
As stated earlier, there was “a system of differentiation”, of “hierarchical 
subordination”, operating within the relationship between guide and students.  In 
Foucault’s terms the students had internalised the rules of behaviour governing the 
classroom; they had “disciplined” themselves, become “docile bodies”.38  In the 
museum they accorded the guide the status of teacher.  The institutional authority of 
                                                          
35 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (trans) A.M. Sheridan Smith, London: Tavistock, 
1972. 
36 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 2. 
37 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 2. 
38 For a discussion of Foucault’s notions of ‘discipline’ and ‘docile bodies’, see Discipline and 
Punish. The Birth of the Prison (Trans) Alan Sheridan, New York: Vintage Press, 1979. 
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the museum reinforced this ascription.  One effect of such a positioning was a lack of 
dialogue, resulting in the guide’s representation of ‘the Aborigines’ in the painting as 
‘real’ going unchallenged.  Consequently, the students, including the Indigenous 
students and the guide ‘appear’ to be like-minded.  The students function as part of the 
‘public’.  The students as ‘public’ began to deconstruct, however, when they were no 
longer in the museum. 
The homogenisation of the students and the museum act to “privilege and 
exclude certain kinds of viewing.”39  So it is that a non-Indigenous, colonial view is 
privileged in this instance.  In “Progressive Pedagogy” Valerie Walkerdine discusses 
working-class children in a way that aids understanding of the Primary Extension 
Academic Challenge class position.  She writes: 
[m]eanwhile, meanings are struggled over in the classroom.  “The child” 
is created as a sign, to be read and calibrated within the pedagogic 
discourses regulating the classroom.  The child is defined and mapped in 
its relations of similarity and difference with other signs. ... Through the 
regulation of this pedagogy children become subjected in the classroom.40 
In a similar way, the guide read the children in the Primary Extension 
Academic Challenge class as ‘a group of students’.  Their differences remained 
unacknowledged, perhaps even unrecognised.  This was consistent with the easy 
distinction between ‘real and inauthentic Aborigines’ that informed her framing of the 
exhibition.  For the many other students who have gone to the exhibition and heard the 
same explanation (but not deconstructed it) there would be “a critical reinstatement and 
revalorisation of history’s “great” [racist] metanarratives.”41 
The Museum guide, through her uncritical and non-personal approach, played a 
significant role in reinforcing and ensuring the perpetuation of the colonial ideology, an 
official narrative of the museum.  Certainly, in this instance the guide maintained a 
distinction between official narratives and the personal narratives of the students.  That the 
museum is “an amalgam of historical structures and narratives, practices and strategies of 
display, and the concerns and imperatives of governing ideologies”42 was thus elided. 
                                                          
39 Daniel J. Sherman and Irit Rogoff (eds), “Frameworks for Critical Analysis”, in Museum Culture, 
London: Routledge, 1994, p. xiii. 
40 Valerie Walkerdine, “Progressive Pedagogy” in Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 22. 
41 Luke, “Feminist Politics in Radical Pedagogy” in Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 25. 
42 Sherman and Rogoff, 1994, p. ix. 
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4.6 Critical Pedagogy 
As already stated, the students enjoyed the museum visit.  Its purpose was to provide 
ways of discussing ‘Aboriginality’ and this it did.  Many vital issues were raised and 
the experience of the museum was thus not a totally negative one.  It provided a site 
for both a productive and enabling intervention towards a re-visioning of knowledges, 
identities and pedagogical relations as these are structured by institutional discourses 
such as the museum, the guide, in her role as teacher, and anthropology.  Students 
learnt that there is a need to organise our theoretical strategies and practical tactics, 
speaking and listening to others, in a counter-offensive front.  That front can no longer 
exclude Aboriginal people, either by failure to critique colonial narratives or by an 
‘add-on’ approach to matters of practice, both academic and pedagogical.43 
However, these outcomes could not have been achieved without the active 
intervention of a teacher or facilitator.  Teachers must be concerned with critical 
pedagogy.   As Luke and Gore argue the task is to enable students to name and give 
voice to their experience (their subject positions) and then transform and give meaning 
to those experiences by critically examining the discourses that regulate those 
experiences. As critical educators “we all attempt to create pedagogical situations 
which empower students, demystify canonical knowledges, and clarify how relations 
of domination subordinate subjects marked by gender, ethnicity, race, class, sexuality 
and many other markers of difference.”44  The museum experience made it clear that 
teachers must provide students with a language of critique with which to demystify 
and politicise the discursive production of meaning students use to articulate their own 
experience and, to analyse those institutional discourses applied to and against them.45 
In this case colonial and stereotypical knowledges were presented to 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous students uncritically.  As already stated, the Nyoongar 
students were thus ‘inauthenticated’ and non-Indigenous students were included in the 
guide’s position.  A critical and an anticolonial reading of the exhibit requires above 
all a practical commitment to the political consequences of representation.  Langton 
writes that “anticolonialism requires a rupture and a positive awareness of the way 
                                                          
43 For a discussion of the need to incorporate practice into theoretical work see Luke and Gore 1992, 
in particular the Introduction to the text. 
44Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 1. 
45 Luke, 1992, p. 35. 
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colonial representation has shaped, and mis-shaped, reality for coloniser [non-
Indigenous students] and colonised [Nyoongar students] alike.”46 
The task I had set for myself, within the Primary Extension Academic 
Challenge course, was to have students consider the origins of their perceptions of the 
‘other’, including when both they and the 'other' were Aboriginal.  I hoped to give 
them an opportunity to re-evaluate these perceptions.  One step towards doing this was 
to “help students discover how they construct cultural meanings and identities within 
and against the frameworks of mass culture, institutional settings and discourses”.47  
Hence, a visit to the museum followed by a deconstruction of their responses to it. 
Back in their own classroom I very pointedly asked the Nyoongar students 
who they were if the people in the photograph were ‘real Aborigines’.  This was the 
first of a series of questions posed to everyone in the class.  It was certainly 
confronting, and not easily answered.  However, it was productive as a means of 
providing the students with a space and the challenge to articulate their own identities 
in the light of the ways in which they had been constructed within the museum. 
Students responded in many ways.  Certainly, they were ‘real’.  But, they 
were not like the people in the photograph, nor did they use any of the tools or artifacts 
that were on display although they, like some of the other students, had digeridoos, 
paintings, carvings and books.  All the Nyoongar students came from families where 
didgeridoos were played by at least some members of their extended family, and one 
boy’s uncle was a painter.  Unlike people depicted in the exhibit, they wore clothes, 
did not bear any initiation scars and lived in the suburbs. 
What is made clear from the students’ experience is that texts such as the 
museum exhibit need to be considered in a dialectical relationship with their social and 
historical context.  It must be clearly understood that they are produced by and 
“productive of, particular forms of knowledge, ideologies, power relations, institutions 
and practices”.  The simple example of the class visit to the exhibit illustrates the 
importance of critiquing anthropological and museumised texts because it 
demonstrates how systems of colonial domination continue to operate.  This critical 
process “involves an understanding of present circumstances as well as the ways in 
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which these are informed by, perpetuate and differ from situations which preceded 
them.”  It involves, at the very least, situating exhibits (such as the colonial one we 
were looking at) in relationships to vital contemporary cultures. 
We took as our starting point the questions: what is ‘Aboriginality’ and how 
is it constructed?  Through student introductions there was already an acceptance that 
‘Aboriginal’ was a generic term, like European, that did not allow for specific 
identities.  It was, however, a description of Indigenous people, one by which 
Nyoongar students were identified in school and one with which non-Indigenous 
students were most familiar. 
Narelle, a student who had expressed embarrassment while at the museum, 
made the point that Aboriginal people are not like those in the photograph and she did 
not like being thought of in that way.  The people and culture were depicted as 
homogenous and primitive and Narelle and others felt that they were being closely 
associated with the ‘primitive’.  Duncan contends that “if the audience, or some 
segment thereof, feels alienated, unworthy, or out of place it is because we want them 
to feel that way.”48  Is this so for Narelle?  The alienation that is experienced cannot 
be explained as some simple or deliberate choice on the part of the curator, or the 
museum to exclude some people from the exhibit.  Rather, the point is that ‘colonists’ 
do not question their assumptions, and colonisation is subtle and ongoing.  Narelle’s 
comment led to a discussion of the class’s apparent acceptance of the guide’s 
commentary and the obvious misgivings they had about it.  As has already been 
indicated, constraints inherent in the student/teacher relationship49, and accepted codes 
of behaviour for class outings, prohibited dialogue or challenge.  It is to be hoped, 
however, that these students will draw on this experience at various times and use it as 
a means of asserting their own points-of view and therefore identities and politics. 
Throughout the course, we built up a list of the students’ knowledges about 
Indigenous people and the sources of this knowledge.  Social Studies lessons and 
library assignments were the source of much formal knowledge, and most of this was 
similar to that gained at the museum.  However, some teachers had invited local 
Indigenous people to speak with students, tell stories, paint, dance and explain other 
aspects of their culture.  The Nyoongar students shared information they received from 
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grandparents, parents and extended family.  Those non-Indigenous students who had 
Nyoongar students in their classes also had some informal knowledge.  After 
discussion, it was agreed that what they had learnt at the museum and in Social Studies 
lessons had little in common with their other knowledges.  Importantly there was a 
recognition that knowledge is acquired by listening to and speaking with others as well 
as from formal lessons. 
Understanding the acquisition of knowledge in these terms allows for an 
appreciation of Langton's argument about ‘Aboriginality’.  She describes it as: 
... a social thing that is remade over and over again in a process of dialogue, 
imagination, representation and interpretation.  Both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people create ‘Aboriginalities’ so that in the infinite array of 
intercultural experiences, there might be said to be the three broad 
categories of intersubjectivity. 
The first is the experience of the Aboriginal person interacting with other 
Aboriginal people in social situations located largely within Aboriginal 
culture.  The second is the stereotyping, iconising and mythologising of 
Aboriginal people by white people who have never had any substantial 
first-hand contact with Aboriginal people.  The third is the construction 
generated when Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people engage in actual 
dialogue, where the individuals test and adapt imagined models of each 
other to find satisfactory forms of mutual comprehension.50 
Throughout the course the students became aware of the processes through 
which ‘Aboriginalities’ were created including their own involvement in that process.  
While Indigenous and non-Indigenous students were obviously involved in different 
ways, they came to recognise that they were participating in an ongoing social process.  
As such it is postcolonial in Collett’s terms, “it is about creating and asserting identity 
at the same time that it seeks to undermine the generality of stereotype - most often the 
stereotype nurtured by colonialism.”51  Perhaps, most importantly, they understood that: 
... as long as Aboriginal cultures have the role of representing timelessness then 
the story of their more recent history will tend to be put to one side, or that too 
will be bought forward as evidence of the continual struggle of an eternally 
oppressed people; always the same as they were from the beginning. 52 
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4.7 Changing the perspective 
For contemporary representations of ‘Aboriginality’ to be available within the 
museum, Lavine and Karp suggest that a number of things must occur.  People and 
their cultures, which are represented in museums, must have the opportunity to control 
the content and manner in which it is exhibited.  This process necessarily requires 
experimentation in exhibition design, a rethinking of the ways in which Indigenous 
cultures are presented.  “The challenge is to devise strategies that do not merely 
rehearse Western ways of organising experience...”53 Only then will different 
perspectives and knowledges be offered54 and the '’same old story'’ will cease to be 
told over and over again. 
Audiences, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, view any exhibition with a 
limited frame of reference.  Invariably every reading of an exhibit will therefore be a 
limited one.  When the photographs and artefacts being studied do not belong to the 
viewer's own culture, or are from one unfamiliar to the viewer, then readings may be 
even more limited.  For the most part, audiences respond in predictable ways.  They 
either “define their experience of the exhibition to fit with their existing categories of 
knowledge, or they reorganise their categories to fit better with their experience.”55  
Through the “shock of non-recognition”56 of themselves, family, friends and fellow 
students and teacher guidance (along with discussion about ‘Aboriginality’) it is clear 
that the Primary Extension Academic Challenge class was able to do the latter. 
In the case of the “Patterns of Life” exhibit however, it was not the exhibit or 
the guide’s commentary that provided the “shock” and therefore the catalyst for 
critique.  For the most part, this exhibit fails to challenge colonial, anthropological or 
stereotypical knowledges.  ‘Aboriginality’ remains a consumable commodity within 
the Perth Museum.  And so, I suggest we are left with Marcia Langton’s question:  
“Can we ever decolonise Australian institutions?  Can we ever decolonise our minds?”  
Probably not.  But we can try to find ways to undermine the colonial hegemony.  The 
museum is one such site of colonial hegemony.  I now want to turn to another such 
site, the Western Australian State legislation from 1848 to 1972, which I read in 
conjunction with Alice Nannup’s When the Pelican Laughed. 
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Chapter Five  
 
Stories of Western Australia 
In this chapter I analyse the ways in which official and personal narratives intersect 
through a reading of Western Australian State legislation as it relates to Aboriginal 
peoples.  I consider official narratives to be part of what Lyotard identified as “grand 
narratives, which have the goal of legitimating social and political institutions and 
practices, laws, ethics, ways of thinking.”1  And, in many ways I take up the question 
posed by Lyotard after Auschwitz, “How could the grand narratives of legitimation 
still have credibility in these circumstances?”2 but ask it of Western Australian State 
legislation as it is applied to Aboriginal people.  In responding to Lyotard’s question I 
draw extensively from Alice Nannup’s life-story When the Pelican Laughed;3 extracts 
from the National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
(RCIADC); Telling Our Stories; and, Bringing Them Home.  Each text is also deployed 
as a way of illustrating the far reaching and ongoing ramifications of this legislation. 
It is my intention to provide a brief overview (not a comprehensive analysis) 
of the significant legislation determining the lives of Aboriginal people in Western 
Australia from 1848 to the present, and to juxtapose this with the ramifications of this 
legislation on Alice Nannup’s life.  The purpose of this ‘juxtapositioning’ of texts is 
to “institute new addressees, new addressors, new significations, and new referents for 
the wrong to find an expression and for the plaintiff to cease being a victim.”4  In this 
instance Alice Nannup and other Aboriginal people testify to the wrongs perpetrated 
against them while they were divested of the means to argue; this is an example of 
what Lyotard calls the differend.  This chapter is thus largely a retelling, but one that 
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3 There are several other life stories written by Western Australian Indigenous authors that I could 
have used here.  I have a number of personal reasons for working with Alice Nannup’s text.  In 1992 
after a discussion with Nannup about When the Pelican Laughed and the “Postcolonial Fictions” 
conference that I was co-ordinating, she said “postcolonialism is a fiction but my book is not.”  She 
challenged the theoretical framework in which I was working in a way that was very productive for 
my future work. 
4 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, (trans) Georges Van Den Abbeele, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983, p. 13. 
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brings together narratives that have been deliberately, and yet artificially, separated.  
While I am fully aware of the problems associated with the retelling of other people’s 
stories, in this instance it is justified because it allows Alice Nannup’s account to 
highlight the disparity between the states intentions, according to the legislation, and 
the ramifications of its implementation. 
This comparative reading has potential to demonstrate the ways in which this 
legislation, as part of the State’s official narrative, homogenises and undermines the 
personal experiences of Aboriginal people by treating them as a unified collective.  
The homogenisation of people and their experiences has partly occurred because of 
the imposition of distinctions such as ‘full-blood’ and ‘half-caste’ as if these are 
‘factual, objective and authoritative’ categories, subsequent legislation has reinforced 
these distinctions.  Alice’s life-story demands that the very personal impacts of this 
legislation on the lives of individual people be recognised, and foregrounds the 
political expediency of denying any such recognition.  As such, When the Pelican 
Laughed functions as a ‘writing back’ to the official narratives from one who, however 
resistant, has been defined by them.  The result is a foregrounding of the paradox 
between the narratives. 
Another effect of juxtaposing these two narratives (one official and one 
personal) is to highlight the contradictions between them, or perhaps more accurately, 
between the State legislation and its implementation.  The main justification for taking 
children from their families and cultures was that it would enable them to receive an 
education.  An analysis of the legislation and comparison with the education that Alice 
and others like her received, reveals however, that the State’s definition of education 
was exceedingly narrow.  In fact, the education received by most Aboriginal people 
was consistent only with doing manual or domestic work and it could be argued that 
‘education’ for this kind of work was not a requirement.  The State legislation was, in 




5.1 “Just a minute, I’ve got something to say –  and I want you all to 
listen.”5 
Alice Nannup wrote When the Pelican Laughed in conjunction with Lauren Marsh and 
Stephen Kinnane, who recorded, transcribed and edited the work with her.  The book 
is the result of Stephen Kinnane’s research into the life of his grandmother, Jessie 
Argyle, who had met and formed a friendship with Alice in the 1920s.  Both women 
were, at that time, under the care of the Chief Protector of Aborigines. 
When the Pelican Laughed is written under the rubric of autobiography, a 
particularly useful genre for the telling of life stories because it combines the functions 
of both the historical and literary text.  A book marked ‘autobiography’ is usually 
privileged as being the most accurate and reliable account of a person’s life involving a 
type of ‘witnessing’ of experience, a validation of a life.  The reader is called upon to 
enter the spirit of the telling, that is to accept that this is a story other people should know 
about.  And, most importantly, the act of public telling is an appeal for the acceptance 
of its content as ‘truth’.  Alice Nannup makes a direct appeal to the reader: 
There are things that I’ve told that will make them [her family] sad too, but 
I had to tell those things because they are the truth, and part of doing this 
is the hope that all people, young, old, black, white, will read this book and 
see how life was for people in my time. (p. 217). 
The very powerful emotions of empathy, understanding, longing, revulsion 
and hate, evoked through her choice of events and the mode of telling, give the reader 
an opportunity to develop a rapport with the writer and thereby develop a relationship 
with her.  This rapport reinforces the ‘truth’ of the text by inviting the reader to align 
with the writer, not the State.  For, in terms of ideology and narrative tactics, both 
narratives – the personal and the official – comment dialectically upon each other.  The 
personal narrative is valid.  I take this to be the point of the early, significant 
positioning of the “Radio Theatre: Geraldton, 1950” anecdote in which Alice’s 
confrontation with some of the locals moves into a discourse on colour and blood. 
‘You know,’ I said, ‘it’s not fair.  We’re all the same, we’re all human beings; 
we walk, we talk, we eat the same kind of food, we are all just made the same.  
Colour is skin deep and I think we should all be treated as human beings.’ 
                                                          
5 Alice Nannup, Lauren Marsh, Stephen Kinnane, When the Pelican Laughed, Fremantle: Fremantle 
Arts Centre Press, 1992, p. 15.  Hereafter the page number is provided in the body of the text. 
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Pearl was standing next to me and I said to them, ‘I’ll send my daughter 
next door to the tearooms to get two saucers.  Then whoever of you is 
willing to come up here can be blindfolded.  I’ll take blood from me and 
from you, swirl it around in the saucers ... then you come and tell me which 
is your blood.’ (p. 15). 
At the end of the dispute, Alice is standing proudly defiant.  The telling of the 
personal narrative further vindicates her stance.  Because this book is her narrative, it 
is the official narrative that is excluded: “Right,” I said, “you haven’t got anything to 
say.  You can go” (p. 16).  The use of autobiography, in this instance, is a very powerful 
strategy for exposing “the memory of the epistemic violence of colonisation.”6 
Autobiography is a text concerned with providing information about the span 
of a person’s life and as such can be read as history.  In When the Pelican Laughed, 
the writer achieves this by drawing on official historical sources for information, 
including the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, the 
Pilbara Aboriginal Centre and the Anthropology Department at the University of 
Western Australia.7  Further, autobiographies usually adhere to a linear chronology 
and mark out significant periods, a methodology consistent with the writing of history.  
Nannup’s text follows this format and is divided into five sections, a preamble 
followed by four distinct periods corresponding to her life as a young girl, a young 
woman, a middle-aged woman and, finally as a grandmother. 
Like other life stories written by Indigenous women, When the Pelican 
Laughed is not merely an account of one person’s life, but also a history of Western 
Australia, spanning a period of eighty years.  Brewster makes the point that: 
a number of Aboriginal women who’ve written auto/biographical 
narratives describe their work in terms of an historical project which 
reconstructs a collective rather than a personal history, and is archival and 
pedagogic; they also describe it as culturally specific. 8 
This certainly applies to Nannup’s text, which is a ‘writing back’ to the official 
history of the State, one that highlights the human suffering and tragedy that has marked 
the establishment of Western Australia.  This life-story fills in the gaps left by those 
                                                          
6 Ann Brewster, “Towards a genealogy of ‘Aboriginal Literature’”, Unpublished paper, 1997,  
p. 4.  See also Ann Brewster, Literary Formations, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995. 
7 Nannup, “Acknowledgements”, 1992. 
8 Brewster, 1997, p. 5. 
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historic eras such as ‘Protectionism’ and ‘The Growth of the Western Australian Pastoral 
Industry’, for those who did not experience them.  As Ann Brewster suggests: 
The writers of auto/biographical narratives perform the function of 
historians and custodians of knowledge in Aboriginal culture.  Their stories 
record a past which has been elided in official white histories of the nation.9 
In recording this past, Alice Nannup documents the repressive effects of the 
1905 Aborigines Act on the lives of thousands of people, describing how the 
instigation of legalised child abduction affected the everyday lived experiences of 
numerous women, men and children in this State.  She explains in poignant detail, 
through an account of her own experience and the experiences of many others the 
consequences of internment in the Moore River Settlement, including life-long loss of 
contact with family, identity and independence.  Her life-story gives readers the 
opportunity to know the irony of how some Aboriginal people have experienced living 
in ‘the lucky country’ this century. 
5.2 The production of knowledge 
Texts exist in “a dialectical relationship with their social and historical context - 
produced by but also productive of, particular forms of knowledge, ideologies, power 
relations, institutions and practices.”10  For the most part life stories written by 
Indigenous people in Western Australia expose the colonialist and racist ideologies 
that have made practices such as the taking of children, and the herding of people onto 
reserves, possible.  It is my contention that the most productive readings of life stories 
written by Indigenous people in Western Australia are those that are informed by a 
knowledge of the State’s legislation which controlled the lives of people through the 
removal of children, the control of marriages and assimilation.  Reading When the 
Pelican Laughed is in this way a case in point. 
Most non-Indigenous Western Australians have had little direct association 
with this legislation and it is common to hear people say, “I knew nothing about it.”11  
Joy Burns, an eighty-eight-year old woman, has spoken to me about her lack of 
knowledge of Aboriginal people and the repressive practices that have been imposed 
                                                          
9 Brewster, 1997, p. 5. 
10Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (ed), Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory, 
Hertfordshire Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 4. 
11 Joy Burns, Personal conversation, Fremantle, 2nd August 1996. 
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on them.  Joy and Alice’s lives have spanned the same period of Western Australian 
history.  Joy was born in 1909 in Cunderdin, a small wheat belt town approximately 
four hundred kilometres from Perth.  She married a farmer and lived in Cunderdin until 
1964 when she was fifty-five.  As a child and young woman, she had no experience of 
Aboriginal people because, “there were none living in the area.”  In the late 1930s 
Molly, a young Aboriginal woman, came to work on the farm as a domestic and to 
help Joy with the children.  At that time, Joy believed that Molly had no family and 
consequently believed that she and her husband, Charlie were actually providing a 
home for her.  Later when Joy learnt that Molly had a family she helped her get back 
to them, but tragically Molly’s mother had passed away.  In subsequent years Joy has 
spent much time educating herself and others about the State legislation that controlled 
Molly’s and other Aboriginal peoples’ lives, and has become involved in a local 
reconciliation group. 
Working with State magistrates in 1994, I was dismayed to realise that, 
similarly, most of them had little or no knowledge of Western Australian legislation 
pertaining to Aboriginal people.  This is alarming particularly in light of the fact that 
Commissioner Elliott Johnson in the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody insists that the government regulation of the lives of Aboriginal people, 
particularly the removal of children from their families and the placement of people 
on reserves and missions, is directly responsible for the disproportionate number of 
Indigenous people in the court system, in prisons and, suffering great social 
disadvantage.  (This is discussed more fully in Chapters Six and Seven.)  When it is 
considered that the RCIADIC was conducted in the 1990s and that social disadvantage 
can only be changed through public action, it is vital for non-Indigenous people to 
know what happened. 
Historically, non-Indigenous knowledges of Aboriginal people have been 
produced through official narratives including State legislation, historical documents 
and institutions such as the Perth Museum.  The commonly held belief that Aboriginal 
people were dying out is a case in point.  This information comes directly from the 
Chief Protector, A.O. Neville whose views are discussed later in this chapter.  
Stereotypes, albeit a vulgar form of knowledge, about the differences between people 
whom the State has designated ‘full-blood’ and ‘half-caste’ has a similar history.  
Relevant statutes reveal that ‘half-castes’ were initially deemed to be educable and 
capable of assimilating into the wider society.  However, over time this view changed 
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‘half-castes’ became ‘the problem’;  they were re-identified as ‘lazy’, ‘failed to attend 
school or work’ and were ‘alcoholics’. 
Terms such as ‘half-caste’, ‘full-blood’, ‘lazy’, and ‘alcoholic’ form part of 
what Foucault defines as a discursive formation.  Bain Attwood, a cultural theorist, 
whose work illuminates the operation of power in Aboriginal and white relationships, 
draws on Foucault’s critique of truth to discuss the ways knowledge of Aboriginal 
people has been constructed.  Attwood reminds us that “objects do not exist prior to 
knowledge for it is knowledge which creates their ‘truth’ and reality.”12  Further, “all 
knowledge is political, it is constructed by relationships of power – of domination and 
subordination – and is inseparable from these.”13  In Western Australia the ‘half-caste’ 
did not exist until 1874 when the term first appeared in the Game Act.  After this time, 
the term became instrumental in “a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, circulation and operation of statements ... [It] is linked in a circular relation 
with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it 
induces and which extend it.”14  As will be made clear through a reading of both the 
State’s statutes and Nannup’s text, the term coined by the colonists has become a 
powerful force in defining identity and determining the lives of the colonised. 
Hodge and Mishra provide a valuable discussion of the construction of 
‘Aboriginality’ and the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Australians in their book Dark Side of the Dream.15  They make the point that there is 
a recognisable “discursive regime” that informs our ways of knowing Aboriginal 
people and have coined the term ‘Aboriginalism’16 to describe this regime.  These 
writers acknowledge that the naming of this discourse and its tenets derives directly 
from Edward Said’s Orientalism which: 
can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with 
the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising 
views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, 
Orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring and having 
authority over the Orient.17 
                                                          
12 Bain Attwood and John Arnold (eds), “Power, Knowledge and Aborigines”, Journal of Australian 
Studies, No.35, Victoria: La Trobe University Press, 1992, p. 1. 
13 Attwood and Arnold, 1992, p. 1. 
14 Michel Foucault, “Afterword: The Subject and Power”, in Hubert Drefus and Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982, p.208. 
15 Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra, Dark Side of the Dream, North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990. 
16 Hodge & Mishra, 1990, p. 27. 
17 Edward Said, Orientalism, Ringwood: Penguin Australia, 1978, p. 1. 
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In the same way, there exists a “corporate institution” in Australia, including 
the state and more recently federal government, for “dealing with” Aboriginal people.  
An analysis of State legislation highlights the ways in which “making statements 
about, authorising views of, describing, teaching, settling, ruling over” Aboriginal 
people has determined their lives and provides the frame or stereotypes from which 
many Australians have formed their views of Aboriginal peoples and ‘Aboriginality’. 
By considering the discourse of ‘Aboriginalism’ including official legislation 
and the history of subjection of Aboriginal people in Western Australia, it is possible 
to appreciate Alice Nannup’s account of her life more fully.  When the Pelican 
Laughed makes explicit the ways in which non-Indigenous Western Australians are 
consciously or unconsciously complicit in Aboriginal subjectification and are in many 
instances advantaged by it.  In the process Nannup provides an alternate representation, 
one that works both within and against colonial representations. 
Williams and Chrisman, the editors of Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial 
Theory, offer important advice about the analysis of texts, particularly those that 
perpetuate racist and colonial stereotypes and form the basis of knowledges about 
Indigenous peoples.  They write: 
... an analysis of the texts of imperialism has a particular urgency, given their 
implication in far reaching, and continuing systems of domination and 
economic exploitation.  This involves an understanding of present 
circumstances as well as the ways in which these are informed by, perpetuate 
and differ from situations which preceded them, and the complex 
interrelation of history and the present moment provides the terrain on which 
colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial theory operate.18 
For these theorists, a critique of imperial texts is the first step in “colonial 
discourse analysis and postcolonial theory”, as it is also the first step for Marcia 
Langton’s anti-colonial critique.  Alice Nannup provides this. It is, in part, through my 
analysis of Nannup’s life story that my ambivalent relationship with the term 
‘postcolonial’ surfaces.  And so at the very moment that I recognise When the Pelican 
Laughed as an example of the “terrain on which colonial discourse analysis and 
postcolonial theory operate” I suggest that it is not adequate for an analysis of 
relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people or Western Australian 
                                                          
18 Williams and Chrisman, 1993, p. 4. 
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State legislation.  And I am again reminded of Alice Nannup saying to me, “my work 
is not fiction but perhaps postcolonialism is.”19  There is however (as Williams and 
Chrisman point out) an urgency to analyse imperialist texts. 
As I have stated, what is often missing for many readers of texts such as When 
the Pelican Laughed is a knowledge of the colonial legislation that determined the 
lives of, created the ‘truths’ about, represented and thus informed public perception of 
Indigenous people.  An overview of key legislation follows, including the Aboriginal 
Protection Act 1886; Aborigines Act 1897 (WA); Aborigines Act 1905 (WA); Native 
Administration Act 1936 (WA); Native Welfare Act 1954 (WA); Native Welfare Act 
1963 (WA); and Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 (WA)20.  This is done 
as a way of framing policies, such as Assimilation and the Removal of Children that 
are fundamental to the lives of most Aboriginal people in Western Australian and 
certainly to Alice Nannup and her family.  It is also important to consider this 
legislation, described by Anna Haebich as “the visible face of government policy”21, 
as a way of understanding public opinion, particularly if we accept that the government 
reflects that opinion.  This legislation has been ‘practised’ under the broad categories 
of protection, tutored assimilation, segregation and biological absorption.  The 
following section weaves together official and personal narratives together to 
demonstrate the interplay between them.  It foregrounds the lack of a dialectical 
relationship between legislation and its affects on people. 
5.3 “For their own good” 
While England, the State and then the Commonwealth were regulating the lives of 
Aboriginal people, to the point of determining who was Aboriginal, public 
‘knowledge’ about Aborigines was being constructed.  This knowledge paralleled 
government regulation.  Aboriginal people were constructed as ‘primitive’, 
‘uneducated’, ‘without law or religion’, ‘promiscuous’, ‘unfit parents’, and ‘needing 
to be constrained.’  Legislation – “not merely the products of the irrational prejudices 
                                                          
19 See Chapter Three for a discussion of Nannup’s response to postcolonialism. 
20 For a detailed description of the effects of this legislation on the lives of Aboriginal people, 
especially in the south-west of Western Australia see Anna Haebich 1993.  See also Aboriginal Legal 
Service, After the Removal A Submission by the Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc) to 
the National Inquiry into Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their 
Families, Prepared by Tony Buti, Perth: Aboriginal Legal Service, 1996. for a description of the way 
these policies were used to sanction the removal of children from their families. 
21 Haebich, 1990, p. 1. 
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of individuals”22 – and, public opinion correlated to the objectification, subjugation 
and construction of Aboriginal identity.  In their discussion of Aboriginal peoples’ 
contemporary relationship to power and law Bottomley et al in Law in Context suggest 
that there is an interrelationship between Aboriginal identity and powerlessness.  They 
cite Pettman who writes of powerlessness that it: 
... means, among other things, having others say who you are, with the 
naming usually counting against you.  Aborigines have been largely 
rendered invisible and Aboriginal rights have been effectively denied 
throughout much of white Australian history.  Who is “really” Aboriginal, 
and what flows from that, has been laid down by governments, policemen, 
local officials and, more recently anthropologists.  Many Australians still 
make a distinction between “real” Aborigines (usually presumed 
tribal/traditional/“full-blood”) and “part” and/or urban Aborigines – 
despite the discrediting of genetic determinism, and the fact that many 
“urban” Aborigines know and have close links with country and kin.  Such 
distinctions are not only personally and socially offensive and hurtful; they 
also have powerful political functions in challenging many Aborigines’ 
rights to speak for, or even about, Aboriginal claims.23 
A close consideration of State legislation since 1841, much of which has been 
directed at Aboriginal people, provides an explanation for the powerlessness that 
Pettman describes.  In fact, according to many sources, Aboriginal people are the most 
legislated for group of people in Australia.24  Aboriginal people were first mentioned 
in the Western Australian statutes in 1841 for establishing a legal prison on Rottnest 
Island for: 
Aborigines sentenced to transportation, imprisonment or committed for 
trial or any other form of custody, there to be instructed in “useful 
knowledge” and “trained in the habits of civilised life.”25 
Given that the first legislation specifically dealing with Aboriginal people 
related to the establishment of a prison for them, is it any wonder that in the 1990s there 
are a disproportionate number of Aboriginal people in prison?  The use of the term 
‘Aborigines’ in this statute, and the later introduction of the term ‘half-caste’, indicate 
an official denial of the distinct groups – Yinjibarndi, Ngulama, Bunjima, Nyoongar – 
                                                          
22 Stephen Bottomley, Neil Gunningham, Stephen Parker, Law in Context, Leichhardt: Federation 
Press, 1991, p. 285. 
23 J. Pettman, “Learning About Power and Powerlessness: Aborigines and White Australia’s 
Bicentenary”, Race and Class 69, 1988, pp. 75-76, cited in Bottomley, 1991, p. 285. 
24 There are also many Federal Government Statutes regarding Aboriginal people. 
25 Haebich, 1990, p. 4. 
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who lived in what became the State of Western Australia.  Colin Tatz in his article on 
the relationship of Aboriginal people to the civil law makes the point that: 
Legislation created a whole computation of status (what I call ‘the 
arithmetic of colour’) when it defined octroons, quadroons, half-castes, 
full-bloods.  Based on a mis-guided biological spectrum of ‘blood content’, 
law determined the degree and extent of rights on a scale where lightness 
was congruent with civilisation and darkness with savagery.  For the 
general public such laws set the tone, the flavour, the image of Aborigines 
as held by White authority.  In these senses law gives legitimacy to 
prejudice, creates notions of difference and inferiority in the minds of an 
adult public, and ordains and perpetuates racism. 26 
It is in the Game Act of 1874 that the term “half-castes” is mentioned for the 
first time. 
‘Aboriginal natives’ and ‘half-castes’ are exempted from restrictions on 
killing game if for their own subsistence.27 
Since 1874 the proportional terms ‘part-/quarter-/full-blood’28 (normally only 
used to describe animals) have been applied to Aborigines as a means of designating 
the amount of ‘white blood’ in an Aboriginal child and thereby marking the child as 
superior to ‘full-blood’ Aborigines.  The belief in ‘white’ superiority was historically 
employed to legitimise the taking of Aboriginal children from their parents, on the 
pretence of providing them with an education that would be beneficial to themselves 
and their families.  The detrimental effects of this policy and the resultant cruelty 
inflicted on Aboriginal children have been extensively documented in the Stolen 
Generations and Bringing Them Home reports, excerpts of which are included in this 
discussion.  It is ironic to note though, that since the 1970s it is ‘full-blood’ Aborigines 
who seem to be more highly regarded.  Could it be that as ‘full-blood’ they remain the 
exotic ‘other’, the ‘noble savage’ or are objectified29 while those people designated as 
‘half-castes’ are vilified for ‘ripping off the system’ through claims to Aboriginality? 
The Aborigines Protection Act of 1886, enacted in England, instituted the 
Aborigines Protection Board, which was responsible for the welfare of all Australian 
                                                          
26 Colin Tatz, “Aborigines and civil law”, in Aborigines and the Law, Peter Hanks and Bryan Keon-
Cohen, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 111. 
27 Haebich, 1990, p. 5. 
28 For a full discussion of the use of these terms see Eve Fesl, Conned, St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press, 1993. 
29 It is only necessary to glance through tourist brochures to understand that Aboriginal people are part 
of the ‘attraction’ in some areas of the country. 
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‘Aborigines’.  Through this Act the Board was required to “exercise a general 
supervision and care over all matters affecting the interests and welfare of the 
Aborigines, and to protect them against ill-treatment, imposition and fraud.”30  While 
the legislation clearly stipulates that proper care and protection is to be afforded to 
Aboriginal people, there are numerous reports of ill-treatment at the hands of the 
‘Protector’ and, or his subordinates.  Just one example from many in When the Pelican 
Laughed is enough to illustrate the type of protection people received: 
Then they took Norman down to the shed, stripped him and tarred and 
feathered him.  The trackers bought him up to the compound and paraded 
him around to show everybody.  He was covered in feathers and all you 
could see were his eyes. (75) 
This occurred because of Norman and his girlfriend, Linda, attempting to 
leave the Moore River Settlement in order to be married. 
The Constitution Act of 1889 was also pivotal to the ‘protection’ of 
Aboriginal people because it stipulated that: 
The Colonial Office is to retain control over Aboriginal Affairs; a 
minimum of £5,000 ($10,000) or 1% of the colonial gross revenue, 
whichever was greater, to be granted annually for Aborigines in Western 
Australia. 
Repealed 5/1897.  Repeal subsequently deemed invalid.  Repeal legislated 
for retrospectively in 14/1905.31 
Again, the legislation is clear: adequate funds for the care of Aboriginal 
people were to be available.  There was no provision for reducing or deleting this 
expenditure and hence no justification for the poor conditions that were endured.  In 
1897, the power to legislate for Aboriginal people was transferred to the Western 
Australian government.  In principle, eliminating the spatial gap between where 
legislation was enacted and where it was practised should have facilitated the ‘proper 
care’ of Aboriginal people.  The result was quite the opposite. 
John Princep, the first Chief Protector of Aborigines in Western Australia, 
believed in the separation of Aboriginal people from the wider society.  In 1901, he 
addressed the State parliament about his concern with the growing number of “half-
                                                          
30 Buti, 1996, p. 16. 
31 Haebich, 1990, p. 10. 
 
148 
castes” saying, “It is our duty not to allow these children, whose blood is half-British, 
to grow up as vagrants and outcasts, as their mothers are now.”32  Princep wanted the 
powers of the Chief Protector to include the right to remove any Aboriginal child from 
its mother. 
Princep’s inhumane views were not isolated, as was borne out by the 1904 
Roth Royal Commission into the administration of the Aborigines Department and the 
subsequent treatment and conditions of the Aboriginal population.  The Commission 
found in favour of Princep’s views recommending that the Chief Protector be made 
legal guardian of all Aboriginal children under the age of 18.  The motivation for this 
is given to be that: 
There is a large number of absolutely worthless blacks and halfcastes about 
who grow up to lives of prostitution and idleness; they are a perfect 
nuisance; if they were taken away young from their surroundings of 
temptation much good might be done with them.33 
Parliamentary discussion of the Commission’s findings includes the 
suggestion that while “it may appear to be a cruel thing to tear away an Aborigine from 
its mother it is in some cases necessary to be cruel to be kind.”34 
Just a year later the 1905 Aborigines Act was enacted to govern the lives of all: 
Aborigines of the full descent (referred to as ‘Aboriginal natives’); ‘half-
castes’ (defined as persons with an Aboriginal parent on either side or children 
of such persons) who lived with an Aboriginal as wife or husband; other ‘half-
castes who lived or regularly associated with ‘Aboriginal natives’; and ‘half-
caste children under the age of sixteen, irrespective of how they lived.  A 
special clause allowed for Aborigines of a “suitable degree of civilisation” to 
apply for exemption from the provisions of the Act.35 
According to Haebich the 1905 Act “set up the necessary bureaucratic and 
legal mechanisms to control all Aboriginal contacts with the wider community, to 
enforce the assimilation of Aboriginal children and to determine the most personal 
aspects of Aboriginal lives.”36  It “established the Chief Protector as the legal guardian 
                                                          
32 Peter Biscup, Not Slaves, Not Citizens, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1973, p. 142, 
cited in Buti, 1996, p. 25. 
33 Biscup, 1973, p. 142, cited in Buti, 1996, p. 25. 
34 Hansard, Western Australian Parliament, Perth, Vol. 25, 1904, p. 588, cited in Aboriginal Legal 
Service, 1996, p. 25. 
35 Haebich, 1990, p. 14. 
36 Haebich, 1988, p. 84. 
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of ‘every aboriginal and half-caste child’ to the age of 16 years.”  The key provisions 
of the Act included giving the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs the power to move 
‘aboriginals’ from one district or reserve to another; regulate marriage between 
‘aboriginal’ women and non-Aboriginal men; exempt ‘aboriginals’ from the Act and 
revoke exemptions; regulate ‘care, custody and education of aboriginal children and 
half-castes’; send ‘aboriginal and half-caste children to an aboriginal institution, 
industrial school or orphanage’.37  In response to this legislation one parliamentarian 
cautioned people not to be upset by the decision because the mothers of the ‘half-
castes’ would “forget all about it in 24 hours, and ... is glad to get rid of it ...”.38 
This parliamentarian could do well to have been there the night the Bunjima 
woman knocked on our door in Wickham and needed a place to stay until the man who 
was hitting her fell asleep.39  Her willingness to continuously endure being beaten is a 
direct consequence of the 1905 Act.  For not only did mothers not “forget all about it 
in 24 hours” they and their children suffered in indescribable ways and they told and 
retold their stories of loss. This woman’s choice to stay with a man who beat her 
because he was the father of her child, and because she believed he had the legal right 
to the child, are based on her awareness of the accounts of the experiences of mothers 
whose children were taken from them.  They form the basis for her understanding of 
her rights as a mother in the 1990s.  Although it can be argued that legislation and laws 
have changed, and that the taking of Aboriginal children no longer occurs, in effect it 
continues.  The white miner, in threatening to take the child, relies on her mother 
having limited knowledge (in this case the knowledge of abduction) but no knowledge 
of her real ‘rights’ as a mother post 1967. 
In 1909 and 1911 guardianship powers were extended to give the Chief 
Protector power of removal “to the exclusion of the rights of the mother of an 
illegitimate or half-caste child.”40  It was in 1911 that Alice Nannup was born on 
Abydos station just out from Port Hedland in the Pilbara region of Western Australia.  
Alice’s mother was a member of the Yindjibarndi tribe41 and her father was Tom 
                                                          
37 Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (ed), Bringing Them Home, Perth: Aboriginal Legal 
Service of Western Australia (Inc). The Report Appendix 5 Western Australia, 1997. 
38 Hansard, 1996, p. 25. 
39 See my Introduction for a more detailed account of this incident. 
40 Aborigines Act Amendment Act 1911 (Western Australia), Section 3. 
41 Although there are many people, including Eve Fesl, Koorie author of Conned, who regard tribe as 
a derogatory word this is not so for the Injibandi people.  Ngurra Wangkamagayi, the cultural 
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Bassett, an Englishman and small station owner in the area.  Because she was born 
after the 1905 and 1911 Acts, which gave guardianship “of ‘every aboriginal and half-
caste child’ to the age of 16 years”42 to the Chief Protector of Aborigines, Alice was 
automatically a ward of the state. 
Alice introduces the reader to her experience of living under this ‘protection’ 
by recounting experiences of her own cultural deprivation and abduction.  She begins 
by asserting that undermining of her Yinjibarndi language and culture began even 
before being removed, as was reflected in the need for people to take on a European 
name and using the term ‘Aborigine’: 
My mother’s name was Ngulyi, that’s her Aborigine name, and her 
European name was Dot.  That’s like me, my Mulba name is Wari, and 
I’ve got a European name too. (18) 
In a recent native title claimant’s meeting in Roebourne, one of the elders 
voiced her objection to the use of ‘Aboriginal’ rather than Yinjibarndi, by people 
working for the claimants.  Through a very surprising interjection the point was made 
that ‘Aboriginal’ is an imposition, one that is not appropriate.  ‘Aboriginal’ is however 
the most commonly used name for Indigenous peoples and as a result of its use there 
is a lack of knowledge of tribal names by most of the population, including many 
Indigenous people.  It also applies to the Indigenous people of any country - therefore 
giving Aboriginal people even less identity. 
As Said’s work on Orientalism reminds us, there is a great deal of power 
invested in the act of naming.  When Indigenous people take on European names, not 
of their own accord, they are being subjected and regulated, just as they are when they 
are mis-identified by people who have been educated ‘not to know’ the correct tribal 
names or by those who have disallowed Aboriginal peoples use of their paternal name.  
It is part of the discursive regime of Aboriginalism of which Hodge and Mishra write.  
On her arrival at Moore River Settlement Alice was asked her name and where she 
had come from by the Superintendent, a man named Brodie.  She writes: 
                                                          
awareness training group in Roebourne, largely consisting of Injibandi people, speak of tribes in 
preference to language groups or clans.  As this is consistent with many other groups in Western 
Australia it is the practice that I will follow here. 
42 Haebich, 1990, p. 14. 
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Anyway, this questioning went on for a while, and then they let us go.  But 
afterwards they always called me Cassit.  Matron would be coming along 
and she’d say, ‘Cassit! Cassit! Cassit! don’t you go past when I call you.’ 
I’d look at her and I’d say ‘I’m not Cassit I’m Bassett,’ but she’d never call 
me by my proper name. (62) 
Alice realised that the Superintendent had been a policeman at Roebourne and 
did not like her having her father’s name; for he was after all, a station owner and well-
known in the region.  This of course works both ways; there were Aboriginal people 
who do not take on the names of ‘rightful’43 fathers because they do not want to be 
associated with them. 
In 1915 Auber Octavius Neville became Protector of Aborigines in Western 
Australia.  Like Princep before him he too believed in a segregationist policy, one that 
relied on ‘half-castes’ being assimilated into white society through education and ‘full-
bloods’ dying “out as quickly as possible.”44  In keeping with this agenda Alice was 
removed from her family by the department of Aboriginal Affairs at the age of twelve: 
It was when we were back on Mallina that the scouts started to come 
around.  They were sent up from the Aboriginal Affairs in Perth to come 
and look for the half-caste kids ... Then this one time...the Aboriginal 
Affairs man ended up staying the night...and that must have been when 
they made all the arrangements...they told them (mother, aunt) they were 
going to take us down South to educate us (p.39). 
It was promised she would be educated and returned home when she was 
eighteen.  The irony is as Alice points out that: 
[m]y mother spoke five languages, as well as English—Nyamal, Palyku, 
Kariyarra, Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi.  I spoke Kariyarra and Ngarluma 
the most, and, of course, English (p. 20). 
One cannot help but be aware that in ‘white’ Australian society speaking two 
languages is considered a mark of ‘good’ education yet an Yinjibarndi woman 
speaking six languages was ‘uneducated’.  Further, Alice in fact received little formal 
education as her account of life at Moore River illustrates. She recalls the time that 
A.O. Neville, then Protector of Aborigines, went to the Settlement and she overheard 
him saying “... it’s all right as long as they can write their name and count money ... 
                                                          
43 ‘Rightful’ is a term used in Roebourne to describe the biological father of a child, usually a white 
station owner. 
44 Haebich, 1988, p. 150. 
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that’s all the education they need.” (71)  She only ever finished the first three grades 
at school while for the most part she did chores and looked after the infants. 
Alice’s experience is consistent with those of many other people as reports 
including Telling Our Stories, the personal accounts of Aboriginal children who were 
removed from family and community reveal.  Elizabeth, born in 1933, and ‘taken 
away’ at age 13 reports: 
The authorities said I was removed from my parents so I could receive an 
education but the fact is the nuns never gave me that education.  I didn’t 
receive an education.  I was very neglected.45 
The Aboriginal Legal Service found that lack of education was a consistent 
complaint by many of the ‘stolen children’ whose experiences they recorded in Telling 
Our Stories and Bringing Them Home.  Where children had been sent to a mission the 
main educational focus was religion while on State reserves it was work ethic and the 
skills required to perform either labouring jobs such as fencing, clearing land or 
repairing windmills for boys, or domestic work for girls.  Such skills, it could be 
argued, would have been better learnt by traditional methods, described by John Heath 
in a paper on the value of traditional ways of learning in contemporary contexts: 
In our traditional ways children are taught, from the earliest ages, of the 
need to be observant and to listen.  The processes of tracking, hunting, 
fishing, obtaining water ... all depend on such learned behaviour. ... 
Observation and listening is essential and this continues throughout the 
learning years.46 
As the work Aboriginal people were required to do was physical and relied 
largely on several specific skills, usually learnt by observation, traditional Aboriginal 
teaching would certainly have been appropriate.  That this method was not officially 
advocated, but would have been used when people arrived at the farms to work, 
reinforces the contention that education was merely a justification for the destruction 
of Indigenous culture, borne out by the fact that opportunities to learn any Indigenous 
culture or to experience traditional ways of learning were not available.  From the 
experience of Joy Burns, related earlier, it is also important to consider that there were 
                                                          
45 Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc) (ed), Telling Our Story, Perth: Aboriginal 
Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc), 1995, p. 49. 
46 John Heath, “Traditional Aboriginal Teaching and Learning Styles and Their Appropriateness to 
Contemporary Learning” in Contemporary Issues in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 
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many well-meaning people, it was the ‘nicest’ people, with social consciences who 
employed Aboriginal people and others who adopted children. 
While it is difficult to imagine that using education as a pretence for removing 
children could be maintained for a long period of time, it continued in fact under the 
Assimilation policy of 1954.  Under this policy children could be taken from their 
parents if they were not deemed to be receiving an appropriate education, with 
‘appropriate’ being defined by the State.  Even in the 1990s education is being used as 
a means of regulating the lives of Indigenous people as illustrated by a conversation 
with Wendy, a Bunjima woman living at Noorawanna, a settlement at Jindawurru 
(Millstream National Park), approximately 200 kilometres from Roebourne.47 
Wendy’s seven-year-old son Lawrence had been studying through the State’s 
School of the Air programme.  When he failed to complete work and Wendy was asked 
to account for this she expressed her concerns about her son doing the ‘Bears in 
Bikini’s’ series, a reading program that relies on children associating images, such as 
bears wearing bikinis, with letters of the alphabet as a way of triggering word 
recognition.  The images were to be coloured in, cut out and pasted into a workbook 
as each one was learnt.  Both the content of the series and the process were far removed 
from Lawrence’s life.  Neither he nor his mother saw the value of completing the 
exercise.  After a visit from an Education Department School of the Air teacher, 
Wendy was told that by not completing the programme her son was being denied the 
right to a good education and therefore, if he did not complete and submit work action 
would be taken.  A month later the seven-year-old boy was ordered to leave his home 
and parents, live in Roebourne and attend the local primary school.  Clearly 
interventionist policies have not changed significantly and neither has the State’s 
definition of ‘appropriate’ education. 
While legislation regarding ‘half-castes’ was supposedly designed to improve 
their conditions, raise them above the status of the ‘full-bloods’ and allow them a 
productive place in society there were many contradictions.  In Alice’s case for 
instance, her father, Tom Bassett, was unable to keep her even though he had given 
her his name, was a station owner and was prepared to provide for her and her mother.  
After she was taken from Mallina her father made a trip to Perth to maintain contact 
                                                          
47 Hubert Wendy, Personal conversation, Noorawanna, April 1996. 
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with her.  However, after taking her out just once, Neville – as her legal guardian – 
forbade him to see her.  Towards the end of her life Alice said: 
I think it is the one main thing I’m bitter about today, depriving me of my 
father.  It just makes no sense.  They wanted me to have white peoples’ 
ways, yet they denied me my father.  How does that make any sense? (51) 
A further contradiction between the actual legislation and its implementation 
is highlighted through Alice’s account of being defrauded of an inheritance from her 
father by the Chief Protector of Aborigines.  When Tom Bassett died, he left Alice 
four hundred pounds which would have benefited her and her children.  It was 
automatically passed on to the Department of Aboriginal Affairs however, and she was 
not even officially notified about it: 
...if Aboriginal people received an inheritance, any money left to them 
became the property of the Aborigines department.  I don’t understand that, 
we are all human beings, we should have been entitled to it.  I could have 
really used that money my father left me, and it would have made the world 
of difference to my family (p. 179). 
5.4 Reserving their rights 
It was Neville who instituted the system of reserves in the State as a means of 
centralising authority over Aboriginal people.  According to Neville, Aborigines 
would “settle down to a new life of peace, contentment and usefulness.”48  The reality 
however, was quite different.  At the Moore River Settlement, for instance: 
Aborigines from all over the State were inappropriately grouped together; 
the young and single were isolated in a compound from the main camp where 
families lived; children removed from their parents had names and birth 
dates arbitarily given on arrival; parents trying to see or have their children 
returned were rejected, while children were told parents had lost interest in 
them; and absconding girls and other offenders were flogged with a cane if 
under sixteen; if over that age they were imprisoned for up to a fortnight in 
the ‘boob’ - a windowless tin shed topped with barbed wire.49 
Alice Nannup, like many thousands of Aboriginal people, was sent to the 
Moore River Settlement, approximately six hundred kilometres north of Perth.  The 
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Stannage (ed), Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1982, p. 138. 
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settlement was split into two main parts, the compound where all the kids and older 
girls were, and the camps, where all the married people and old people had to live. 
The compound was set up just like a little town.  At the bottom of the main 
street was the Big House – that’s the superintendent’s quarters – and this 
faced the church which was at the top end of the street.  In between, on 
either side, were all the other buildings, like the dormitories, dining room, 
sewing room, bakehouse and staff quarters.  It was built up on a ridge, and 
down on the flats near the river were the camps where all the campies built 
their little places. (62-63) 
Within the settlement people lived highly regulated lives that where 
controlled by the superintendent and staff; times were allocated for meals, exercise and 
sleeping, as in any prison.  Brothers and sisters, children and parents were separated 
from each other, unable to have even the comfort of family.  Black trackers who had 
been brought down from the north policed the settlement, making sure anyone who 
tried to escape was brought back.  Anyone caught breaking the rules was severely 
mistreated, as Nannup illustrates: 
Lots of girls got a thrashing but I never did.  They used to take them down 
to the storeroom and the superintendent would belt them until they weed 
all over the floor.  They never spared them, and in the afternoons I’d have 
to go down with a mop and mop it up. (74) 
Not all Aboriginal people experienced reserves in the same way, because not 
all were operated as prisons.  Roebourne Reserve is a case in point.  The Injibarndi, 
Ngaluma and Gurrama people from Roebourne and the surrounding areas, including 
Jindawurru (Millstream National Park) were progressively removed from their lands 
to the town reserve between the early 1900s and the 1940s.  Later, Bunjima people, 
from the Tom Price area were moved there too.  In the reserve there are three tamarisk 
trees which mark each group’s tribal area.  Unlike at the Moore River Settlement, there 
were no white overseers who determined where or how people lived.  The elders were 
therefore able to maintain tribal groupings and the skin system, which in turn 
determined marriage partners and respect within the group.  Trevor Solomon, an 
Ngaluma/Injibarndi person explains: 
I grew up in the old reserve ... In my younger days, on the reserve was 
really good, we didn’t see much of people drinking like you do now.  It 
was a time of knowing who you were and that you belong to a certain group 
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of people.  We lived in harmony with each other always carrying our law 
ceremonies the right way and our elders was well respected by all people.50 
In 1975 the government closed the reserve and moved all the people to a 
newly built village near the cemetery.  In the village there was no demarcation between 
the groups.  This meant that sons-in-law and mothers-in-law who should never speak 
to each other often had to live in the same house or close by.  Children were then able 
to play with whoever they liked which eventually led to non-straight marriages and a 
weakening of the respect system.  This has caused a great deal of pain to the elders 
who today work very hard at reinforcing and maintaining this important system.  It is 
not just the elders though who are nostalgic for the reserve, but also the children who 
grew up on it and had the security afforded by tribal groupings.  It is ironic however 
that any people should regard life on a reserve, where they have not chosen to live and 
where conditions were poor, as providing a better quality of life than that which they 
currently have in the town. 
The Native Administration Act of 1936 was enacted to significantly amend the 
1905 Aborigines Act.  While it might have been expected that more autonomy would be 
granted to Aboriginal people at this time, quite the opposite was the case, for the 
legislation conferred even greater powers on the Commissioner of Native Affairs 
(previously Chief Protector of Aborigines) by increasing his control over peoples’ daily 
lives.  The parameters determining who came under the Act were broadened to include: 
all such persons to be deemed ‘natives’ ... virtually all persons of 
Aboriginal descent with the exception of ‘quadroons’ over the age of 21, 
unless classed as ‘native’ by special magisterial order, and persons of less 
than ‘quadroon’ descent born before 31 January 1936.51 
The Act extended state control over children so that the Commissioner 
became the guardian of every native child under the age of 21.  It also gave him the 
power to “authorise any person to medically examine a ‘native’. ... Any sexual contact 
between Aborigines and non-Aborigines became an offence.  And, “a miscellaneous 
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category enabled the Commissioner to “intervene to stop any traditional Aboriginal 
practices (for example initiation, child betrothal).”52 
Advocates of the right of the Commissioner to intervene in cultural practices 
such as initiation may well have regarded it as their Christian duty to put an end to 
‘acts of barbarism’.  However, when initiation practices are seen to be barbaric but the 
medical examination of a ‘native’ by any person is authorised then this is a travesty.  
That this intrusion into, and denial of cultural autonomy, is a ‘miscellaneous’ item is a 
powerful comment on ‘white’ superiority and ‘primitivism’ as is the photograph and 
commentary about the women’s body scars in the Perth Museum’s “Patterns of Life” 
exhibition, discussed in Chapter Four. 
Tony Buti in “After the Removal”53 states that while there may be some who 
claim that ‘protectionist’ polices, particularly the right to intervene in ‘inhumane’ 
cultural practices, were implemented out of concern for the welfare of Aboriginal 
children insists this was simply not so.  He submits “that there is little doubt that the 
systematic removal of Aboriginal children from their families and culture was driven 
by the government’s obsession with control of Aborigines ... The emphasis was on the 
assimilation of the “half-caste” Aboriginal children into the mainstream.”54  This is 
borne out by what the Chief Protector of Aborigines, Neville, had to say about ‘half-
caste’ children at the initial conference of the Commonwealth of State Aboriginal 
Authorites held in Canberra in April, 1937: 
The opinion held by Western Australian authorities is that the problem of 
the native race, including half-castes, should be dealt with in a long range 
plan.  We should ask ourselves what will be the position, say, 50 years 
hence; it is not so much the position today that has to be considered.  
Western Australia has gone further in the development of such a long range 
policy than any other State, by accepting the view that ultimately the 
natives must be absorbed into the white population of Australia.  That is 
the principal objective of legislation which was passed by the Parliament 
of Western Australia in its last session.  I followed closely the debates 
which accompanied the passage of that measure, and although some 
divergence was, at time, displayed, most members expressed the view that 
sooner or later the native and the white population of Australia must 
become merged.  The Western Australian law to which I have referred is 
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based on the presumption that the Aborigines of Australia sprang from the 
same stock as we did ourselves; that is to say, they are not negroid, but give 
evidence of Caucasian origin. 
If the coloured people [“half-castes”] of this country are to be absorbed 
into the general community they must be thoroughly fit and educated at 
least to the extent of the three R’s.  If they can read, write and count, and 
know what wages they should get, and how to enter into an agreement with 
an employer, that is all that should be necessary.  Once that is accomplished 
there is no reason in the world why these coloured people should not be 
absorbed into the community.  To achieve this end, however, we must have 
charge of the children at age six years; it is useless to wait until they are 
twelve or thirteen years of age.  In Western Australia we have power under 
the Act to take away any child from its mother at any stage of its life, no 
matter whether the mother be legally married or not.55 
Neville was an exceedingly ambitious man with his own ‘master plan’ of 
‘absorption’ as reflected in this address.  It is important to note, however, that not 
everyone agreed with him or his way of ‘managing’ the Aboriginal ‘problem’.  There 
was considerable animosity, for instance, between him and staff in Aboriginal Affairs.  
Certainly one cause of this was the lack of monies available for the provision of care 
to people under his jurisdiction.  In “1935 Western Australia spent only £1 10s 2d per 
head on Aborigines”.56 This was half that spent in Queensland and a third or quarter 
of that spent in other states, yet only one percent of the State’s colonial gross revenue 
was designated for this purpose.  Relationships between himself and the Police and 
Health Departments were also poor, resulting in members of the Health Department 
refusing to treat sick or injured Aborigines.57  There was also public comment about 
the inappropriateness of removing children, refusing to allow people to marry who 
they wanted, and other issues that were ignored. 
In my opinion Neville’s lack of any genuine concern for Aboriginal people is 
also evident in his control of their wages, effectively denying them adult status.  
Independent adults working full time were only paid half of their wages, the remainder 
went to the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and could only be accessed upon 
approval of the Chief Protector if it was deemed to be for a suitable purpose.  Neville’s 
‘welfare’ mentality was imposed upon people and became one of the most insidious 
forms of control, one that still operates effectively.  The Department also had the power 
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to stop payment of monies such as child endowment if it believed that the money was 
not being correctly spent.  On one occasion Alice was stopped in the street by an 
Aboriginal Affairs man and warned that this could well happen to her.  There was, of 
course, much more at stake than merely the loss of money.  As Alice states: 
They could just stop you anytime, anywhere, and ask whatever personal 
questions they liked.  Someone might write a letter just to be nasty or 
something, and they wouldn’t stop and think about what they knew of you 
... Getting a bad report about you was something to worry about, in case 
they got it into their heads to take your children away from you. (188) 
5.5 The ‘rights’ of the citizen 
From 1944, an Aboriginal person could be granted citizenship if s/he could prove to a 
magistrate that all ties with family (with the exception of parents, siblings and children) 
and friends had been severed; was not diseased; and was industrious.58  Clearly this 
was another step toward assimilation.  People wanting to improve conditions for their 
families, or fearful of having children removed in some instances, saw application for 
citizenship as a way to do this.  The consequences of this ‘choice’ are documented in 
auto/biographies such as Sally Morgan’s My Place.  Ramifications, including 
community rejection and disapproval, dislocation from culture and identity are still 
having to be dealt with today, often by people working to renew those previously 
severed cultural and familial ties. 
From 1944 to 1951 Paul Hasluck, Federal Minister of Territories, worked to 
achieve consensus between the States for the implementation of an assimilation policy.  
In 1951 he achieved his aim, under the terms of this policy all Aboriginal people were to: 
… attain the same manner of living as other Australians, enjoying the same 
rights and privileges, accepting the same responsibilities, observing the same 
customs and being influenced by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties.59 
While much of the rhetoric promoting this policy suggested that it would 
ensure a more equitable life for Aboriginal people, it in fact introduced other forms of 
control.  Assimilation meant that if children were not attending school, being 
‘adequately’ dressed, or were deemed to be in poor health, they could be regarded as 
neglected and consequently taken from their parents.  Glenyse Ward, author of 
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Wandering Girl discussed in Chapter Seven, was removed from her mother, for 
instance, because she had an ear infection.  According to the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody the legislation was deliberately used to do this: 
If parents failed in the eyes of the State, they lost the right to see their 
children and to play the parenting role with them.  Those implementing the 
policy told Aboriginal mothers to blame themselves.  Anxiety, depression, 
confusion and most of all anger and despair resulted; as much as the 
mothers or fathers as for the children taken away.60 
The Royal Commission’s findings are a sharp contrast to the belief that 
mothers would “forget all about it [the removal of their children] in 24 hours” and be 
“glad to get rid of it”.61 
A significant outcome of the Bringing Them Home and related reports has 
been a discussion of the assimilation polices as an act of genocide.62  This charge draws 
on the definition of genocide in Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Convention).  This Human Right’s 
Convention was ratified by Australia in 1949 and came into force in 1951.  It is 
important to note, however, that Australia has not incorporated Article II into its 
domestic policy.  Tony Buti suggests that this is because doing so would be tantamount 
to an act of admission.  This recalls Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard being 
reticent to publicly apologise in 1998 for the removal of children.  The Convention 
defines genocide as: 
...any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
a. killing members of the group; 
b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group; 
c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (63) 
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Genocide is clearly not just the mass killing of people; it is the intent to 
destroy a group by whatever means.  “Forcibly transferring children from one group 
to another” deprives them of cultural identity and knowledges including language, 
effectively destroying the group.  Both Princep and Neville were outspoken about their 
desire to assimilate ‘half-caste’ children while waiting for the ‘full-bloods’ to die out.  
There is no doubt about their intent. 
Through her status as ‘half-caste’ there was an attempt, albeit subconscious 
in some cases, to deny Alice and other Indigenous people a cultural identity.  There 
are many accounts in Telling Our Story After the Removal, and in the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, of people who feel they have lost all 
sense of who they are, and subsequently self worth, because of being denied access to 
their cultural identity.  The effects of lack of identity are tragically detailed in the 
RCIADC report.  Within that document Commissioner Wootten reports on the Inquiry 
into the Death of Glenn Clark who was removed from his mother at the age of four.  
He states that: 
From that point on, Glenn’s life follows the tragic and well-worn path of 
many Aborigines brutally separated from their families and thrown into an 
alien environment, cut off from family warmth, maternal care and any 
sense of identity.64 
That Glenn Clark died in custody is a poignant reminder that the adverse 
effects on the lives of Indigenous people are not merely historical.  The extent of 
cultural denial, what some people have termed genocide, is clearly articulated by 
Anne, who was born in 1947 and taken away at age seven.  She says: 
One striking feature of the mission days was that we were never taught 
anything about Aboriginal culture or Aboriginal language.  It never arose 
that we were Aboriginal.65 
The 1905 Act continues to have powerful detrimental effects on the lives of 
many people.  For Alice the situation was different.  She was old enough when she was 
taken away to be sure of who she was, and she later had contact with other Yinjibarndi 
people.  However, like many others who were removed from families and country, Alice 
was denied access to family, language, and rites once she was taken south. 
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Denial of access to one’s own language did not just occur for Alice once she 
was removed from her family though.  As a young child her father forbade her to speak 
Yijibarndi in his presence.  He insisted that she only speak English.  While Alice makes 
no further comment about this and, in fact, ensures the reader that “he was very good 
to me” (27), it does foreground the complexity of the issue.  Most certainly there is a 
power relationship and a set of values being established.  Alice herself said, “he didn’t 
really mind about Ella but it was different for me.” (27)  Ella, Alice’s sister, was 
Yinjibarndi but not his child. 
At the Moore River Settlement Alice was with other people from her area and 
could therefore keep speaking her language.  However, once she was working as a 
domestic servant, in Williams, a small town in the south-west, there was no-one to 
speak to and it was “during my time with the Larsens, that little by little I began losing 
my language.” (92) The placement of Aboriginal people in domestic and labouring 
jobs in areas where they were unable to speak in language or share any other cultural 
practices was consistent with both Princep and Neville’s beliefs that the ‘half-castes’ 
would be absorbed into the mainstream society, even if only as servants. 
In 1954 the Native Welfare Act maintained the guardianship role of the 
Commissioner of Aborigines and allowed him to “direct what person is to have 
custody of a native child of whom he is a legal guardian.”66  At this time a significant 
number of Aboriginal children were placed with white families.  This is obviously in 
direct conflict with the Convention that Australia had ratified just five years earlier.  
By this time there were clearly no grounds for claiming that the removal of children 
was carried out with the belief that this was ‘for their own good.’ 
The 1960s were a time of positive change in the State’s legislation and the 
public attitude to Aboriginal people generally.  It was not until 1963, however, that 
significant change in practice occurred.  In that year the Native Welfare Act of 1963 
repealed the Commissioner’s guardianship powers so that removal of children had to 
comply with the Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA) which applied to all children in the 
State.  As statistics reveal however, it was invoked most often in the removal of 
Aboriginal children so that the change from ‘protection’ to ‘welfare’ did not afford 
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Aboriginal people much more security.  Custody, maintenance and education of 
Aboriginal children were still the responsibility of the Native Welfare Department. 
In 1967, after a Commonwealth Referendum, Aboriginal people were granted 
citizenship rights and the Commonwealth Government gained the right to legislate on 
Aboriginal matters.67  The State Labor government, then under the leadership of John 
Tonkin, began dismantling legislation that treated Aboriginal people differently from 
anyone else.  The Community Welfare Act 1972 and the Aboriginal Affairs Planning 
Authority Act 1972 replaced the Native Welfare Act of 1963 and the Native 
(Citizenship Rights) Act 1944.  The new legislation was designed to meet the social 
and political needs of Aboriginal people and to ensure their ‘development’.  Tony Buti 
suggests however that Australia has done little to move away from its paternalistic and 
racist treatment of Aboriginal people.  He cites the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission as a case in point.   He made the point that it is “a white 
imposition on the lives of Aboriginal people”68 and while it may give some autonomy 
in decision making regarding Aboriginal people, the power of the Minister, not an 
Aboriginal person, is prohibitive of self determination.  This mirrors Alice Nannup’s 
reflection in 1991 when she said: 
It makes me sad to say this but I don’t think I’ll see a time when there will 
be true equality in this country...It makes me really wonder what’s going 
to be left for future generations. (217) 
In this paralleling of When the Pelican Laughed and the legislative context, I 
have been particularly concerned to illustrate that official and personal narratives do 
not exist autonomously of each other.  As subjects we are always defined and 
positioned by the rules and regulations of the society in which we live.  Aboriginal 
people in Western Australia have been highly regulated and consequently have had 
little opportunity to define themselves at the level of the State.  But it is important not 
to deny that, at the same time, Indigenous people have always defined themselves in 
their own terms. 
While life stories including When the Pelican Laughed provide readers with 
the opportunity to critique and deconstruct colonial and racist representations and 
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agendas, it is important to remember that books such as this are not simply political 
tools.  They are not written to salve the conscience of those who read them.  This was 
highlighted for me by the lack of overt anger expressed by Alice Nannup in the telling 
of her life.  It is difficult to appreciate that a person, their family and people can endure 
the atrocities that so many Aboriginal people have endured and still maintain a 
dialogue and a desire for reconciliation with the people that enforced such oppression.  
However, by the end of Alice’s story, the reader is aware, if s/he is white, that s/he is 
not the ‘ideal reader’.  This privilege is reserved for Alice’s family and people: 
I think it has been important to get all my stories down into the one book.  
That way my family, and their family, and so on, will always have them. 
(217) 
By stressing the importance of the stories for her family Alice does not exclude 
a wider readership but the point is made that being able to obtain a book and read it, does 
not necessarily make someone the ideal reader or listener of the narrative.  Narratives 
serve many purposes.  They are productive of many personal and communal identities. 
In the following chapter I discuss the Western legal system as it operates in 
relationship to Indigenous people in Western Australia and the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.    I do this to demonstrate the importance of personal 




Chapter Six  
 
Law as Narrative: Law as Change? 
It is my thesis that Aboriginal Australia underwent a rape of the soul so 
profound that the blight continues in the minds of most blacks today.  It is 
this psychological blight, more than anything else that we see on reserves 
and missions [in prisons].  And it is repeated down the generations.1 
In Chapter Five, “Stories of Western Australia”, I demonstrated how the Western legal 
system in the form of legislation displaced and disadvantaged Aboriginal people.  
Colin Tatz in “Aborigines and Civil Law” foregrounds “several inimical roles of law” 
in this process.  He identifies these as being: 
... law as the creator and perpetrator of a special, inferior legal class of 
persons; law which ascribes, for generations, immutable negative traits to 
that legal class; law which brands as criminal (for that class) behaviour 
which is acceptable in society at large; law which controls Aborigines 
physically, mentally, geographically; which predicates the negative Black 
image in White eyes and fashions official stereotypes.  There is law which 
excludes, or allows to be excluded, Aborigines from its benefits.2 
Tatz insists that, while the claim can be made that many of these laws have 
now been repealed, “the reality is that their operation has deeply scarred Black 
Australians”3.  This is borne out by the results of formal investigations such as the 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and, poignantly in the life-story 
of Alice Nannup; the experience of the Bunjima woman who was being beaten and 
feared her baby would be taken from her; the visit of the Primary Extension Academic 
Challenge class to the Perth Museum.  Further, the effects of these laws are currently 
being played out in the justice system. 
In this chapter I discuss the role of unofficial narratives such as personal 
histories, experiences or life-stories and Aboriginal customary law in challenging 
official narratives, particularly the Australian legal system and aspects of magistrates’ 
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practices within that.   I argue that the structure of the legal system and of the court 
itself disables the telling, hearing and responding to personal narratives which 
(according to the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths In Custody) is imperative 
for some change.  The strategic use of narrative can be explored through a discussion 
of some aspects of the Australian Institute Judicial Association’s “Aboriginal Culture: 
Law and Change” seminar for Western Australian magistrates, which was held in 
December 1994 as part of the Australian judiciary's response to the Royal Commission 
Into Aboriginal Deaths In Custody report.  Discussion of several aspects of the seminar 
demonstrate that it is not only the telling of and listening to peoples’ stories that is 
important, but equally the place or site in which stories are told and listened to because 
this determines their reception. 
Magistrates regularly hear the mitigating circumstances explaining why 
Aboriginal peoples are in court, but, as the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” 
seminar demonstrated, the legal system does not facilitate either the effective telling, 
or listening to, of personal stories that enable real understanding of these 
circumstances.  Rather, it works against this.  The architecture of the courtroom, and 
the positioning of the ‘players’in it, illustrates the hierarchy within the system that is 
at the core of this failure.  Useful reference can be made here to Foucault's discussion 
of both the panopticon and the classroom.  In Discipline and Punish,4 Foucault argues 
that both places are designed to ensure that the prisoner or the student internalises the 
gaze of the guard or teacher and, consequently, disciplines him or herself to act in 
accord with the rules of the institution.  Most importantly these rules do not need to be 
overtly stated and neither does the guard or teacher must be watching the pupil or 
prisoner before s/he will act accordingly.  It is my contention that the courtroom 
operates in the same way. 
6.1 The western legal system 
Appreciation of the outcomes of the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar 
and the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths In Custody rely on some knowledge 
of the Western legal system, a grand narrative that attains its ‘legitimacy’ through 
(‘Enlightenment’) ideas of rationality, operating in Australia.  Further, it is the system 
that produced the Western Australian State legislation that has governed the lives of 
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Aboriginal people from 1848 to the present and which has been complicit in the 
construction of Aboriginal people as ‘primitive’and as ‘incapable of being responsible’ 
for themselves.  The adjudication of law (that which occurs within the magistrate’s 
court), while theoretically different in that it is supposedly impartial and objective 
(assuming everyone is equal before the law), is also influenced by and perpetuates 
these very discourses that disadvantage Aboriginal people. Commissioner Johnson's 
findings in the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths In Custody demonstrate that 
this divide is an artificial one, and that equality and justice have been denied to 
Aboriginal people, in part, because this divide is not actuated. 
It is necessary to appreciate that the Western legal system is simply a way of 
defining the rules, or a ‘narrativisation’ of the ‘rule of law’, which ascribe obligations, 
particularly on the part of the government to: 
... act in accordance with rules.  This principle is commonly taken to have 
two broad consequences; first, that there should be no arbitrary use of 
power and second that any government discretion should be limited and 
exercised within the limits imposed by general laws.5 
According to Bottomley et al law in Australia operates in the broader view of 
liberalism,6 the key elements of which are liberty, individualism, equality, justice, 
rights, utilitarianism and rationality.7  It must be noted however, that this is a 
theoretical ideal.  While the common law and statute law provide Australian people 
with freedom of religion for example.  Unlike the United States of America we have 
no Bill of Rights that clearly articulates a list of individual rights.  Certainly, there is a 
‘rhetoric of rights’ that is spoken in Australia. However the actualities of the legal 
system does not mirror this ‘rhetoric of rights’.  Although a discussion of legal rights 
within Australia is not within the scope of this work it is important to note that the 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody draws on this ‘rhetoric of 
rights’.  Commissioner Johnson identifies the disparity between formal equality before 
the law and ‘effective rights’ as being at the heart of the Commission and its findings.  
As a consequence, he calls for reform to the justice system in keeping with accounts 
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of the personal experiences of Aboriginal people and their traditional beliefs which 
highlight that disparity. 
In this context justice, another tenet of liberalism, is also a nebulous concept, 
in part because of its ambiguous relationship with law.  In “Force of Law: The Mystical 
Foundation of Authority” Derrida aptly writes: 
Everything would still be simple if this distinction between justice and 
droit [law] were a true distinction, an opposition whose functioning was 
logically regulated and permitted mastery.  But it turns out that droit claims 
to regulate itself in the name of justice and that justice is required to 
establish itself in the name of a law that must be “enforced”.8 
Like equality, justice relies on everyone being ‘judged’ by the same set of 
rules.  In the legal sense it is the outcome obtained when rules are formally observed 
and applied regardless of race, class, gender or group affiliations,9 as expressed in the 
slogan ‘Everyone is equal before the law’.  But everyone is not equal before the law 
and neither, I suggest, would they always wish to be so considered. 
The tenet that ‘everyone is equal before the law’ contributes, I believe, to the 
social disadvantage, experienced by Indigenous people in Australia, that Bottomley et 
al refer.  They pose the question: “How can such disadvantage have occurred in an 
affluent society apparently committed to the values of liberty, equality, the rule of law, 
and the sanctity of property?”  The answer lies, these writers suggest, in the very nature 
of liberalism with its emphasis on individualism and the rights and duties of the citizen 
as opposed to people whose identity and social customs are defined through local 
group affiliations. 
While in theory a commitment to equality and justice may ensure that all 
people are fairly dealt with by the law, in practice this is not so.  For instance, Justices 
Deane and Toohey make the point, in the case of Gerhardy v Brown “that formal 
equality must yield on occasions to achieve ... effective, genuine equality”. This is 
clearly necessary in Australia where there has been no clear demarcation between 
legislation and adjudication with the result that treatment of Aboriginal people within 
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the legal system reflects the history of discriminatory legislation already discussed in 
Chapter Five and identified by Commissioner Johnson in the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.  Furthermore, the legal system, in part because of the 
depiction of law as neutral and innocent,10 is unable to “confront the substantive 
inequality”11 that occurs.  As is demonstrated through a discussion of several aspects 
of the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar, later in this chapter, it is not 
able, by its very nature, to stop prejudice and disadvantage, and may even foster it by 
limiting what can be done to prevent it. 
If one considers then that equality before the law relies first on knowledge of 
and access to the law, then the implications of cultural (but also class and gender) 
differences become obvious, especially in relation to many Aboriginal peoples who 
historically have had negative relationships with the law.12  Equity before the law is 
further determined by government legislation that dictates who is eligible to access, 
therefore to ‘rights’ through such mechanisms as citizenship, education and funding.  
For instance, because a Bunjima woman was not informed or educated about her rights 
as a mother she remained within a violent relationship for fear of having her child 
taken from her.13  The argument might be made that this lack of education about 
individual rights is not restricted to Aboriginal people and therefore this Bunjima 
woman is no more disadvantaged than any other woman is.  However, the point must 
be made that the history of forced removal of Aboriginal children ensures that she has 
a set of expectations and thus it is that the effects of past and present government 
policies and legal injustices, exacerbated by a degree of mystification, still informs and 
determines how some people live.   For Aboriginal people, what their ‘rights’ were 
and access to those ‘rights’ was complicated by the fact that that it was the States that 
legislated 'for the welfare of Aboriginal people' not the Commonwealth government.  
This resulted in a lack of consistency between the states and a lack of responsibility on 
the part of the Commonwealth government.  At a Premier’s conference in 1936 the 
idea of Commonwealth control over the affairs of Aboriginal people was rejected, the 
only agreement reached was that “regular meetings of State and Commonwealth 
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officials responsible for the administration of the governments’ policies”14 should 
occur.  The first meeting occurred in 1937 for “endorsing a national policy of 
assimilation.”15  Aboriginal people were not granted citizenship until 1967 and even 
since this time the Commonwealth government has taken insufficient responsibility to 
ensure that they have ‘rights’ appropriate to their lives and that these are enforced. 
Justice is the final aspect of liberalism and the Western legal system to be 
discussed here. Sarat writing about access to justice or ‘due process’ and the 
participation of citizens in the United States justice system states that: 
The right to one's day in court, the right to be heard, the right to take part 
in procedures through which one's fate is determined all provide the basic 
substance of due process, which is in turn, at the heart of our conceptions 
of fairness and justice.16 
While the liberal view of justice has wide appeal, in reality it too is little more 
than rhetoric.  Consequently, it has fallen out of favour, particularly with those who 
consider that the effects of a person's socio-economic-psychological background should 
not be ignored when assessing their ability to access justice and therefore due process or 
the rule of law.  This of course is the point of the Bunjima woman’s story. Dis-ease with 
the liberal view of justice is important both for the recognition that the enactment of 
legislation specific to the lives of Aboriginal people has ensured that there is no 'even 
playing field' and for the opportunities it provides for critique and change. 
6.2 Pleading before the court 
The architecture of the court and its protocols ensure that the defendant behaves in a 
‘courtly fashion’.  For instance, everyone stands as the magistrate enters the 
courtroom.  This and the fact that s/he sits at a bench raised above all other participants 
is a physical acknowledgment of his or her institutional power.  The lawyers, 
defendants, claimants and clerks are all positioned in front of and thus lower than the 
magistrate; the lawyers for the prosecution and defendant sit at the bar table with the 
prosecution on the right and the defendant on the left.  The defendant sits or stands to 
the left of his or her lawyer and does not have the ‘protection’ of the bar table between 
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171 
him/herself and the magistrate.  The defendant is thus exposed and, as is the case with 
the panopticon, is subjected to the direct gaze of the court.  Furthermore, court 
procedure determines who speaks and what is spoken, as well as how and when it is 
spoken.  It is a lawyer who acts for the parties and provides most important 
information, such as factual summaries, pleas in mitigation which may describe 
embarrassing domestic circumstances.  Finally, it is the lawyer who attempts to lead 
the magistrate to a particular decision.  The overall selection and presentation (that is, 
the grand narrative) is thus overwhelmingly in white, educated, institutionalised and 
highly specialised legal terms, the Indigenous voice is lost. 
Bernard Jackson, Queen Victoria Professor of Law in the University of 
Liverpool, provides some useful insights into why this might be so in an article titled 
“Narrative Theories and Legal Discourse”.17  He examines court procedures and 
explicates the ways in which these inhibit certain narrative types while facilitating 
others.  He explains that: 
Conventionally, the ‘battle’ which occurs in the courtroom is assumed to 
be between the two parties to the litigation: plaintiff and defendant in civil 
cases, prosecutor and accused in criminal.  But it does not take long to 
observe the fact that the two parties to the dispute very rarely engage in the 
combat.  There will be no occasion in the trial during which the parties 
confront each other, as speaking subjects.  Indeed, it is only in relatively 
modern times that parties to a dispute have been permitted to give evidence 
on their own behalf.18 
What this means is that in many cases the magistrate will hear little of the 
defendant's story in his or her own words.  Rather, as a result of the courtroom format, 
or pragmatics, it is the lawyer for the defendant who presents the relevant information.  
The defendant answers questions and provides what information he or she is instructed 
to give.  While the magistrate will usually give the defendant the opportunity to say 
something on his or her own behalf, the structure and tone within the court is 
determined.  It takes a very confident person to represent her/himself well or say 
anything at all under these circumstances. 
According to Bernard, however, the defendant is an actor, one who must 
impress the magistrate.  The ability to perform is thus a determining factor in the 
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outcome of the case.  A colleague confirmed this by describing his own experience of 
being charged with a driving offence, serious enough to cause him to appear in the 
local magistrate's court rather than receive the usual fine.  He explained that quite 
obviously his class, employment and ability to convince the magistrate that he was a 
‘good’ though ‘aberrant’ citizen – his own cultural capital – resulted in his receiving a 
good behaviour bond rather than any other penalty.  While waiting his turn to appear 
he listened to the preceding cases and noted that people on less serious charges than 
his own at times received greater penalties and without exception were socio-
economically disadvantaged and were unable to represent themselves positively. 
It should be noted that many people who choose to plead guilty in the 
magistrate’s court and therefore simply accept the consequences do so because they 
either cannot afford to engage a lawyer, are not educated in the necessity to do so, or 
do not have the confidence to approach a law firm.  Those who have state-funded legal 
representation realise the necessity to be represented but cannot afford private defence.  
This is important to the experience of the defendant because the court works on a 
system of seniority; that is, the order in which cases are heard is based on the seniority 
of the lawyers involved.  If a defendant is wealthy and educated enough to hire a senior 
lawyer, s/he has the benefit of having the case heard while the magistrate is still fresh 
and has not heard a long list of similar ‘excuses’.  The cases of those people with legal 
aid lawyers are heard after the senior lawyers and private lawyers and only then are 
the cases of those people without representation heard. 
Defendants without representation, waiting for their case to be heard, may sit 
in the back of the courtroom for much of the day.  During this time they witness cases 
where the defendant has a lawyer to intercede with the court which may undoubtedly 
cause many people to feel excluded from and thus disempowered by lack of knowledge 
of the court and the legal system.  It would almost certainly act as a barrier to story 
telling in any full sense of the term. 
6.3 Pluralism: recognition of Customary Law 
To confront and deal with substantive inequalities the Australian legal system would 
have to practice pluralism, the right to religious and cultural difference which 
Bottomley et al suggest is intrinsic to it19 but which I argue is certainly not practised 
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in Western Australia.  Rather, the law attempts to reconcile self and others to a single 
position through the universal application of law, as is demonstrated by the judiciary's 
limited, though in some instances increasing engagement, with Aboriginal customary 
law.  A significant shift in thinking would be required for pluralism to be incorporated 
into the system, in part because the formalistic or 'equal' application of rules or 
standards, which are inherent to Western notions of justice as equality, desert and 
entitlement, are anti-thetical to pluralism. 
Much has been written on the customary law of Indigenous people in 
Australia. The discussion that follows is restricted, however, to that of the Ngulama, 
Injibarndi and Bunjima people who now live in Roebourne.  This is so because 
Marshall Smith, who spoke about customary law at the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and 
Change” seminar is a Bunjima man living in Roebourne. He made the point that people 
wanting information about customary law from other areas must ask the appropriate 
people. Further, both Alice Nannup, an Injibandi woman, and the Bunjima woman 
who feared losing her baby, lived there. 
Customary law can be partially understood as the complex set of rules that 
guide individual and community behaviour within and between Aboriginal groups. It is 
important to appreciate that Aboriginal people's subjection to the Western legal system 
does not exclude them from customary law.  Rather, customary law is integral to the 
identity of many Aboriginal people. It is also important to appreciate that customary law 
has little or no relevance to the lives of some other Aboriginal people, particularly those 
who have been denied access to country, family and culture through forced removal. It 
is not my purpose to provide a comprehensive discussion of customary law here as this 
would not be possible, for “the traditional culture is an oral one, and there are no written 
codes or statements.”20  More importantly it would not be appropriate or possible to do 
so from my position as a white woman.  What is necessary for this discussion however, 
is to provide some examples of the richness and complexity of customary law and to 
reinforce the Royal Commission's point that dialogue between people involved in both 
systems of law is vital.  As Crawford points out: 
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Non-recognition contributes to the continued undermining of traditional 
laws and authority structures.  Aboriginal customary laws are a continuing 
reality in the lives of traditionally oriented people. 
Aboriginal people generally support recognition of their laws and, more 
specifically, have sought ways to enable the two laws, the general law and 
the Aboriginal customary law, to work together. 
Aboriginal customary laws assists in maintaining law and order within 
Aboriginal communities while Non-Aboriginal law and order mechanisms are often 
seen as ineffective and based on alien, shifting and compromised value systems.21 
Galtharra-na, or the skin group system, is fundamental to peoples’ identity 
within the group, how they relate to others and the organisation of law meetings.  Each 
person is born into one of the four skin groups Bananga, Burungu, Garimarra and 
Balyirri.  The system determines whom people marry and their relationship to each 
other. For instance: 
A Bananga man must marry a Burungu woman and all their children are 
Balyirri. 
A Garimarra man must marry a Balyirri woman and all their children are 
Burungu. 
By knowing your Galtharra-Na you will know how to relate to other 
people. 
You can work out whether you are a brother, aunty, cousin, nephew etc.22 
People can joke and play with others from their own skin group or those who 
are straight for them (people whom they can marry) but may not speak to those who 
could potentially be their mother-in-law (nirdi) for instance, ensuring that respect 
within families and the larger group are maintained and that there is a clearly marked 
‘duty of care’. 
A very important aspect of the Ngulama, Injibarndi and Bunjima family 
systems is that specific functions or roles, such as having a mother or grandfather, must 
be maintained to ensure the physical and emotional welfare of each person.  If, for 
example, a man's mother has two sisters they are also his mothers.  He must treat them 
with the respect and care due to a mother while they in turn care for him as their son.  
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1997, p. 30. 
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The system is also cyclical so that each family function can be maintained.  When a 
woman's grandmother passes away for instance, her own great granddaughter may 
become her grandmother.  For people outside the group such family relationships can 
be difficult to appreciate.  It certainly does not easily translate into a western family 
model.  This system of relationships has not been readily understood or acknowledged 
within the Western legal system so that there have been occasions when a child's 
mother's sister has not been able to take responsibility for a child when the court has 
required the mother to guarantee her or his future behaviour.23 
Within the Ngulama, Injibarndi and Bunjima system of family relationships 
maintaining friendly and supportive relations between parents and children is a 
priority.  One mechanism for doing this is having the parent's sisters and brothers 
responsible for disciplining children.24  This is significantly different to what occurs 
in most non-Indigenous Australian families and in many instances is regarded as a lack 
of responsibility.  When this system of discipline is taken into consideration then it is 
also appropriate that a child's aunt or uncle take responsibility for her or his behaviour 
within a legal context. 
It is through customary law that cultural knowledge is maintained, including 
the time at which boys are initiated, what knowledges they are responsible for, and at 
what age men and women are given spiritual information.  Through the law people 
learn about looking after the land in ways that facilitate positive, productive 
relationships between themselves and country.  Sacred sites, such as increase thalus,25 
have songs and stories that must be sung and told at appropriate times and places to 
ensure, for example, a plentiful supply of seeds and the significance of the site.26  
Adherence to customary laws is important in developing and maintaining personal and 
communal responsibility and respect. 
The relationship between the Western legal system and customary law in 
Australia is an uneasy one however and is limited to very specific cases.  In fact, 
according to McRae et al, “white law has never recognised black law as a separate and 
                                                          
23 For a more comprehensive discussion of the skin system see Frank Rijavec and Noelene Harrison, 
“Exile and the Kingdom”, produced by the Australian Film Commission and Norrawanna, 1992. 
24 Bernie Ryder, speaker in Ngurra Wangkamagayi: Cultural Awareness Training Course, Roebourne, 
October 1997. 
25 A thalus may be a rock, a tree or some other physical formation. 
26 For a discussion of thalus in the Roebourne area see Ngurra Wangkamagayi.  See also Peggy Brock 
(ed), Women Rites & Sites, North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989 for a discussion of the relationships 
between women, cultural knowledge and the maintenance of sites. 
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autonomous system of laws and dispute resolution procedures.”27  Mick Dodson, 
Aboriginal Social Justice Commissioner, speaking about Customary Law and Human 
Rights made the following comment on the ways Aboriginal customary law is 
generally regarded: 
Apart from seeing them as problematic there appears an addiction in policy 
development (and ensuing legislation) to isolate components of our laws 
[traditional marriage laws for instance] in order to place them into artificial 
compartments which western legal systems are familiar with.  The process 
of segmenting and selecting what is considered 'legitimate' provides 
compromised justice for Indigenous peoples. 
If native title is a title based on our laws and customs, it is an absurd 
position for our traditional rights to land to be recognised but other laws 
and customs (which give meaning to those rights) to be treated as if they 
did not exist or are somehow lesser rights. 
The Australian legal system must take the further step of accepting that 
native title is inseparable from the culture, which gives it meaning.28 
Keith Maddox, an anthropologist at Macquarie University, in writing about 
Aboriginal customary law draws on the work of the anthropologist, W.E.H. Stanner, 
particularly his suggestion that “Aboriginal customary law conflicted in almost every 
respect with the root assumptions of Australian law”,29 as a way of explaining the lack 
of engagement with customary law by non-Indigenous Australians.  Drawing on 
Stanner he asserts that: 
 [w]hether contemptuous or solicitous of Aborigines, Whites are inflicted 
with ‘a kind of sightlessness towards the central problems of what it is to 
be a blackfellow in the here-and-now of Australian life’.  It was unlikely a 
court would recognise an Aboriginal marriage or most of the other things 
that made life worth living.  White people were intellectually distant from 
such ideas, as ‘the totally inalienable link between a man and his clan 
estate, a man's right to hunting tracks, his right to claim material wealth 
from the husband of his sister or daughter-all these, all these and a dozen 
others’.30 
It is important to make the point however that co-operation between the two 
systems, built on dialogue and respect, can facilitate a useful accommodation between 
                                                          
27 H. McRae, G. Nettheim, L. Beacroft, Aboriginal Legal Issues, North Ryde: The Law Book Co., 
1991, p. 221. 
28 Mick Dodson, “Customary Law and Human Rights”, Unpublished, 1994. 
29 Keith Maddox, “Aboriginal customary law”, in Aborigines and the Law, Peter Hanks and Bryan 
Keon-Cohen, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 232-3. 
30 Maddox, 1984, p. 233. 
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the two laws.  This happens reasonably successfully on the Pitanjatara lands where as 
McRae et al explain: 
the white magistrates and police perform their duties in a generally 
sensitive manner, usually in close consultation with the Aboriginal 
community, though some areas of conflict remain. 
Another example can be found in the case of the State of Western Australia v 
Ben Ward & Ors on behalf of the Miriuwung Gajerrong Peoples.  The Miriuwung 
Gajerrong peoples have claimed native title to the land and water surrounding, what is 
now known as the town of Kununurra in the north east of Western Australia.  Justice 
Lee, who heard the case sought to determine whether there needed to be restrictions 
on the hearing of evidence that might not be appropriately heard in a public forum. He 
was particularly concerned to ensure that gender restrictions on the presentation of 
evidence were addressed and was willing to allow restrictions despite objections by 
the State that such an approach interferes with ‘natural justice’.  This need comes out 
of the Western system of law that is historically adversarial that is, all evidence to be 
heard in a case must be available to all.  Further, Justice Lee's concern to respect 
cultural restrictions is in keeping with Justice Deane's finding in the case of Dietrich v 
The Queen (1992)31 where he asserts that: 
... a change in community perceptions or standards may lead, on 
reconsideration, to the modification or abandonment of rules or practices 
which were, in other times, seen as necessary to ensure that the trial of an 
accused was a fair one. 
The implication here is that court requirements must change in relation to 
changes in the society that the courts serve.  And, certainly Justice Blackburn’s dictum 
in the Grove Land Rights case in 1971 provided a possible direction for change.  He 
found that: 
a recognisable sovereign or a separate territorial community with well 
defined boundaries were not prerequisites for “law”.  He preferred to place 
emphasis on the process of dispute resolution in traditional societies.32 
His emphasis on dispute resolution in Aboriginal communities is a 
recognition and acceptance of the fact that these communities do have their own 
structures for mediating disputes. This recognition is essential to a synergistic 
                                                          
31 ibid 
32 Crawford, 1992, pp. 54-55. 
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relationship between the two systems of law that may lessen the number of Aboriginal 
people who “live and die in custody”.33 Deterritorialisation is not achieved however.  
The law immediately reterritorialises.  It maintains its control.  In the case of Walker 
V NSW the judgement is made that allowing for customary law is not an 
acknowledgement of Aboriginal customary law. 
6.4 Law and the possibility of change 
...the law is capable of providing an important impetus for social and 
economic change.  Not only is reform of the law essential to overcome 
obvious inequalities and injustices in society, but the reforms can markedly 
influence community attitudes and behaviour.34 
From the overview of the Western legal system it is easy to understand law as a grand 
narrative that is singular, homogenous, transcendental, inflexible, lacking in human 
agency.  However, this is not so; it is multifaceted and while law is traditionally and 
persistently conservative and slow to change, it is a social process and therefore 
dynamic.  That law is not homogenous is evidenced by the fact that it consists of 
several interrelated practices including ethics, education and politics and is peopled by 
judges, magistrates, justices of the peace, clerks of court, social workers, probation 
officers and educators.  Although they act in accord with the law, apparently neutrally, 
there is now a general acceptance that even 'impartial' people such as magistrates and 
judges are influenced by and therefore make judgements based on their own socio-
psychological backgrounds.  In a liberal society these people may work at consensus, 
at “reconciliation of self and other within the sphere of social interaction”35 but they 
may also operate autonomously, critiquing the law, and working for change. 
Law is a social process.   There is thus an exchange or interaction between 
politics and public opinion.  It is as Sackville asserts, that law informs and influences 
public attitudes and behaviours.   One example of this is the High Court’s Mabo 
decision which: 
                                                          
33 Hal Wootten, “Aboriginal People and the Criminal Justice System” in Aboriginal Perspectives on 
Criminal Justice, Chris Cunneen (ed), Monograph Series, No. 1, Sydney: The Institute of 
Criminology, 1992, p. 52. 
34 Sackville, in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, 
David Gray Carlson (eds.), Routledge: New York, 1992, p. 213. 
35 Michel Rosenfeld, “Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the 
Temptations of the New Legal Formalism” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Drucilla 
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson (eds.), Routledge: New York, 1992, p. 171. 
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reject[ed] the view that Australia belonged to 'no-one' (terra nullius) at the 
time of European settlement and recognised the existence of Indigenous 
Australians' native title rights as part of Australia's common law.  The 
Court found that common law native title was different from other forms 
of title as its content depends on the laws and customs of the Indigenous 
people who hold it - not on rights granted by governments.36 
Prior to the High Court’s ruling there was limited debate outside of academic 
circles and Aboriginal Affairs about the rights of Aboriginal peoples to native title and 
self-determination.  Since 1992 there has been a significant increase in discussions 
which are informed by the High Court's Mabo determination.  It is also in native title 
claims such as the Miriuwung Gajerrong case, discussed later, that changes to the 
judicial process are occurring.  However, the point must be re-made that law does not 
change radically and does not encourage conditions that facilitate change.  And further, 
because it is just one aspect of a social process, decisions such as Mabo are critiqued 
and reacted to in a multitude of ways.  In the case of the High Court decision many of 
the resultant narratives have included overt criticism of the court.37  A small group of 
people has accused the court of being too conservative and not ‘settling’ the issue of 
native title.  However, most narratives generated by the decision is overtly critical of 
the High Court and has been anti-native title. 
In writing about penal reform David Brown makes the point that, for positive 
change to occur, a “series of forces which create the conditions of possibility of 
change”38 must exist.  The Australian Institute Judicial Association’s decision to 
implement cultural awareness training for instance did not occur in a social vacuum or 
even of its own volition.  It was the result of the number of deaths in custody, the Royal 
Commission, the Labour government's commitment to Aboriginal welfare and self-
determination and the concern of individual people and an international concern for 
the rights of Indigenous people.  Brown lists several tasks that he regards as necessary 
for change, these include: 
... addressing specific issues against a background of a detailed empirical 
knowledge of their localised history and struggles; regulating the media as 
a major agency in the construction of ‘common sense’, ‘public opinion’ 
and the limit of reform; socialising the judiciary; developing a more critical 
                                                          
36 Nick Minchin, “Fairness and Balance: The Howard Government's Response to the High Court’s 
Wik Decision”, January 1988. 
37 There have also been personal, community and national celebrations of the Mabo decision.  It gave 
hope to many that Indigenous people would be treated with a new respect and that social justice 
issues, related as they are to dispossession might being to be addressed. 
38 David Brown “The Politics of Reform”, Unpublished paper, 1998.   
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approach to generalised claims of judicial independence; creating new 
forums and sites for debate; changing informational and decision making 
practices within political parties and government; regrouping the law 
reform / penal reform lobby...39 
But, as is illustrated by the discussion of the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and 
Change” seminar that follows, “localised” education and “socialis[ation of] the 
judiciary” on its own is not enough.  In any circumstances change is not necessarily 
readily embraced or ‘actually’ achieved by all who operate in the legal system.  Rather, 
as Rosenfeld asserts, “in the process of making itself formal the law only incorporates 
certain ethical and political values while repelling others,”40 often by acting 
strategically to protect it.  There must also be an ongoing dialogue between the 
judiciary, the public (which of course they are part of in the most general sense) 
including key Aboriginal organisations and as many Aboriginal people as possible, 
together with a willingness on the part of government to alleviate socio-economic 
inequities, fund education initiatives and alternative sentencing options, including 
culturally appropriate self-assertiveness training and anger management programs. 
The content of the Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change seminar, which 
serves as one possible model for negotiating change, was decided upon after a series 
of interviews with six magistrates and input from the Aboriginal Cultural Awareness 
Pilot Project Sub-Committee.  Although the seminar content was focused on 
contemporary issues such as domestic violence, imprisonment and Aboriginal 
customary law, it was decided that some time must be spent providing an historical 
frame in which these issues could be understood and from there dealt with.  In Anne 
Collett's terms this required “deliberately, consciously examining the past, the present 
and deciding a course for the future”41 and in this way the seminar could thus be 
identified, again in her terms, as a postcolonial initiative. 
6.5 The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: grand 
narrative or anti-colonial critique? 
As already stated the Western legal system is a modernist institution resistant to radical 
change.  However, it is a political and social process and therefore subject to critique 
                                                          
39 David Brown, 1998. 
40 Rosenfeld, 1992, p. 171. 
41 Anne Collett, “Perspectives on Home Ground, Foreign Territory” in Teaching Post-Colonialism 
and Post-Colonial Literatures, Anne Collett, Lars Jensen & Anna Rutherford (eds), Denmark: Aarhus 
University Press, 1997, p. 15. 
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and demands for accountability by the public, the Human Rights Commission and 
other forms of national and international scrutiny.  The Royal Commission Into 
Aboriginal Deaths In Custody is one critique that challenges the impartiality and equity 
of the Australian legal system and its ability to effectively and productively relate to 
and, meet the needs of Aboriginal people. It achieves this by exposing “the horror”42 
of Aboriginal deaths in custody and foregrounding socio-economic reasons for the 
disproportionately high number of Aboriginal people in custody and thus at risk.   
Hence, it is my contention that the Royal Commission can be interpreted as acting in a 
postmodernist and, by extension, postcolonialist way. 
It is important to understand the relationship between modernism and the 
Western legal system and that between postmodernism and the Royal Commission Into 
Aboriginal Deaths In Custody to appreciate both the potential for critique and the 
limitations of the Commission.  Just as postmodernism does not involve a radical break 
with modernism so the Royal Commission is not opposed to or outside of the Western 
legal system.  The inter-relationship between them is most clearly exemplified by the 
fact that Commissioner Elliott Johnson QC, who occupies an elite and powerful 
position within the legal system and therefore has a vested interest in maintaining its 
integrity, conducted the inquiry.   And further, that while the Commission can make 
recommendations, which it has done, these are not enforceable by law just as 
postmodern and postcolonial critiques may be called for but cannot be enforced, 
remaining at the level of rhetorical intervention as narrative pleadings. 
Understanding the function of narrative within the Royal Commission and in 
its relationship to the Western legal system is also important here. This system is, in 
Lyotard’s terms, a grand narrative.43  It functions as a central story or meta-narrative 
within Western culture.  The Royal Commission, on the other hand, functions to 
challenge aspects of that meta-narrative by providing a forum for local and personal 
stories to be told and heard that may change attitudes and practices but that cannot 
radically alter the structure of the meta-narrative because it seeks solutions in the meta-
narrative of law.  This is, I suggest, comparative to the relationship between colonialism 
and postcolonial theory.  The Royal Commission can perhaps be usefully thought of in 
Homi Bhabha's terms as a “form of social criticism that bears witness to those unequal 
                                                          
42 This refers back to Lyotard’s response to Auschwitz and his explanation of postmodernism 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
43 Refer to Chapter Three for a discussion of modernism and grand narrative. 
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and uneven processes of representation” by which the horrific experiences of Aboriginal 
people in the justice system have been dismissed for too long. 
A brief overview of the Royal Commission’s report, written in five volumes, 
is provided here to outline the main concerns of the commission and to provide a 
context for the discussion of the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar that 
is to follow.  Volume One is a comprehensive analysis of the deaths investigated.  It 
includes a profile of those who died; the findings of the commissioners as to the deaths; 
and the adequacy of previous investigations.  Volume Two is a comprehensive critique 
detailing the underlying historic/social issues that explain the disproportionate number 
of Aboriginal people in custody.  It includes accounts of Aboriginal relations with the 
non-Aboriginal community: Criminal and Juvenile Justice Systems, police, education, 
employment and housing.  Alcohol, drug use, unemployment and poverty are 
considered for the ways they affect these relations, as are land needs and self-
determination.  Volume Three, is divided into two parts, “Reducing the Numbers in 
Custody”, which focuses on diversions from police custody and imprisonment as a last 
resort and “Reducing the Risks of Deaths in Custody” which considers the prison 
experience, including the vulnerability of those in custody, their custodial health and 
safety.  The fourth volume, “The Underlying Issues: Directions for Change” 
recommends strategies for dealing with problems highlighted in Volume Two.  These 
strategies include the path to self-determination; accommodating difference; 
improving the Criminal Justice System; better health; coping with alcohol; future 
education; increasing economic opportunities.  Volume five is in two parts: “Towards 
Reconciliation” which deals with the process of reconciliation including conforming 
to international obligations and addressing land needs44 and “Recommendations”. 
Recommendations 96, 97, 104 and 107 of the Commission’s report 
specifically relate to the judiciary.  Recommendations 96 and 97 stipulate that: 
Judicial officers and persons who work in the court service and in the 
probation and parole services and whose duties bring them into contact 
with Aboriginal people be encouraged to participate in an appropriate 
training and development program, designed to explain contemporary 
Aboriginal society, customs and traditions.  Such programs should 
emphasise the historical and social factors that contribute to the 
disadvantaged position of many Aboriginal people today and to the nature 
of relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities today.  
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The Commission further recommends that such persons should wherever 
possible participate in discussion with members of the Aboriginal 
community in an informal way in order to improve cross-cultural 
understanding. 
That in devising and implementing courses referred to in Rec. 96, the 
responsible authorities should ensure that consultation takes place with 
appropriate Aboriginal organisations, including, but not limited to, 
Aboriginal Legal Service.45 
Recommendation 104 specifies that in the case of remote or discrete 
communities those communities be consulted about the types of sentences that they 
believe are appropriate. 
Though the Royal Commission was unable to enforce change several 
important outcomes have arisen from it, including increased public awareness of the 
historical factors that have contributed to the number of Aboriginal people in the 
justice system.  The families of people who had died in custody were given the 
opportunity to speak in a legitimate public inquiry.  The biographies of those who have 
died were recorded and listened to as a means of determining whether there were 
commonalties in their histories and, most importantly, whether these had been taken 
into account by the justice process in an attempt to decrease the number of Aboriginal 
people in prison and the number of deaths.  Furthermore, establishment of the 
Australian Institute Judicial Administration's cultural awareness programme for the 
Western Australian Magistracy was a direct result of the Royal Commission’s inquiry, 
report and recommendations. 
The call for the cultural awareness program resulted, in part, from 
Commissioner Johnson’s finding that the separation of legislation and the adjudication 
of law does not occur for Aboriginal people; rather the effects of legislation have 
continuing direct and detrimental repercussions for them in the justice system.  
Commissioner Johnston in his 1991 “Overview and Recommendations” to the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody foreground the role of past legislation 
in contributing to the disproportionate numbers of Aboriginal people in the court 
system, in custody and dying in custody.  He wrote: 
I include in this report a chapter on that history.  I make no apology for 
doing so.  I do so not because the chapter adds to what is known but 
because what is known is known to historians and Aboriginal people; it is 
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little known to non-Aboriginal people and it is a principal thesis of this 
report that it must become more known.46 
The report also includes facts about the socio-economic disadvantage of 
Aboriginal people in terms of employment, education, poor living conditions, ill-
health, high infant mortality and, many other factors.  This information and past 
legislation is included in the report because of the direct correlation between them; as 
such it functions as a critique of colonial practice.  There is, as Commissioner Elliott 
Johnston has stated, a direct relationship between the lived effects of legislation on 
Aboriginal peoples’ lives, and the number of people before the courts and in prison.  
However, that the Royal Commission's recommendations are not enforceable is a sign 
of the complicitious relationship between the Commission, the legal system and the 
government.  And, so we are left wondering if the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody is merely a strand within a grand narrative. 
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Chapter Seven  
 
Cultural Awareness: Listening to the Stories of Others 
This chapter provides a discussion of several aspects of the Australian Institute Judicial 
Association’s “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar for Western Australian 
magistrates, held in December 1994.  I coordinated this seminar, as part of the 
Australian judiciary’s response to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody report.  Discussion of several aspects of the seminar, particularly those 
relating to the importance of dialogue and listening to personal narratives as ways of 
developing productive and respectful relationships between members of the judiciary 
and the Aboriginal community are focused on.  They demonstrate that it is not only 
the telling of and listening to peoples’ stories that is important, but equally the place 
or site in which stories are told and listened to because this too determines their 
reception. 
7.1 Implementing cultural awareness 
The Australian Institute Judicial Association responded to the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations 96 and 104 by convening the National Cultural Awareness 
Committee.  Discussion of the Committee is not necessary here1 other than to say that 
it initiated an Aboriginal Cultural Awareness Pilot Project Sub-Committee in Western 
Australia.2   And further that the implementation of cultural awareness training is a 
practical and local response to the recommendations, very much in keeping with the 
tenets of postcolonial theory.  As the Honourable Mr Justice Paul Seaman, chair of the 
National Cultural Awareness Committee, reports: 
                                                          
1 For further information of the National Cultural Awareness Programme Paul Seaman (Justice), “A 
National Cultural Awareness Programme: Working With Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders”, 
Australian Institute Judicial Association, Thirteenth Annual Conference, 1994. 
2 Membership of the Aboriginal Cultural Awareness Pilot Project Sub-Committee included an 
Aboriginal  and Torres Strait Islander Commission representative, the Assistant Commissioner of the 
Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority, an Aboriginal woman lawyer, the Director General of the 
Ministry of Justice, the Chief magistrate and one other magistrate, the Chief Judge of the District 
Court and one other District Court Judge, the Director of the Aboriginal Legal Commission, a 
representative of the Professional and Continuing Education Unit and Murdoch University and 
myself.  Justice Seaman chaired the sub-committee. 
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the project has its genesis in an approach in early 1992 by Stephen Skehill, 
then Deputy Secretary and now Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney 
General’s Department. The Department wished to implement 
Recommendation 96 by enhancing awareness about Aboriginal culture 
among the Australian judiciary with a budget of $50 000 per annum over 
a period of five years.3 
Given the fact that there are six states and two territories in Australia, the per 
annum budget for the cultural awareness training was not substantial and hence there 
were many communities in Western Australia not represented in the seminar.  Seaman 
goes on to acknowledge that there are both those in the judiciary who are in favour of 
cultural awareness training and those who are not.  This proved to be the case for the 
“Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change Seminar” in which some magistrates 
participated with enthusiasm and an obvious desire to speak with Aboriginal people 
while others were present under duress.  Importantly Seaman also states that: 
... in the development of any educational project nothing should be done 
which offends the independence of any judicial officer.  Equally nothing 
should be done which fails to appreciate the independence of views of 
Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders.4 
That Justice Seaman can make the comment that nothing should be done 
“which offends the independence of any judicial officer” underlines how tragically he 
missed the point of much cultural awareness training.  Such training aims to highlight 
the ways in which discourses and the interests of people such as judicial officers and 
Aboriginal people interact and impact upon each other.  Independence, like the 
objectivity of law, is a function of the grand narrative that needs to be challenged.  
Members of the judiciary need to be free of it they are to listen to and take account of 
personal stories in productive ways.  There were very interesting tensions between 
speakers and magistrates focusing on this point of ‘independence’, particularly in 
discussions of family violence. 
The content of the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar, which 
serves as one possible model for negotiating change in the legal system, was decided 
upon after a series of interviews with six magistrates and input from the Aboriginal 
Cultural Awareness Pilot Project Sub-Committee.  Although the seminar content was 
focused on contemporary issues such as domestic violence, imprisonment and 
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Aboriginal customary law, it was decided that some time must be spent providing an 
historical frame in which these issues could be understood and from there dealt with.  
In Anne Collett’s terms this required “deliberately, consciously examining the past, 
the present and deciding a course for the future”5 and in this way the seminar could 
thus be identified, again in her terms, as a postcolonial initiative. 
There were twenty-five Indigenous speakers at the seminar representing 
communities from Albany, Willunna, Roebourne, Port Hedland, Broome, Derby and 
Perth.  In a State as large as Western Australia and given that there was a limited 
budget, it was impossible to have a representative from all communities. After 
interviewing several magistrates and deciding upon the programme for the seminar, I 
consulted with people from the Aboriginal Medical Service, the Aboriginal Legal 
Service, the Aboriginal Affairs Department, members of the judiciary, community 
organisations and individuals to whom I had been directed.  As a result, a list of 
potential speakers/participants was drawn up and as many appropriate people, 
representing the greatest possible area, were invited. 
7.2 Engaging with the other 
Most speakers met on Thursday, 8th December to get to know each other, to become 
familiar with the function centre in which the seminar was being held and, to discuss 
the format for the following two days.  A number of people within the group already 
knew each other and this was an opportunity to reconnect; for others it was a first 
meeting.  For some of the speakers, including Joannie Malay from Turkey Creek and 
Robin Eades from Perth, this was the first time they had spoken in a formal meeting 
or in this type of role. 
While each of the speakers had agreed to be involved in the seminar, many 
initially felt inadequate and intimidated, feelings that were directly related to the fact 
that they were speaking to and with magistrates.  Without exception, each speaker 
and/or their immediate family had been involved in the court process and, again 
without exception, had negative experiences to recount.  Sharing accounts of their 
                                                          
5 Anne Collett, “Perspectives on Home Ground, Foreign Territory” in Teaching Post-Colonialism and 
Post-Colonial Literatures, Anne Collett, Lars Jensen and Anna Rutherford (eds), Denmark: Aarhus 
University Press, 1997, p. 15. 
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experiences re-enforced the need for the seminar and was an acknowledgement of their 
‘right’ to be there as educators. 
For several people (although not necessarily their intention or the purpose of 
the seminar) it functioned as a forum for the expression of anger, pain, frustration, and 
injustice for the oppression, imprisonment and death of Aboriginal people and for their 
own experiences.  It was not possible for the speakers to remain objective and detached 
when discussing issues such as deaths in custody, domestic violence and juvenile 
offenders.  There was a collision between the personal and the official, the emotional 
and the objective, between individual’s feelings and their role as educators within the 
seminar. Magistrates responded to these expressions of emotion in several ways.  Some 
became defensive, feeling as if ‘they are on trial’, and expressed the view that a 
seminar was not the appropriate forum for emotional displays. For others it provided 
an opportunity to better understand issues such as juvenile offending and to express 
their personal rather than official responses. 
A formal meeting such as this seminar occupies a specific place within the 
public domain.  In this instance, magistrates, have conventions or ways of operating in 
public forums.  These are determined by personal histories and characteristics, and by 
attributes of the private sphere, but are perhaps most strongly linked to their roles as 
public figures within the judicial system.  Quite obviously, for a number of reasons, 
magistrates need to maintain a critical distance between themselves and the people 
who appear before them in court.  Only if this distance is maintained can there be, they 
claim any semblance of objectivity in sentencing.  It is also vital if magistrates are to 
be able to function effectively for any length of time.  If one became personally 
invested in cases before the court there would be a continuous emotional toll that no 
one could be expected to pay.  This continual distancing of self from the public was 
not easily put aside; and it did dictate, at least in part, interactions and expectations in 
the seminar, beginning with the introductory session. 
While introducing ourselves to others in ‘everyday’ situations is common 
practice, this was not an unproblematic session.  In a formal seminar, albeit one that tries 
to break with convention, introducing oneself is not a politically neutral act: it is a 
function of power relationships and is not necessarily easy to do.  In a rich sense it is an 
important part of what Anne Collett identifies as postcolonial “ becoming consciously 
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aware of – what has made me what I am, and how can I become actively participatory... 
? ... creating and asserting identity at the same time as seek[ing] to undermine the 
generality of stereotype.”6  In the same way that the introductions are breaking down 
stereotypical expectations of people, so they disrupt the conventions of an academic 
seminar.  The seminar is deterritorialised.  It is no longer a place where only formal 
knowledge is exchanged.  It is all right to ‘become’ personal. 
Justice Hal Wootten in his opening remarks at a seminar for the Institute of 
Criminology in 1992 made this point.  He began the proceedings by explaining that: 
... [o]ne of the most important all-pervading issues of which I have become 
aware is the most invariable failure of non-Aboriginal people to listen 
seriously to Aboriginal people who are trying to explain the issues from 
their own direct and personal experience. ... ‘Consultation’ ... usually 
means telling Aboriginal people, not seriously treating them as a source of 
information, ideas, experience and wisdom.  To my observation this has 
been a primary cause of failure on the part of police of goodwill, as well as 
other operators in the criminal justice system, to achieve results 
commensurate with their efforts. 
I propose to come to this seminar with as open a mind as I can muster, 
listen carefully to what the Aboriginal speakers have to say and respond to 
it as best I can.7 
As Wootten suggests, “listening seriously” is about being receptive, it is about 
being willing to enter a dialogue.  To do this most effectively a relationship must exist 
that facilitates an open exchange of ideas and respect for the opinions and positions of 
each other. 
Mudrooroo, (the) then Chair of the Aboriginal Studies programme at 
Murdoch University and a participant in the seminar, began by explaining that the 
primary purpose of the introductory session was to establish relationships between 
people.  He spoke of introductions as being part of a story, the story of who people are 
and their relationship to other people and to country.  Introductions allow people to be 
clear about their relationship to those about them so they know what rules or customs 
must be observed.  Part of this protocol is an acknowledgement of whose country the 
meeting is taking place in.  He explained that for Indigenous people this is always 
necessary and never just a formality and so suggested that magistrates give some 
                                                          
6 Collett, 1997, p. 7. 
7 Wootten, 1992, p. 49. 
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information about their place, either where they were born or now live, as a way of 
situating themselves. 
Despite the importance of the introductory session it was regarded as too long 
and intimidating by some of the magistrates.  However, the Indigenous speakers 
thought that it was too short and impersonal.  So that while everyone agreed that 
introductions are a necessary formality and that most of the information was 
interesting, (some magistrates received insights into the background of their peers that 
had been unknown to them) it was not an uncomplicated or, even a non-threatening 
activity.  Most magistrates gave their name, some information about where their family 
was from and where they had worked, a few did offer more personal details, including 
whether they were married and had children.  Few could speak of themselves without 
prioritising their relationship to the judicial system however, which was problematic 
for several speakers who said that some magistrates maintained a ‘court like’ critical 
distance that restricted what it was possible to say throughout the seminar and therefore 
affected its usefulness. 
The value of this session should not be underestimated however despite the 
difficulties with it.  The autobiographical details provided by participants caused a 
blurring of the boundary between private and public, emotional and objective 
knowledge, which certainly influenced the way information in other sessions was 
heard and interacted with.  More importantly the value of this session extended beyond 
the parameters of the seminar.  I spoke with Eileen Harris, a presenter from the 
Aboriginal Medical Service at Wiluna, in September 1997 at the “Northwest Women’s 
Conference”.8  It was with great pleasure that she spoke of the change in her 
relationship with the magistrate who deals with the community at Wilunna.  Since the 
seminar and getting to know him on a personal level she has found it easier for 
Indigenous community members to form a working relationship with the magistrate 
built on communication and dispute mediation that occurs both outside and within the 
justice system.  The re-negotiation of relationships at the seminar has helped to at least 
partially deterritorialised the practice of law in Wiluna. 
                                                          
8 This is a bi-annual conference held in the north-west of Western Australia designed to lessen the 
isolation experienced by some women and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. 
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7.3 History, Dialogue or just a ‘Whinge’? 
Following the lead of Commissioner Elliott Johnston in the Royal Commission Into 
Aboriginal Deaths In Custody, the second session of the seminar was an overview of 
Western Australian legislation that has governed the way Aboriginal people have lived 
and has contributed to them being over-represented in the justice system.  The session 
began with magistrates and speakers watching a video describing the 1905 Act, 
produced by the Aboriginal Affairs Department.  It is narrated by Jeremy Gartlett and 
provides an overview of the Western Australian legislation dealing with Indigenous 
people from 1905 to 1972.  After watching the video, three speakers (Marshall Smith, 
Harry Taylor and Glenyse Ward) discussed ways in which the 1905 Act and 
subsequent legislation had affected their lives and the lives of people they knew.9  Each 
of these speakers works in mainstream organisations and has had experience 
presenting information to groups of people in relatively objective, non-confronting 
ways with which the magistrates were comfortable.  The stories that they told were 
similar to those that Alice Nannup wrote of in When the Pelican Laughed and 
reinforced Commissioner Johnson’s findings in the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal 
Deaths In Custody. 
Marshall Smith is a Bunjima man from Tom Price who lives in Roebourne and 
works with the Ministry of Justice.  Smith described the ways in which the Ngulama, 
Injibarndi, Bunjima and Kurama people had been moved from their traditional lands as 
a result of pastoralism, been forced to live in the Roebourne Reserve and later in the 
town.  He explained that, as a consequence of this, respect and marriage systems were 
disrupted creating much social hardship.  Although asked for information about other 
groups and areas Marshall Smith was only prepared to give details about people and 
customs from his own area.  (On day two of the seminar he explained customary law.)  
This was an acknowledgement of cultural diversity and a demonstration of the need to 
seek information about specific groups from the people themselves. 
Harry Taylor from the Department of the Family, who is involved with re-
uniting families that had been separated as a result of the 1905 Act and subsequent 
legislation, then described the ways children had been removed from their families and 
placed in missions and other institutions without parents or extended family.  He 
                                                          
9 For a full discussion see Haebich, 1988. 
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explained that this resulted in many people not having a sense of their own self worth or 
any modelling of parenting skills and the advantage of extended family to rely on for 
advice or support.  Because of this, Taylor explained, the next generation of children 
was often not provided with the guidance and support they required and so family 
breakdowns occurred.  This breakdown in family structures had many ramifications 
including lack of education, alcoholism, family violence and imprisonment. 
Taylor, like Smith, presented materials objectively providing an historical 
account and then moved on to current strategies for reunification of families.  His mode 
of delivery invited questions such as: “Are many people accessing the service?  What 
is the success rate?”  These questions were, in turn, able to be answered factually, 
concisely and relatively unemotionally; a real dialogue was not generated. 
Glenyse Ward, author of Wandering Girl and Unna You Fellas, responded to 
the 1905 Act video, Smith and Taylor by reading several sections from Wandering 
Girl, an autobiographical account of her life written in 1987. Ward was born in Subiaco 
in 1949.  She lived with her mother until age one when the Welfare Department 
decided her mother was unfit to care for Glenyse.  She was put into St John of God’s 
Orphanage and later moved to St Francis Xavier’s Native Mission, Wandering Brook.  
Unlike many children in missions Ward did receive a rudimentary education before 
undertaking domestic duties on the mission.  At sixteen she became a domestic for an 
upper class white family and then at eighteen worked as an aide in a hospital.  After 
she married she and her husband, Charlie, moved to Broome where they still live. 
After reading several extracts Ward discussed her long term involvement in the 
prison visitors scheme, visiting young Aboriginal offenders who lack family support.  
Ward explained that most young repeat offenders want to talk about their experiences 
and reasons for being in prison.  For the most part they come from families where parents 
were unemployed, have little education and have not been able to instil in their children 
a belief in the benefit of school, and have problems with alcohol and violence.  Many of 
their parents have lived on missions and reserves, often away from their own families.  
The accounts that Ward provided mirrored Taylor’s experiences of people he worked 
with.  Most magistrates responded very positively to Glenyse Ward and the account of 
her life.  They wanted to know about her as a writer including what had contributed to 
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her success and whether she was still writing.  Although she did not have a great deal to 
say in response to this interest, it caused no apparent frustration. 
In a later session Bea Ballangarry a Thungutti Ngamba women from the mid 
north coast of New South Wales who has lived in Western Australia since 1974 spoke 
on domestic violence.  She was invited to speak at the seminar because of her long-
term work in women’s shelters in Western Australia and her own experience as a 
victim of domestic violence.  Much of her discussion focused on what she considered 
to be inappropriate strategies, on the part of the court, including the sentencing of 
offending men to prison rather than culturally appropriate anger management and self-
esteem courses.  Ballangarry became quite upset as she described the ways in which 
she and her children had been abused and finally had to flee from their home. 
Magistrates found it very difficult to develop a dialogue with Bea 
Ballangarry, even to express sympathy for her situation.  Several magistrates 
responded by stating that they have to act within constraints that are imposed upon 
them, including a lack of appropriate options for dealing with offenders.  They 
expressed frustration at the frequency with which Aboriginal women had their partners 
arrested for domestic violence but then do not proceed through the court system.  After 
some discussion, they were able to appreciate that women, while wanting the violence 
to stop, did not want their men locked up and put in ‘at risk’ situations.  Magistrates 
who asked what they could do to assist were clearly frustrated because Ballangarry 
could not give them a response that they found useful.  On seminar feedback sheets, 
several magistrates asserted that the session on domestic violence allowed people to 
whinge and that a seminar was not the venue for this to occur.10  There was little 
difference, however, in the type of information or the lack of strategies offered by 
Ballangarry compared with Glenyse Ward, who was well received. 
It is my belief that the magistrates were better able to relate to Glenyse Ward 
because the account of her life followed a narrative structure with which they were 
more personally familiar and comfortable.  While her life began badly (being taken 
from her mother and later being forced to work in difficult circumstances) Ward was 
                                                          
10 A large percentage of the Aboriginal women in prison for having killed someone have actually 
killed a person who has been violent towards them.  See Judy Atkinson, “Violence Against Aboriginal 
Women: Reconstitution of Community law-the Way Forward”, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 
46 October 1990, p. 6. 
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able to overcome the obstacles in her life to become a successful writer.  Her life story 
can hence be read as a form which some critics have described as the “battler’s story”, 
which allows the reader or listener to be assured that ‘all is well in the end’.  Such a 
resolution absolves the reader of any feelings of obligation to provide support or 
assistance.   A becoming assimilated facilitates a becoming absolved. 
7.4 Children should be heard not just seen 
All magistrates who were involved in the pre-seminar interviews requested that young 
Aboriginal people be invited to attend and address the seminar.  There was a consensus 
that too few opportunities existed for magistrates to speak with juvenile offenders and 
therefore understand their positions, in particular why it is that they re-offend after the 
age of eighteen when they know they will then become part of the adult justice system.  
As magistrate Sue Gordon, from the Children’s Court, explained in a lecture at 
Murdoch University in 1994, most young non-Aboriginal offenders, especially those 
from middle and upper middle class families do not re-offend as adults.  They are, 
according to Gordon, more likely to regard the crime that they commit, whether it is 
breaking and entering or stealing a car, as an act of rebellion against their family or as 
a challenge.  They are also more likely to be advantaged by having parents who can 
assure the court that they have financial and emotional support and the prospect of 
being ‘good citizens’.  Most young Aboriginal offenders are, on the other hand, 
motivated by social disadvantage and do not have the type of family support that 
reassures the court of their prospects. 
In response to the magistrates’ request I contacted the youth programme 
organiser at the Aboriginal Legal Service who offered to speak with young offenders 
in the programme and encourage them to be involved in the seminar.  Unfortunately, 
although there was an initial acceptance of the idea; everyone felt intimidated at the 
prospect of confronting magistrates who s/he, or members of their families, had 
encountered, or may encounter, in the court system and so declined.  Magistrate 
Gordon subsequently asked a 17 year old male, Robin Eades, to participate.  He agreed, 
but ‘ironically’, had three days remaining to serve on a custodial sentence so was only 
able to attend the Saturday morning session.  Unfortunately, this meant that he did not 
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meet the other speakers prior to the seminar and had therefore not developed a support 
network with them.11 
Discussion of this session of the seminar is considerably more detailed than 
any other. This reflects both Eades’ courage and the importance of his contribution to 
the magistrates and all other participants.  It also very clearly demonstrates the 
importance of listening to and engaging with personal narratives. 
 Eades was very obviously nervous; his mouth was ringed with a grey/silver 
film, evidence that he had been inhaling some toxic substance prior to arriving at the 
seminar.  There are many things that one could say about addictions here, particularly 
to point out that his reliance on addictive substances had not been successfully 
addressed during his detention.  Perhaps most significant, however, was his need to 
‘use’ something before confronting this situation.  Like the inability of the other young 
people to attend, his ‘use’ is an indication of the personal cost to himself of speaking 
with the magistrates.  When I had a quiet moment with him at morning tea, just before 
he spoke, he was visibly shaken and said that he was afraid but had things that he 
wanted to say and that the magistrates should hear.12 
Beresford and Omaji have asserted in Rites of Passage, that “young 
Aborigines do not live in a social vacuum;”13 they are part of an already disadvantaged 
group.  Most have experienced disrupted family lives, family violence, alcoholism, 
poverty, and poor standards of education, poor employment opportunities, social 
ostracisation and racism.  Those who do not have these experiences in their immediate 
family certainly do within their extended family.  It is, according to Beresford and 
Omaji, the result of several generations of children being removed from their families, 
destroying “the emotional ties binding Aboriginal families and exposing each new 
                                                          
11 Graham Dixon, a local poet who has received international acclaim for his prison poetry, who spoke 
in the same session and had much in common with the younger participant, helped make him feel at 
ease.  The importance of this support cannot be overstated. 
12 Robin’s discussion was pre-empted by the group watching “Where the Children Play” a film 
produced by, Koorie filmmaker, Richard Franklin.  It is a series of interviews with young Aboriginal 
people, on and around the Perth railway station, exploring issues such as family relationships, social 
ostracisation, drug use and high speed chases.  A number of workers from services such as the 
Aboriginal Legal Service also provide opinions and insights into the lives of Aboriginal youth.  The 
disruption to family and community life caused by the taking of children from their families and the 
movement of people onto missions was identified, by these young people, as a central cause of their 
own social dislocation. 
13 Quentin Beresford and Paul Omaji, Rites of Passage Aboriginal Youth, Crime and Justice, 
Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1996, p. 17. 
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generation of Aboriginal children to a diminished and scarred family life.”14  Young 
people therefore suffer because their parents, many of whom have been 
institutionalised, have limited ways of providing the necessary guidance for dealing 
with these issues. The legacy of forced institutionalisation is thus “transmitted to the 
next generation.”15 
Eades experiences of being institutionalised for long periods of his life, 
between the ages of eight and seventeen, were a direct result of his own parents and 
extended family’s similar history.  His parents had been unable to provide the guidance 
and discipline that he had needed.  As a consequence of this, the experiences of his 
peers and ways in which the wider community responded to him, he truanted and 
began a cycle of petty stealing, taking drugs and driving in stolen cars. 
In this young person’s case there was not an available family structure capable 
of giving him the support he needed to avoid being a repeat offender.  His parents had 
not completed school, did not instil in him a sense of its relevance and were unable to 
help with practical problems.  Neither of his parents had been in long term regular 
employment, and there was therefore no modelling of this for him.  This was all further 
complicated by family problems with alcohol.  Given this history, and that he had been 
institutionalised for various periods of time since he was eight, he certainly needed 
external help.  The most striking feature of this personal account is its similarity to the 
stories of many other young Aboriginal people. 
Institutionalisation was, Eades explained, also a cause of his becoming a 
repeat offender.   According to Eades the institutional process, as it is experienced in 
detention centres, is about the separation of people from conflicts or problems.  All 
aspects of life in the detention centres are regulated so that sleeping, meals and 
recreation are all time-tabled.  People are segregated according to age, sex, and 
sometimes the offence committed.  He suggested that if people are institutionalised for 
a long period they do not learn to self-regulate their behaviour, which was a personal 
problem for him, resulting in his not knowing how to live outside of an institution.  As 
Eades explained them, the effects of institutionalisation cannot be dismissed if 
attempts to decrease recidivism are taken seriously. 
                                                          
14 Beresford and Omaji, 1996, p. 35. 
15 Beresford and Omaji, 1996, p. 43. 
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Personal interactions within the detention centres were regulated so that there 
was little opportunity for him to learn necessary and effective communication skills.  
In ‘everyday’ situations there are generally unequal power relationships between 
adults and children that dictate modes of address, familiarity of speech, topics that can 
be discussed.  These relationships are negotiated and re-negotiated according to time, 
place and the participants.  For institutionalised children and young adults, the power 
relationships between themselves and the adults they interact with are still more 
complicated.  These adults are invested with judicial power that limits negotiation so 
that although there are variations in the ways that these relationships are played out 
there is little flexibility.  This results in few opportunities for developing strategies for 
initiating and maintaining relationships with adults. 
Communication and negotiation with peers was also fraught, in that there 
were few opportunities to work through disagreements and dislikes or to share 
common interests.  When people do not have these skills they are more likely to 
become frustrated and angry when their position is opposed and are less likely to 
maintain long term relationships.  A further consequence of poor communication and 
negotiation skills, therefore less satisfactory relationships, is often a lack of respect for 
other people, particularly those with whom one has no immediate connection. 
An important consequence of not developing strong relationships with others 
is not learning to regulate one’s own behaviour in socially acceptable ways.  In the 
wider community, disagreements and frustration with people are usually negotiated in 
non-violent ways.  However, when a person does not have the appropriate negotiation 
skills, s/he is more likely to act violently.  Further, crimes against property are more 
likely to be seen as being of little consequence.  According to this speaker, juveniles 
who have been institutionalised for long periods are, as a consequence, often unable 
to regulate their behaviour, are more likely to become involved in criminal behaviour 
and thus to be re-institutionalised.  Becoming institutionalised. Becoming criminal. 
Eades was critical of detention centres as a way of dealing with young 
offenders because, in his experience, there were only limited, unsatisfactory education 
opportunities offered.  He received no skills training that would assist him in gaining 
employment; there were no recreational courses, such as art or writing, that might 
increase self-esteem and, no anger management programmes.  The lack of new skills 
 
198 
or contacts meant that he had no new choices when he was released from the detention 
centre.  Like many other repeat offenders, Eades returned to his old peer group and 
past behavioural patterns armed with an increased knowledge of how to commit 
crimes.  Knowledge of, strategies for stealing cars and breaking and entering is 
circulated among inmates and is cultural capital within that context. 
Peer groups provide familiarity in similar ways to institutional life.  When the 
majority within the group are offenders, criminal activity might well be part of the 
code of conduct.  As Robin Eades pointed out, certain unlawful behaviours, stealing 
cars for instance, are ways of demonstrating adulthood, group allegiance, position 
within the group or, “rites of passage.”16  Whatever the reason for these actions, its 
importance to some youth as both a way of belonging and a model of behaviour cannot 
be ignored if effective change is to occur.  According to Eades, other support 
mechanisms for young offenders need to be put in place.  Support and rehabilitation 
should be a function of detention centres. 
Importantly any effective consideration of Aboriginal youth and crime must 
take account of racism and social ostracising as contributing factors.  Institutionsalised 
racism, both at the level of bureaucracy and everyday life, exemplified by the 1905 
Act and other State legislation, has resulted in Aboriginal people being oppressed both 
physically and spiritually.  Inadequate health, housing, education, employment 
opportunities and poor Aboriginal/police relationships are often directly attributable 
to bureaucratic racism.17  This fuels the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘oppressor’ 
and ‘oppressed’, and the resulting sense of injustice is at times manifested in various 
forms of violence. 
It would be naive and counter-productive to deny that there are crimes and 
violence enacted by some Aboriginal youth and that these actions do lead to members 
of the public being afraid.  What also occurs, however, is an ‘incitement to fear’ fuelled 
by emotive media coverage that stereotypes Aboriginal youth as ‘violent gangs’.18  
This in turn encourages people to automatically treat these youth negatively, thus 
fostering defensive responses.    What needs to be understood is that young Aboriginal 
                                                          
16 Beresford and Omaji, 1996, p. 15. 
17 See Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and the Social Justice Report for specific 
discussion of this. 
18 Stephen Mickler, The Myth of Privilege, Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1998, p. 18. 
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people like Eades are constantly placed in the position of defending themselves from 
this discriminatory behaviour. 
Just one example from my own experience demonstrates this.  In October 
1996 I took a suburban train from the Perth railway station.  Though it was 
approximately four o’clock and the train was relatively full; I had a seat to myself.  At 
Oats Street station three Aboriginal girls, approximately fourteen to fifteen years of 
age boarded the train.  Two of the girls sat on the seat with me.  The inspector who 
had entered the carriage addressed the girls, saying that one of them was to get off the 
seat as they were “squashing the lady against the window.”  My own response was 
indignation at the conductor for needlessly setting up an antagonistic situation.  Within 
seconds it escalated.  The conductor reached out towards one of the girls, tried to take 
the bag she was carrying from her hand, while at the same time demanding to see what 
was in it. 
The young girl responded by pushing back at the conductor, pulling her bag 
sharply towards herself and moving to the door.  In the meantime, the woman sitting 
in the seat in front of me stood up and tried to hold one of the other girls.  At the next 
station all three girls managed to get off the train.  The conductor ran towards the front 
of the train, and later we learnt that she had rung the police to have them find the girls.  
When asked by the conductor if I could make a statement I responded by wanting to 
know what the girls had done.  This also upset the conductor.  At no point was there 
any dialogue.  It may well be that the conductor has had difficult incidents with young 
Aboriginal people on the trains before and thus acted defensively.  However, it is not 
appropriate or productive to respond to every Aboriginal youth in a predetermined 
way, as if ‘on cue’. 
As few Aboriginal people have direct ways of dealing with the source of 
injustices and socio-economic difficulties with which they must contend, inappropriate 
responses often occur.  Violence, inflicted upon family and community members, is 
one such response.  This violence, directed at others equally oppressed, is a 
manifestation of frustration, the lack of accessible avenues for change and, lack of self-
empowerment.  It escalates the problems rather than contributing to remedies.  Given 
the circumstances that many Aboriginal parents are in they are generally not able to 
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provide their children with the strategies needed to deal with racism, fear or 
inappropriate actions on the part of others. 
As Eades pointed out, young Aboriginal people are confronted by racism in 
many situations and have few strategies for dealing with it.  If they are faced with 
racism in school, which is usually the first institution that they have to deal with on an 
everyday basis they are very likely to leave at an early age and so lessen their 
opportunities to gain or increase skills.  In this way the cycle is perpetuated.  When 
confronted by racism young people react in ways that are available to them.  If they 
have learnt that violence, verbal or physical, is a way of dealing with problems then 
this is how they are most likely to respond.  Consequently, they will often initiate and 
react to situations aggressively.  Further, they may assume before any exchange has 
occurred, that they will be dealing with racism and thus be defensive or aggressive.  
Beresford and Omaji, in considering the reactions of Aboriginal youth to oppression 
and racism, suggest that the result is often, “a relationship to this society...laced with 
hostility...and often exhibited in retaliatory crimes.”19 
Social ostracism can also be the impetus for juvenile crime.  Magistrate Sue 
Gordon discussed this in some detail at Murdoch University in October 1994.20  There 
had, at that time, been a number of incidents in which people were robbed of brand-
name articles of clothing, particularly shoes (for example Reebok, Nike, etc.).  Several 
of these robberies had occurred on suburban railway stations and involved Aboriginal 
juveniles.  Magistrate Gordon, while certainly not condoning robbery, gave an 
explanation of why it may be committed.  She explained that many young Aboriginal 
people feel ostracised from mainstream society, they have little education, few job 
opportunities, low self esteem and see no future possibilities.  It is consequently very 
important for them to belong to a peer group.  To be well placed in a group they need 
cultural capital.  In the 1990’s cultural capital for urban teenagers includes name brand 
products such as Nike, Doc Marten, Billabong and Quiksilver. 
Gordon went on to explain that these juveniles are themselves the victims of 
rampant capitalism as well as poverty and social disadvantage.  Companies such as 
Nike have succeeded in convincing people that they need their products.  As Gordon 
                                                          
19 Beresford and Omaji, 1996, p. 17. 
20 Sue Gordon, Lecture for “Introduction to Aboriginal Studies” Murdoch University, October 1994. 
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explained, the tragedy is that people no longer just desire these products they do need 
them.  They are status symbols and commodities of exchange among people who feel 
bereft of other cultural capital and who have no means to buy it.  Robin Eades reiterated 
that this situation is common for many Aboriginal youth living in Perth. 
The stealing of cars and high speed chases were also discussed by Eades.  As 
with brand-name goods, many of the juveniles who stole cars did not have access to a 
family car and could not see themselves owning one.  Stealing a car and joy riding were 
often linked to group status and moreover most juveniles understood car stealing and 
high-speed chases as victimless crimes as no bodily harm was intended.  Although 
hostility and retaliatory crime cannot be condoned, it is necessary to understand why it 
occurs if effective strategies for preventing this are to be found.  As Magistrate Gordon 
made explicit, this does not justify robbery, it merely contextualises the motivation. 
Finally, Robin Eades spoke about his plans for the future.  At fifteen he had 
a relationship with a young girl.  She became pregnant and had a baby but Eades has 
had no further contact with the mother or child.  He expressed his pain at this and made 
it clear that if he had more control over his life he would not have lost contact with his 
baby.  Robin was very clear that he saw his own life as part of a cycle that he had 
inherited from his parents and which had its history in past government policies that 
had debilitated Aboriginal families and he wanted to change the cycle.  He was 
determined to look after and have a relationship with both his new girlfriend and the 
baby they were expecting.  When he was released from custody Robin planned to move 
to a country town where he felt it would be easier to get a job and he would be less 
likely to re-offend. 
Robin was released from custody the following Wednesday.  Just three days 
later he was arrested for being in a stolen car involved in a high speed chase.  This was 
of course predictable according to Robin.  No amount of good intentions would enable 
him to start anew.  He knew the problems he faced – he was able to articulate them 
when given the opportunity – but he had no strategies for re-entering society and 
negotiating a new position in relation to his peers. 
Robin Eades’ experiences bear out the Royal Commission’s findings about 
Aboriginal youth crime and recidivism.  The commission concludes that the reasons 
for offending include: 
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... the nature of the criminal justice system which defines criminality, 
socioeconomic disadvantage, the role of the family and home life, cultural 
factors, the experience of racism, the role of alcohol, boredom, the more 
general experience of growing up and the role of peer group pressure.21 
During the final forum of the seminar, several magistrates expressed their 
appreciation at having the opportunity to hear Robin Eades speak.  One magistrate 
found the session particularly thought-provoking and explained that although he had 
heard similar information within the court he had not appreciated its significance.  His 
response was to assert that he should have young people such as Eades to his home as 
a way of building relationships and dialogues that would facilitate his dealing with 
them in the court.  While this response may appear naive or paternalistic to some, it 
was humbling and reassuring. Robin Eades’ account of his life and current 
circumstances had been listened to and appreciated.  It provided a potential for change. 
As well as having a profound effect on a number of people, hearing Robin 
Eades speak clearly exposed the function of place, particularly the courtroom and 
official procedures as inhibitors of dialogue and consequently of understanding 
between people.  Hearing the ‘evidence’ of people’s lives outside of a courtroom was 
instrumental to changing magistrates’ engagement with it. So that while much 
information provided by speakers was similar to that heard within the court, as 
exemplified by the comment, “we’ve heard it before”, from some magistrates in the 
pre-seminar interviews the responses to it in the seminar were obviously different to 
those in the court.  This is understandable when one considers that within the court the 
magistrate listens for information, makes sure procedure is correct and is concerned 
with administering the law.  The marked difference in roles between being a magistrate 
in a courtroom and a participant in a seminar results in quite different ways of listening 
and reasons for doing so. It is therefore not surprising that some magistrates responded 
as they did to Robin Eades, the Richard Franklin video and other speakers. 
7.5 State reterritorialisations 
While the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody has created a greater 
community awareness and some discussion of the issues surrounding the 
imprisonment and deaths of Aboriginal people in custody, it has done little to effect 
                                                          
21 Commissioner Johnston, 1991, p. 275. 
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real official change, that is to initiate the necessary political, social and economic 
equity that Commissioner Johnson recommended.  This is not surprising given that the 
Commission is itself a product of the very colonial, modernist structures such as the 
Australian legal system that it is critiquing.  As such both the Royal Commission Into 
Aboriginal Deaths In Custody and the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and Change” seminar 
share similarities with postcolonialism and anticolonial critique. 
The relationship between the Western legal system and the Royal 
Commission is ambiguous and complex.  While the Royal Commission is censorious 
of the legal system for its inappropriate treatment of Aboriginal people, it also seeks 
solutions in the very system it is critiquing.  One ‘solution’, to implement the cross-
cultural seminar, although a necessary and productive measure, is inadequate when 
this is all that is done.  As an analysis of various aspects of this seminar demonstrate, 
its power as a catalyst for change was undermined by the state government and 
specifically the Attorney General’s Office, responsible for aspects of the functioning 
of the legal system, which refused to implement initiatives, such as culturally 
appropriate anger management courses generated by the seminar. 
Both the Royal Commission and the seminar provided legitimate public 
spaces for the telling of personal narratives, primarily by Aboriginal people but with 
some opportunities for magistrates to tell their own stories.  Equally as importantly, it 
gave Commissioners and magistrates the opportunity to listen to these life experiences 
and respond to them differently than they might do within the courtroom, though of 
course there were magistrates who did not respond differently. 
What is not in doubt is that the Western legal system does not meet the needs 
of Aboriginal communities, as is clearly demonstrated by the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody report.  McRae et al in Aboriginal Legal Issues goes so 
far as to claim that: 
Far from providing Aboriginal Australians with a just and respected means 
of social control and protection, appropriate to their needs, the Australian 
criminal justice system remains an alien and discriminatory instrument of 
oppression, through which Aborigines are harassed, subjected to unfair 
legal procedures, needlessly jailed, and all too often die whilst in legal 
custody.  This may sound like an exaggeration, yet the crime statistics and 
the figures relating to Aboriginal deaths in custody provide a tragic 
indictment of our criminal justice system.  Aborigines are between ten and 
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twenty times more likely to die in custody.  How is it possible that this 
situation is sustained, despite the fact that crime statistics have been widely 
known and deplored for many years?22 
McRae’s indictment of the Australian criminal justice system, made in 1991, 
is still pertinent today.  There is still a disproportionately high number of Aboriginal 
people represented in the justice system.  The potential for deterritorialisation 
promised by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody has not 
eventuated.  The State reterritorialises upon each deterritorialisation.  But Indigenous 
people too reterritorialise. 
 
                                                          
22 Heather McRae, Garth Nettheim, Laura Beacroft, Aboriginal Legal Issues, North Ryde: The Law 
Book Co., 1991, p. 238. 
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Conclusion: Mixing Them Up 
“We can't go back.  The old law was for the old problems.  Now we got 
this new law – this whiteman's way.  And we got these new problems.  This 
law doesn't fix them either.  It's no good.  What we got to do is put them 
together – the old and the new.  Mix them up.  And they'll be hard and 
strong like cement.”  (Harry Daphney Kowanyama)1 
 “We can’t go back.”  Now it is a matter of how we go forward. What trajectories we 
follow.  We can continually trace the same journey and maintain the histories of 
exclusion that Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships in Australia have been 
founded on.  Or, we can follow new trajectories.   Map potentialities.  New “lines of 
flight.” I argue that the possibility for meaningful change is embodied in speaking and 
listening to the stories of others.  “Narrative is [after all] not just an academic subject.  
There is a basic human drive to hear and tell stories.”2  We are the stories that we tell 
about ourselves. 
In this thesis, I have argued for the need to tell and listen to personal stories and 
for the recognition of the inter-relationship between these personal stories and official 
narratives.  I have demonstrated that the effects of personal and official narratives are 
not confined either to the private or the public sphere.  Rather, there are “rules of 
discursive formation” which act to restrict what can be said, particularly in the official 
domain.  This restriction is I suggest, detrimental to facilitating meaningful relationships 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people and should therefore be subverted. 
Barry Morris and Gillian Cowlishaw describe Race Matters, a collection of 
essays concerned with racism and the denial of rights to Aboriginal people as “an 
enquiry rather than a lesson.”3 This thesis too is an enquiry.  Throughout it I have 
argued for the necessity of telling and listening to personal stories, as a way of 
negotiating productive relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people 
in Australia.  For negotiations to be successful I have suggested that there must be a 
                                                          
1 Judy Atkinson, “Violence Against Aboriginal Women: Reconstitution of Community law-the Way 
Forward”, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 46 October 1990, p. 6. 
2 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 84. 
3 Barry Morris and Gillian Cowlishaw (eds), “Cultural Racism” in Race Matters: Indigenous 
Australians and ‘our’ society, Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1997, p. 2. 
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recognition that each group of people and situation is unique.  Hence, there must 
always be “an enquiry”.  An asking. A wanting to know who you are.  A willingness 
to listen to and act upon the response. And, to tell you who I am. 
The importance of telling and listening to personal narratives has been 
demonstrated here, through a discursive account of the actuation of theory and praxis, 
particularly a postcolonial or anticolonial critique of law, legislation and anthropology.  
This is not to suggest that any one critical practice or the telling and listening to, of 
personal stories can always facilitate meaningful relationships. Each situation requires 
a willingness to accept that there are “no finite truths and fail-proof answers.”4  Rather, 
there are potentialities.  This is not to infer that there are endless possibilities or 
meanings but rather that there are always, as many ways to achieve this synergy as 
there are people involved. 
It is changes to grand narratives, the knowledges they validate and the 
inclusions and exclusions that they perform, that must be achieved.  Change is slow.  
It is ambivalent.  And it very often affords little respect to the marginalised and 
disempowered people who most need change. But, grand narratives can and do 
transform. Noel Pearson in writing about the Mabo decision describes one specific 
moment of change while in the same moment recognises its back-handedness: 
[t]he significance of the decision is that it recognises Aboriginal law and 
custom as a source of law for the first time in 204 years of colonial 
settlement.  For the great part however Aboriginal law remains 
unrecognised.  Nevertheless, the breadth of the context of this recognition 
sets the stage for an interaction, which has never before been possible.  
Colonial law has been a reality in Australia since 1788.  Aboriginal law 
has always been a reality and we are unanimous in our resolve that it 
continue to be so.  Colonial law is part of our Indigenous reality here in 
Australia; it determines and controls our ability to exercise our law, enjoy 
our rights, maintain our identities.5 
Pearson’s critique of the recognition of customary law afforded to Aboriginal 
peoples through the High Court’s Mabo decision highlights the States’ ability to 
reterritorialise on each deterritorialisation.  Australian “colonial” law determines the 
                                                          
4 Luke and Gore, 1992, p. 7. 
5 Noel Pearson, “Mabo: towards respecting equality and difference” in Race Matters: Indigenous 
Australians and ‘our’ society, Barry Morris and Gillian Cowlishaw eds, Canberra: Aboriginal Studies 
Press, 1997, p. 217. 
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exercise of customary law, the enjoyment of Indigenous peoples’ rights and it 
maintains their identities. 
According to Noel Pearson Indigenous people must, in the face of each State 
reterritorialisation thus follow a new trajectory.  They too must deterritorialise.  He writes: 
Now that the non-Aboriginal legal system has offered something in the 
way of rights, however narrow, to refuse to engage in the game – no longer 
seems smart.  The challenge is to negotiate the expansion of those rights 
without losing ground and without surrendering the chance of future 
progress in a struggle which has seen incremental advances but whose 
resolution is still long in arriving.6 
While public spaces or forums such as the “Aboriginal Culture: Law and 
Change” seminar discussed in Chapters Six and Seven however, provide the opportunity 
for people “to name and give voice to their experience” it must always be remembered 
that there are many impediments to people telling their stories.  As is revealed in the 
analysis of the magistrates’ seminar, differences in social power as a result of differences 
in class, gender, and race all influence what is said and how it is received.  Most 
importantly equal opportunities to a public forum without “the conditions for equal 
participation” effectively deny people the opportunity to speak and therefore “denies 
them equal access to the power (and rewards) with which to articulate and legislate 
change in their diverse interests.”7  There needs be a becoming empathetic. 
On the 24th November 1998 Justice Lee determined that: 
Native title in the “determination area” is held by the Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong people, and in respect of that part of the “determination area” 
known as Boorroonoong (Lacrosse Island), native title is also held by the 
Balangarra Peoples, both parties being described hereafter as the common 
law holders of native title.8 
Also on the 24th November 1998 a young woman from the village in Roebourne 
passed away as a direct result of the tragic circumstances in which people must live.  The 
following day a friend and I spoke with her aunt about both the young woman and the 
Miriuwung and Gajerrong peoples’ native title.  She was happy for the Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong peoples’ win.  She hoped it would help the people in Roebourne. 
                                                          
6 Pearson, 1997, p. 219. 
7 Luke, 1992, p. 36. 
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